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THE FIGGIE REPORT PART IV:

REDUCING CRIME IN AMERICA SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY EFFORTS



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PREFACE

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This study, Reducing Crime in America: Successful Community Efforts, culminates a series of reports on fear of crime in the United States. Part I, America Afraid, issued in 1980, reported on how fear of crime was affecting American lifestyles. It revealed the prevalence of both concrete and formless fear, along with various precautions being taken by millions of Americans in their everyday lives. Part II, The Corporate Response to Fear of Crime, published in 1981, focused on the crime concerns of FORTUNE 1000 company senior executives. It reported how these anxieties affected their businesses and personal lives. Part III, A Fourteen-City Profile, issued in 1982, explored fear of crime from the point of view of community leaders in major urban centers across the country.

The first three reports prompted nationwide media attention, as well as thousands of calls and letters commenting on the studies and requesting copies. Information culled from the reports was disseminated widely in the print and electronic media, was commended by a variety of diverse sources including The New York Times and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and formed the basis of a hardcover trade book recently published by the New American Library. Despite the gratifying results, one question remained. We had documented the problem, but what about promising strategies for dealing with the problem? What steps can be taken to stem the rising tide of crime that for so many communities seems insurmountable?

This fourth volume in the series, The Figgie Report: Reducing Crime in America, is an attempt to address this question by exploring some of the most promising trends in crime control today, which were identified by a nationwide survey of leading observers of the criminal justice system, crime prevention practitioners, and researchers. The solutions are illustrated through eight case studies as well as through additional information supplied about promising new programs. The findings of this study outline

strategies of crime control currently enjoying positive results and widespread public and professional confidence.

The Figgie Report, Part IV clearly demonstrates that the problem of crime in America is by no means hopeless. For every horrible crime story, there exists a much less publicized story of citizens working among themselves and with police departments and other government officials to successfully combat crime in their local communities. This report does not pretend to offer a "solution" to the crime problem. The experiences of state and local governments make it clear that crime cannot be eliminated. There is, however, no question that community efforts have made a significant impact on crime in communities across the country.

I hope that the experiences examined in this report will prove useful to those around the nation struggling with this problem.

OVERVIEW

THE FIGGIE REPORT

Parts I through III of The Figgie Report explored the question of how fear of crime was destroying the fabric of American society. Part IV: Reducing Crime in America -- Successful Community Efforts, examines regional answers to that question.

- During the past twenty years, crime control specialists have mainly fallen into two ideological camps: those who believe primarily in the deterrence approach to crime control and those who believe primarily in the social justice path.

  * The Deterrence Approach

The deterrence perspective on crime control focuses on the individual criminal and on making the consequences of crime sufficiently undesirable so as to discourage the potential lawbreaker, either through persuasion or force. However, the nature and degree of punishments required to be effective often remain contested issues.

Americans think about police and prisons within the parameters of deterrence. This belief in deterrence was behind the "War on Crime" of the 1960s and 1970s -- if society is tougher on the criminal (increased deterrence) and if police are more effective (greater guarantee of deterrence efficiency), there will be less crime.

  * The Social Justice Approach

Improving the society in which crime occurs is the primary concern of the social justice outlook. This perspective emphasizes physical, social, economic, and cultural factors which, it is argued, cause crime. Social psychological studies of both criminal and victim behavior can be included here. The underlying supposition of this perspective is that a "better society" can be achieved by a more equitable distribution of resources, and that a better society would eliminate the causes which precipitate crime.

Grass-roots community action groups have nearly always approached crime from this perspective. And the 1960s "War on Poverty" provided the social justice counterpart to the "War on Crime." Whether such a supposition is wholly supportable, however, is an open question. Like the deterrence theory, the social justice theory has its flaws.

AN EMERGING CONSENSUS -- WHAT WORKS TO REDUCE CRIME

For Part IV of The Figgie Report, about 100 criminal justice experts were interviewed to determine if there was, in fact, any consensus on local or regional programs that actually worked in reducing crime.

Among the crime experts we talked to are police officers and officials, senior administrators in public safety departments, officials in state departments of justice, university and private foundation researchers, state legislators, and researchers with the national Department of Justice and with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. (See Methodology for a more detailed description of the procedures.)

The first finding of this survey is that the skepticism expressed by many people, that "nothing works to reduce crime," is either a superficial and temporary response of frustration, or that it is the view of a vocal minority that has nevertheless received significant media attention.

The second finding is that there is a strong, growing, nationwide confidence and optimism regarding certain crime control strategies, among them the activities covered by the general term "crime prevention." We also detected a renewed belief in citizen self-reliance in avoiding crime and strong support for improving administrative and community cooperation with the police. Furthermore, we uncovered a growing consensus that victims have rights and require more assistance than they currently receive.

The most frequently mentioned technique cited by the experts as being effective in controlling and preventing personal property crime was "opportunity reduction." Measures included upgrading home security, the identification of personal property with driver's license or other numbers, and architectural or environmental designs created with a concern for limiting criminal access.

The second most frequently mentioned strategy for lowering crime was

community group activities which supplement local law enforcement agencies' surveillance. In this category, the Neighborhood Watch and its variations, such as Apartment Watch, Business Watch, Vertical Watch (for high-rise buildings), and Rural Crime Watch, were most often cited. Also frequently mentioned were Citizen CB or Walking Patrols.

The third principal activity stressed was the varied counseling and education projects designed to help citizens avert personal assault -- programs such as those aimed at senior citizens and others at high risk.

The fourth approach to crime reduction raised with greatest frequency was public information programs, including youth education and regional and national advertising campaigns.

And finally, the fifth most often cited activity was the development of more effective response techniques by local police departments to crimes that occur. This category includes mentions of police patrols, administration and various corrections programs.

During our interviews, we were initially disconcerted to find that relatively few of the more traditional law enforcement and corrections procedures were mentioned as being effective in resisting/controlling/preventing/avoiding crime, even among the police and corrections officials themselves. We addressed this concern and learned that their confidence had shifted to ways in which to reduce crime opportunities and away from response measures toward crimes already committed.

Yet this widespread support for crime prevention activities does not indicate a lack of support for law enforcement officials. On the contrary, all of the most frequently mentioned actions included an integral role for members of the police force, usually as community leaders and facilitators of the crime reduction programs.

The response to our survey clearly shows that these experts felt the most essential part the police can play in cutting crime begins before, not after, a crime takes place.

This crime prevention trend seems to have united the deterrence approach and social justice camps by pulling effective principles from each: increasing the threat of apprehension and target hardening from the

deterrence school: improved intracommunity communication and police-community cooperation from the social justice school.

One further observation should be made from the survey of criminal justice experts and that is that crime incidents fall into two categories -- those that cannot be prevented and those that can. For example, statistics show most murders are committed by individuals who know their victims, often friends or family members. There is little that can be done here to avert violence. Our study is concerned only with such crimes that are generally recognized as being preventable -- crimes between strangers related to assault, robbery, burglary, arson, vandalism, and drug abuse.

Preventable crime, however, constitutes the majority of all crimes committed. According to FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics, 90% of all reported crimes in 1981 was property crime, and of these the vast majority are crimes of opportunity. A nationwide effort at fighting preventable crime, therefore, has the potential for enormous impact on reducing the national crime rate and increasing individual safety in America.

THE CRIME PREVENTION MOVEMENT

Most of the case studies of this report deal, at least in part, with crime prevention programs. The concept of crime prevention is usually comprised of three elements:

* Target Hardening -- The physical strengthening and securing of property to make burglary, theft, and vandalism much more difficult to accomplish.

* Victimization Avoidance -- The changing of citizens' personal behavior to make them less likely to be victimized and to reduce the probability of serious injury if accosted.

* Community Cooperation -- The organization of local groups of residents, business people or employees to monitor or patrol an area, looking for suspicious behavior or persons and also to report such observations in a useful form promptly to the police.

CASE STUDIES

The case studies presented in this report illustrate the consensus of findings about the kinds of programs singled out by the criminal justice experts as being most effective in curtailing crime.

All of the prototype case study sites were selected as a result of recommendations made during the interviews. None of the suggestions could be a respondent's own work or program. We do not imply that our examples personify the only anti-crime success stories in the field. We realize, for instance, that in choosing to profile only one major city's crime prevention only anti-crime success stories in the field. We realize, for instance, that in choosing to profile only one major city's crime prevention project, we have undoubtedly overlooked admirable efforts in other urban centers. Our choices, therefore, are meant only to demonstrate the kinds of nationwide activities the experts commended.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH IN AN URBAN AREA

Detroit has drawn some of the greatest national attention in recent years with its community-based action groups. Under the guidance of the Detroit Police Department, the city has built a successful crime prevention program based on the Neighborhood Watch mode. The results the action groups achieved show the positive impact on crime that is possible when there is strong mutual cooperation between the police and the community. Their experience also proves that not even severe social and economic urban problems need present an insuperable obstacle to reducing crime.

Unlike many American municipalities, Detroit makes crime prevention an integral part of its budget priorities rather than an addendum. With the development of the Detroit Police Department's Crime Prevention Section, the city found one of its best vehicles for preventing crime. Following the Police Chief's and Mayor's belief that police services should be decentralized, the majority of the crime prevention officers are placed out in the community, and the 108 officers manning the fifty police mini-stations throughout the city are trained crime prevention practitioners. Crime prevention efforts stemming out of the local precincts and mini-stations are basically aimed at making crime harder to commit by assisting

the law-abiding citizen to not be victimized and improving the efficiency of the law enforcement system.

The centerpiece of Detroit's crime prevention effort is the Neighborhood Watch Program. It entails four major components: Self-Protection, Burglary Protection, Operation Identification, and Crime Reporting. About one-third of Detroit's 12,000 city blocks have been formally organized into Neighborhood Watch groups.

In order actually to prove or disprove the idea that a comprehensive crime prevention program involving both the police and citizens would reduce crime, the Crime Prevention Section selected two neighborhoods with similar characteristics about four miles apart: a target or experimental neighborhood and a control neighborhood. The project entailed the establishment of an extensive crime prevention program in the experimental neighborhood and no police department-initiated crime prevention effort in the control neighborhood. With the exception of the crime prevention attempts, police services to the two neighborhoods were the same. Reported crime statistics for the experimental neighborhood show an overall 58% reduction of crime that is not matched by the statistics for the control neighborhood. The results of a departmental survey of the Neighborhood Watch residents before and after the crime prevention program indicate that fear of crime was also significantly reduced.

SANGAMON COUNTY AND SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS
NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH IN SMALL COMMUNITIES

The Sangamon County Sheriff's Office and the Springfield Police Department have established noted crime prevention programs based on the Neighborhood Watch model in a variety of small cities, towns and rural areas. The results from these projects show that successful Neighborhood Watch activities are not dependent on high density of urban settings. Jerome, Illinois, a township of about 1,700 people, illustrates the report's smallest success story. With the support of the Jerome police chief, the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau and the local women's club, Neighborhood Watch groups were organized. Each of the 610 homes in Jerome was visited by police officers to discuss safety precautions and to encourage participation in the Neighborhood Watch groups.

Now over 85% of the town's residents have directly received crime prevention instruction and are active Neighborhood Watch participants. The results have been fewer burglaries and a much higher clearance rate on those burglaries committed. In addition, in order to keep participants active and the programs current, the secretary of the town water department informs the police department when new residents move in so that they can be contacted by a community representative.

The crime prevention efforts in Jerome are fairly typical of how small communities have been able to reduce crimes of opportunity. One fairly unique factor about the Jerome story, however, is the support and advice provided the community by the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau. The two independent crime prevention programs of the sheriff's office and of the Springfield police department were mentioned more frequently by the crime control experts than any other effort serving small cities, towns and rural areas.

For its size, the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office shows a particularly strong commitment to crime prevention activities. Most of the seventy-two officers in the department have had crime prevention training. The Crime Prevention Bureau has operated over forty programs in nine categories. But most efforts have been concentrated on offenses like robbery and burglary, which are likely to be curtailed by standard crime prevention activities -- civilian surveillance, personal security measures, and citizen-police cooperation. In fact, Sangamon County alone has formed 253 Neighborhood Watch organizations, many achieving 85% overall crime reduction rates. But the most convincing argument indicating the success of these activities is shown in the country-wide crime statistics for Sangamon and adjacent areas with similar demographic features. Between 1978-80, Sangamon was the only county to report a decline in both the number of burglaries and robberies.

Sangamon is also active in rural crime prevention, which differs only in incidentals from the residential approach. Here, too, the reported crime statistics indicate the success of the county's activities, as the Sangamon crime rates for burglary and robbery have declined in recent years while the statewide rural area rates have either climbed or declined much more slowly.statistics indicate the success of the county's activities, as the Sangamon crime rates for burglary and robbery have declined in recent years

while the statewide rural area rates have either climbed or declined much more slowly.

* Springfield

Springfield is located in the center of Sangamon County. It is the county seat and state capital. At a time when the crime rate in Illinois urban areas has generally risen, Springfield has reduced its incidence by 13% from 1978 to 1981.

Like the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office, the Springfield Police Department gives much credit for crime decreases to its own crime prevention activities. It is interesting to see that of the eleven items listed in the Springfield Police policy statement, ten specifically focus on service and assistance to local citizenry and not on criminals.

The city of Springfield has organized 330 individual Neighborhood Watch programs since 1978, with over 25,000 participants (about one-quarter of the local population) trained in improved physical security and crime reporting. Residential and commercial burglaries have declined each year since the program's initiation. Despite severe budgetary cutbacks, Springfield's crime prevention programs have continued to thrive, largely because crime prevention efforts can be implemented economically, capitalizing on extensive citizen participation to keep costs down.

These examples of successful crime reduction in Sangamon County and Springfield show that professional resourcefulness of law enforcement agencies combined with the active support of the citizenry make the difference in resisting crimes of opportunity.

JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

IMPROVED POLICE SERVICES

Despite national and local budget constraints and growing crime rates, Jacksonville has managed to improve the effectiveness of its law enforcement services while reducing costs to the community. It has also instituted a wide range of joint police-civilian activities aimed at crime prevention which are both economical and supportive of better police-community relations.

The ability of the sheriff's office to provide exceptionally cost-effective service in Jacksonville, the largest city in Florida, is made possible by a unique consolidated government structure which allows for centralized law enforcement operations. In addition, this system is complemented by a stable political, economic and demographic infrastructure. This centralized legal framework, along with administrative cooperation, allowed Jacksonville to make changes in law enforcement procedures which most likely would have encountered stiff resistance in other municipalities. Some of these included new police priorities management systems, and revised patrol investigation techniques.

One of the strides the Jacksonville sheriff's office made in improving police services includes the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP), which is a personnel and information management system focused primarily on the patrol function of a law enforcement agency. ICAP's goal is to manage police personnel more efficiently and economically. But this aim can sometimes conflict with traditional ideas concerning the role of police services and criminal investigations. Citizen expectations of the police response time and personal attention to a call for service is such an example.

A former director of the National ICAP program asserts that only 15% of the calls received by the police require immediate personal attention. In the overwhelming number of cases, it is not how fast you get to the scene of a crime but what you do when you get there that matters in criminal investigation and apprehension. Having patrol officers conduct their own investigation and follow-up, for instance, contributes to an effective economy of labor.

From the ICAP perspective, information is the keystone of crime control. So the first step that Jacksonville's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program took was to establish a comprehensive crime analysis unit to develop appropriate information about crime patterns in Jacksonville. After this, the department instituted directed patrols intensifying manpower when it was most needed. It also implemented a new management system to handle service calls so that patrols could respond to pre-screened reports in accordance with their seriousness.

The second phase of Jacksonville's ICAP expanded patrol inquiry

procedures introduced special training for officers and added citizen volunteers to the crime analysis unit. The third phase originated specific target programs such as anti-arson plans, victim/witness assistance and career criminal tracking.

Results from these changes in law enforcement procedures were that while calls for service increased 15%, the department realized a 20.1% per unit cost reduction in handling the calls. In addition, the directed patrol efforts produced a 68% increase in the average monthly arrest rate of perpetrators of crimes in progress. At the same time, the cost of police services declined 9% on a per capita basis for Jacksonville citizens, and the per unit cost of these increased arrests was reduced 27.4%. Moreover, Jacksonville recorded the lowest crime rate among Florida's eight largest cities while maintaining the third largest officer-to-population ratio.

This Jacksonville success story is largely dependent on the cooperation of the city's local residents, whose combined volunteer efforts in support of their law enforcement officers totaled approximately one million man-hours in 1981.

DENVER, COLORADO

AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS

The most difficult crime control problem is that of juvenile repeat offenders. The story of New Pride, Inc., in Denver investigates how one program can change juveniles' lives and their relationship with the local community. New Pride was the only corrections-type program cited in the survey of experts as being successful in its aim of juvenile crime control and, although it is somewhat controversial, the project has drawn much national attention and has been replicated in ten other cities across the country.

New Pride is a community-based corrections program which means it does not incarcerate offenders but works with them in their home environment. The project has three goals: to change the behavior of offenders without imprisonment, to protect the community, and to involve the community in the treatment and reintegration of these youths into society.

The program was conceived as a court alternative to a prison sentence

for convicted juveniles. Its special emphasis is on academic education, including remedial training for those with learning disabilities, counseling, cultural education, and employment guidance. New Pride participants are assigned by a judge to the program as a last resort before incarceration. They have to agree to comply with the project rules and be accepted by the program's administrators as prospects for rehabilitation.

During the first six months, the participants and their parents undergo intensive counseling sessions and tutors work with the youths to improve their academic standing.

During the second six months, the program focuses on reintroducing participants back into their community. Special attention is given to learning job skills and the youths are helped to find part-time employment. New Pride pays the juveniles' salaries during the first two months on the job. In addition, a cultural education element in the program assists the youths in developing social skills and self-confidence. Therefore, New Pride offers an holistic approach to treating its participants, starting from their home life to their education to job training and building overall self-confidence.

Although about half of the New Pride youths have been rearrested, this compares to a 78% rearrest rate among local juveniles not in the program. In addition, only about one in five of those rearrests among New Pride participants are for felonies, and of those only about a third are actually charged.

Seventy percent (70%) of the New Pride juveniles were placed in jobs and the rearrest rate among employed participants was one-third that of unemployed participants. Critics point out, however, that the youths generally do not keep their jobs beyond the two month trial period. It is difficult to determine whether this is because of behavioral problems or the state of the economy. In any event, that New Pride position was probably the first employment experience that these youths have had.

The educational component of the program, however, has been considerably more successful. Forty percent (40%) of the New Pride participants returned to school after completion of the program at the time of the last survey.

New Pride's ten-year record in Denver and its expansion across the country reflect a consistent confidence and belief in the program's principles as well as its positive impact on local youth. Another measure of New Pride's success is the fact that it was chosen by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency to be replicated across the nation. Of the 522 juveniles admitted to the New Pride programs around the country in June 1981, 214, or 41%, had found jobs.

One final indication of the value of the New Pride program is that the annual cost of incarcerating a juvenile in Denver is approximately $12,000. The yearly cost of maintaining a Denver New Pride juvenile is about one-third that figure, between $4,000 and $5,000.

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

GRASS-ROOTS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Philadelphia provides an excellent example of how grass-roots community groups can take the initiative to do something about crime in their immediate area. Interestingly, in our survey of crime control experts the citizen action groups of Philadelphia were mentioned more frequently than those from any other city.

What distinguishes a grass-roots organization from other groups, like a neighborhood watch, is its willingness to act independently of municipal or other outside agencies and its tendency even to confront these governmental forces when authorities fail to support its goals. Two such grass-roots efforts are found in the Kensington area of Philadelphia. They also illustrate how organized local residents can have an impact on particularly intractable crime problems such as arson and drug trafficking.

The crime prevention programs established in Kensington have their roots in a long line of community action projects carried out in the city for more than a decade. The best known of these was the Citizen Local Alliance for a Safer Philadelphia (CLASP). The staff from CLASP aggressively went into crime-ridden neighborhoods and helped form groups around anti-crime activities. Eventually a CLASP association even became a real estate selling point, like a good neighborhood school. Though the functions of CLASP have been assumed by other community groups now, it

served as a model on how to unite individual residents in a common cause.

* Kensington Action Now -- Fighting Arson

Kensington Action Now (KAN) is a multi-issue neighborhood organization founded in 1975 which serves the northern section of Kensington. The area is a combination of commercial, industrial and residential land properties, with a population of about 80,000 living in 20,000 households. KAN is currently comprised of about forty member groups.

The problems faced by these northern Kensington residents are basically the result of a decline in manufacturing industries. As they waned, unemployment increased and vacancies rose. In 1982, KAN reported the area to have 800 empty homes, 100 available commercial buildings, and fifty vacant or partly vacant factories. The number of abandoned buildings brought along with it an alarming increase in the number of fires. Between January and July 1982, there were 115 fires in the area; a full 54% were deliberately set. The human, social, and economic costs of arson finally became intolerable to the Kensington community. In addition, KAN began to take some initial steps on residential property improvement through a related organization, the Kensington Area Revitalization Program (KARP).

KARP was founded in 1979 as a non-profit development corporation to revitalize existing residential properties in the neighborhood served by KAN. KARP was successful in stopping insurance redlining and was instrumental in bringing Kensington into a $15 million renovation project sponsored by the Aetna Insurance Company.

KAN decided it had to do something about the incidents of arson in order to further the KARP redevelopment program. KAN therefore initiated an effort with two overall objectives: to pressure city agencies responsible for preventing arson so as to upgrade their involvement in the KAN area, and to increase citizen awareness of arson risks and to get them to aggressively report potential targets to KAN and appropriate authorities.

In the spring of 1982, KAN created a Community Arson Awareness Program (CAAP) to educate residents as to how and when to report likely arson properties. KAN also has coordinated group meetings with city officials to communicate concerns about problem buildings or city services. Moreover, it monitors city responses to arson risks that have been identified. KAN

reached a milestone in its anti-arson program in September 1982 when it gained the support of the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, who publicly committed his office to KAN's objectives, encouraging insurance companies to reinvest within the community part of the premiums received from that sector.

KAN's next step was to get the city to organize a neighborhood task force to enlarge the arson investigation unit of the Fire Marshall's Office and expand police, fire and building inspection official efforts to identify potential arson risks. The task force also used the authority of the Department of Licensing and Inspections to clean and seal off or demolish fire-damaged buildings more promptly. Moreover, the neighborhood arson task force made the city directly responsible for preventing, not merely investigating, arson after it had occurred.

The example of KAN clearly shows the ability of grass-roots community organizations to impact on both local crime and the physical environment of their neighborhoods, compelling government agencies to be more responsive to their needs.

* The Kensington Joint Action Council

The Kensington Joint Action Council (KJAC) serves the southern part of Kensington, a neighborhood whose racially mixed populace had long been divided against itself. KJAC ia a coalition of about twenty-five church, neighborhood, and other group constituents as well as about 1,000 family members. KJAC has four primary areas of concern: housing, crime and safety, education, and employment. It has helped support the passage of local ordinances that facilitate the turning over of abandoned and severely tax-delinquent properties to the city, which are then made available to a Gift Property Program in a kind of urban homesteading project. KJAC was also instrumental in getting funds allocated from the state government for the construction of a new high school and in dealing with school-related problems. KJAC plays a major role in the fight against drug trafficking. It supplied extensive community support in lobbying for the funding of a Drug Strike Task Force to concentrate on the investigation and prosecution of mid-level dealers. Prior to this, the police department had traditionally focused on low-level users.

Organizations like Kensington Action Now and Kensington Joint Action Council have worked to fight crime in their immediate neighborhoods, but each has also found that these community anti-crime efforts have brought its people back together and provided considerable secondary benefits by improving the all-around quality of life.

STATE PROGRAMS

Our discussions with criminal justice experts repeatedly indicated that state governments also had an important role to play in supporting effective crime control efforts. Three states -- Pennsylvania, Texas and California -- were mentioned most frequently for their methods of assisting local municipalities and citizens to reduce crime.

* Pennsylvania

On a per capita basis, no other state has a greater number of successful crime prevention programs. Efforts deal with urban, suburban and rural problems. Since 1978, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, has been committed to assisting local law enforcement agencies to maintain effective crime prevention programs appropriate to local needs and resources. The commission uses a field network of technical assistants who bring training and information about techniques and effective administration of crime prevention programs directly to local police departments throughout the state.

The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency decided it could be most effective as a unifying force which set standards and taught crime prevention strategies to those responsible for the public welfare, such as crime prevention officers and municipal leaders. The commission currently sponsors three information and education programs which are at the heart of the crime prevention effort: an initial course for local crime prevention officers, an advanced course for the same officers, and a course for municipal government leaders. Since 1978, over 1,600 Pennsylvania law enforcement agencies have taken the Commission's basic crime prevention course. In addition, about 250 senior officers have taken the advanced course, and over 700 local government administrators have participated in the municipal officials seminar.

After mixed success from its experiences with federal crime prevention

funding, Pennsylvania now tries to get such monies built into local law enforcement agency budgets because outside funds dry up easily. This means that finances are always severely limited, and it forces police departments to turn to the community at large for substantial support. Ironically, that has contributed to the great success of the programs.

The Pennsylvania commission also coordinates a statewide elementary school program, Justice Education Teaching Strategies or JETS, to help children understand the importance of law, to know their individual rights, and to encourage responsible citizenship. Instituted in 1979, the JETS program was based on the experiences of the TIPS program, originated in the Charlottesville and Albemarle County, Virginia, school districts. The former was designed to teach youngsters Individual Protective Strategies and Individual Positive Solutions for coping with stressful or conflict situations.

The Pennsylvania approach has instituted efficient, economical, crime prevention strategies on a statewide basis. It has struck an effective balance among citizens, municipalities, law enforcement agencies, and administrators on the responsibilities and roles each should assume in the overall crime prevention effort.

* California

No state has done more in recent years to implement a broad range of comprehensive crime prevention measures. California has stressed hard-line approaches such as stricter sentencing and more police, while at the same time maintaining its reputation as one of the more progressive states when it comes to social and rehabilitation programs. Perhaps most significantly, California has led the way in emphasizing financial and psychological assistance to crime victims. It has even taken the revolutionary step of mandating compensation to victims by fining the convicted criminals.

In addition to the traditional Neighborhood Watch programs throughout the state, the California Crime Prevention Center, within the Office of the Attorney General, supplies local communities with a host of printed, audio-visual, and in-person assistance.

The California Office of Criminal Justice Planning provides through its Victim/Witness Assistance Program such landmark services as: crisis

intervention, including counseling; emergency assistance, including food, shelter and clothing as well as guidance in applying for victim compensation; explanation of the criminal justice system as it applies to that particular case as well as advice concerning community resources available; and the prompt return of property used as evidence.

Moreover, witnesses, who in many cases are also victims, are given an escort to court, notice of appearance time, case progress reports, and the final verdict disposition. Comprehensive witness assistance programs are presently in place in thirty-five of California's fifty-eight counties.

The most controversial of all recent crime prevention initiatives is California's Proposition 8, the Victims Bill of Rights, passed in June 1982. Its most sweeping changes involve not only victims' rights but the rights of criminals. Measures include: Public Safety Bail -- In setting bail, consideration must be given to the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense, and any previous criminal record; Use of Prior Convictions -- any prior felony conviction can be used without limitation in any criminal proceeding; Habitual Criminals -- a five-year sentence is to be added to the conviction of a career criminal previously convicted of a serious felony; Right to Truth in Evidence -- relevant evidence will not be excluded in a criminal proceeding; Limitation of Plea Bargaining -- the state's right to plea bargain with serious felons is restricted. The Proposition also states that victims who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes.

Although it is too early to judge the long-term effect and value of Proposition 8, since many of its provisions are still being sidestepped, there can be no question of the message its passage sends to courts and criminals. California has, however, already made a significant contribution with its victims' assistance and compensation programs. In 1978, $7 million was awarded to victims of violent crime; in 1982 the total awards doubled to $14 million.

* Texas

Similar to the goals of crime prevention specialists in states like Pennsylvania, a principal focus for crime avoidance on the state level in

Overview

Texas has been to train and educate local law enforcement officers in establishing crime prevention programs and to provide materials and direct assistance for them. This idea has been "put on wheels," or institutionalized, through the efforts of the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office and through the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at Southwest Texas State University.

One division of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies, the Texas Crime Prevention Institute (TCPI), has become a leading world center for law enforcement and information about crime prevention. Since 1974, TCPI has trained over 5,000 Texas police officers -- nearly one-third of the state's own staff. The Institute has also trained more than 1,000 people from thirty-six other states, Canada, Guam, and U.S. federal and military agencies. TCPI conducts a curriculum of basic, advanced, and special subject crime prevention courses throughout the year at Southwest Texas State University and other sites. In addition to these seminars, the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies provides printed and audio-visual material to support crime prevention practitioners. The state itself substantially funds its own criminal justice programs through a legislative mechanism which sets aside a proportion of all state fines from class C misdemeanors on up through felony fines.

Texas has, therefore, solved in a fairly unique way the problems of financing its crime prevention efforts -- by taking the burden off the taxpayer and placing it onto the criminal. When training and resources such as those provided by the Texas Crime Prevention Institute are made available by a state at no cost, or at very low cost, communities of all sizes are able to initiate crime prevention programs that would otherwise be impossible.

Garland, Texas, is such an example. Ninety percent (90%) of its approximately 150 police officers have undergone crime prevention training at TCPI. Moreover, Garland has been found to be one of the safest cities in the country.

Another major division of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies at Southwest Texas State University is the Texas Center for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention (TCJDP). Organized and operated similarly to the Texas Crime Prevention Institute, the TCJDP offers training and technical

assistance in the areas of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention to a wide range of professionals who work with youth. Since TCJDP was founded in May 1978, over five thousand people have taken courses and four times that many have applied.

A typical example of the effect of the Texas Center for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention can be seen in the juvenile crime programs in Abilene, Texas. In 1979, a TCJDP graduate helped form the Taylor County Juvenile Justice Association to establish a single functional network to coordinate the efforts of child care agencies with all other professionals in the county.

The Reassignment School for youth suspended from the regular school system is an outgrowth of that alliance. Its existence enables a school to remove students who are disruptive but does not cut them off entirely from the education system. Overall, the increases in juvenile crime has been slowed to 2%-4%, compared to 20%-30% before the program went into effect.

Another crime control activity being implemented statewide in Texas is the Crime Stoppers Program administered out of the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office. This is a variation of the old wanted poster, offering rewards for information that leads to the apprehension of criminals. The Crime Stoppers approach, however, uses the contemporary mass media. Crime Stoppers USA, Inc., an advisory organization, estimates that there are now over 320 such programs in forty-two states, eighty-eight in Texas alone. And in just the Houston version of the project, within the past two years, 520 cases have been cleared by arrest, $1.8 million worth of stolen property recovered, $600,000 worth of narcotics confiscated, and $73,000 paid out to informants. It is a good example of how the resources and scope of state government can produce impressive crime control results.

SAFE COMMUNITIES

In addition to the detailed profiles examined in our survey, we used FBI Uniform Crime Reports among other sources to identify a cross-section of the safest places in America. In total we settled on fifteen examples. They include: Chesapeake, Virginia; Brunswick, Ohio; Erie, Pennsylvania; Glasgow, Kentucky; Huntington Beach, California; Ridgewood, New Jersey;

Upper St. Clair, Pennsylvania; McCandless, Pennsylvania; Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; South Fayette, Pennsylvania; Belmont, Bronx, New York; Sterling Heights, Michigan; Marlborough, Massachusetts; Madison, Indiana; and Columbus, Georgia.

Once the communities were determined, we then interviewed local leaders to find out what they believed accounted for the relative safety of their areas. Although many factors were raised as possible causes of crime, only a few straightforward components were cited as contributing to the safety of a community regardless of its size. Eight elements consistently characterized these localities: improved police methods and procedures in which quality of service and innovative techniques are stressed; stability of the community population; community cooperation and support of the local police force; Neighborhood Watch and other crime prevention programs; active community organizations, especially churches and volunteer groups that sponsor programs geared toward young people; good criminal justice administration, including strict, fair judges and district attorneys and a good court system; a history of low unemployment; and a small population density within the community.

CRIME PREVENTION IN URBAN CENTERS LIKE NEW YORK

Many of the characteristics cited as integral to safe communities would be impossible to achieve in most major metropolitan areas. Yet, the example of Detroit's successful crime prevention program shows that not all these factors are necessary to achieve improved community security. For instance, New York as a whole ranks second nationally in per capita crime among cities with over a million population; however, in each of its boroughs effective crime prevention programs have produced neighborhood islands of comparative safety: Kingsbridge/Marble Hill Interfaith Council -- Bronx; Flatbush/Midwood Operation Interface -- Brooklyn; Lenox Hill Neighborhood Association -- Manhattan; Jamaica Safety Coalition -- Queens; North Shore Anti-Crime Program -- Staten Island.

The crime control activities observed in the case study sites for The Figgie Report, Part IV clearly exemplify the primary features associated with safe communities. However, the study also shows that improved police methods combined with a stable resident population supportive of its law enforcement agencies are the characteristics most likely to coincide with

low crime rates and a community perception of safety.

Though the war against crime still rages, this report demonstrates that in situations where individuals and the justice system join forces to attack crime in their local communities, battles are being won.

DETROIT, MICHIGAN

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH IN AN URBAN AREA

Detroit is a city struggling with some of the worst urban problems in the nation and one of the highest unemployment rates. It is also attempting to deal with another great problem that has plagued it over the years -- crime. After years of being known as a crime capital, Detroit has gained national recognition as having one of the best crime prevention programs in the country. Detroit's police force and its citizenry have united and forged a nationally recognized, successful crime prevention program based on the Neighborhood Watch model. The key to the success of this program has been active citizen involvement under the aegis of the police department.

The Neighborhood Watch program in Detroit shows the positive impact of a strong mutual commitment by the police and the community. Detroit makes crime prevention an integral part of its budget priorities rather than an adjunct. The overall decrease in crime throughout Detroit over the last seven years is widely attributed by crime experts and the community to the city's unique Neighborhood Watch program. This has been achieved despite the many social and economic problems prevalent in the city.

CHIEF HART'S PRIORITIES

In 1976, when Detroit Mayor Coleman A. Young asked his newly appointed Chief of Police, William L. Hart, what would be his goals for law enforcement, Hart replied specifically in this order: 1) to prevent crime; 2) to apprehend criminals; and 3) to build a police force that reflected the community.

Hart's priorities are rooted in his more than twenty years of experience with the Detroit Police Department. Starting in 1952 as a "cop on the beat," during the next two decades he saw duty in a wide range of assignments. In 1975 he attended an FBI crime resistance seminar, and was involved in instituting crime prevention activities in the department when Mayor Young appointed him Chief.

Hart's and Young's determination to integrate police services into the community has never wavered despite the city's diminishing resources. The commitment to crime deterrence began with the formation of a Crime Prevention Section in the department in 1975, staffed by two officers. Today, the division has 150 officers and an operating budget of approximately $4.5 million. It is the largest crime prevention unit in the country and has a national reputation for innovativeness and effectiveness.

The resolve to apprehend criminals has been equally strong. When Hart became Chief, he found there were about 2,000 outstanding felony warrants. He was also distressed at the ease with which suspects under indictment or convicted criminals seemed to be getting back on the street. An intensive police department effort begun in 1976 and 1977 in cooperation with prosecutors and judges brought in about 1,500 of those 2,000 outstanding felony warrants. Knowing the behavior patterns of repeat offenders and career criminals resulted in about a 20% reduction in area crime.

A dedication to building a police force that reflects the community has been steadfastly pursued. The police force under Hart has brought Arab-Americans and Mexican-Americans onto the force, and the department is more racially balanced than before. The department also has expanded its program of police services throughout the city. For example, mini-stations were established throughout the city's neighborhoods. A mini-station has a sworn officer and neighborhood volunteers manning a local police post, usually a storefront. It deals primarily in community relations and crime prevention

functions.

As an effective police department requires more than a representative mix of appropriate demographic groups, Chief Hart found his problems with crime compounded at first by the suspicions of the community toward the police department. Hart says of the police force: "We're not an army of occupation. We're citizens of the community. And since all the problems of the community eventually become police problems, that makes us social workers and social scientists too. Positive change in Detroit only came about when the police attitude and image changed."

Hart points out that the people in Detroit in the mid-1970s had little faith in the police because they felt law enforcement agents either didn't care about their safety or were unable to protect them from criminals. Hart maintains that good police-community relations are essential if criminals are to be apprehended, even more essential than increasing the number of police officers. Crimes have to be reported promptly, accurately and in a form the police can use. Hart says, "Citizens can usually identify a perpetrator. You have to have good cooperation with citizens."

There is a sense now in Detroit among the police and the community they serve that a corner has been turned in crime prevention. Their optimism is characteristic of many such groups of people nationwide working to combat crime when they see their efforts begin to take effect.

Outside Detroit, Hart's crime prevention programs have been commended repeatedly. On November 12, 1982, the International Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners cited the Detroit Project as being one of the best in the world. Attorney General William French Smith also presented Hart with the Crime Prevention Coalition's first national award.

From being widely known as the murder capital of the land to being recognized as having the best crime prevention program in the country, Detroit has come a long way in seven years. The elements of that change, including Chief Hart's and Mayor Young's direction from the top, have made Detroit a classic example of the impact a careful crime prevention program can have on a complex urban center.

Detroit

CRIME IN DETROIT

Detroit is the sixth largest city in the United States. It has a population of about 1.2 million which, according to the 1980 census, is stabilizing. The 1970s brought a series of extensive social and economic changes to the city: it was hit hard by the recessions both early and late in the decade, and it changed from a predominantly white to a predominantly black city.

Detroit has long been viewed as a metropolis of extremes, typifying some of the best and worst aspects of large, northern, industrial American cities. On the one hand, Detroit suffers from the lingering stigma of riots, urban decay, unemployment, and high crime. On the other hand, there is a private and public sector accord to aggressively rebuild the city. For instance, The Renaissance Center brought the service and convention industries back into the downtown area, helping to make Detroit the site of the 1980 Republican National Convention. Nearby Pontiac became the location for the 1980 Super Bowl game and the city hosted the first Detroit Grand Prix in June of 1982.

Though Detroit's murder rate is certainly not insignificant, according to 1981 FBI Uniform Crime Report Statistics of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs), Detroit and its environs reported 635 murders, less than half the 1,500 murders reported by Los Angeles and Long Beach and metropolitan New York. The per capita murder rate (incidents per 100,000 inhabitants) in 1981 was lower than in twenty-eight other metropolitan areas. Detroit suffered 14.7 murders per 100,000 population (down from 16.6 in 1980). In comparison the SMSAs for Albany, Georgia; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Orleans, Louisiana; New York, New York; Odessa, Texas; Pine Bluff, Arkansas; and Savannah, Georgia had over 20 murders per 100,000 population. Miami, Florida, had 34.5 murders per 100,000 population.

Overall crime rates per 100,000 inhabitants also contradict Detroit's past negative reputation. In 1981, Detroit reported 7,933.3 incidents per 100,000 individuals of FBI Uniform Crime Report index crimes. (These are murder and non-negligent manslaughter; forcible rape; robbery; aggravated assault; burglary; larceny theft; motor vehicle theft). Detroit's recorded crime total was less than that of Des Moines, Iowa, which reported 8,099.3 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants, and far less than Miami's 10,820.4 per

100,000 inhabitants and New York's 9,033.6 per 100,000 inhabitants.

None of these comparisons, of course, suggests that Detroit does not have a serious crime problem but it is by no means worse than many other American cities. What does make Detroit unique, however, is that its Police Department has chosen to deal with the problem through an aggressive crime prevention program as part of the cutting edge in an overall effort to decentralize police services. That program has apparently had impressive results: a 30% decrease in targeted crimes. Reductions have been even more dramatic in specific neighborhoods which have established concentrated crime avoidance activities.

THE CRIME PREVENTION SECTION: DECENTRALIZATION AND COMMITMENT

Chief Hart's main priority -- preventing crime -- has been realized with the development of the Detroit Police Department's Crime Prevention Section, headed by Inspector James Humphrey. Having grown from two officers in 1975 to its current staff of 150, the division has been funded primarily by the city of Detroit itself. The programming did receive some outside grants during the late 1970s including a $490,000 block grant in 1977 from the state, used largely for equipment, and about $100,000 from The Law Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA).

Considering that the section has a $4.5 million annual operating budget, it is obvious that the department does not rely on outside assistance to subsidize crime prevention activities. Unlike many American municipalities, Detroit makes crime prevention an integral part of its budget priorities rather than an addendum tacked on only when funds remain or can be brought in from the outside. By formalizing the Crime Prevention Section, Detroit guarantees the continuity of its services.

Following Chief Hart's and Mayor Young's belief that police services should be decentralized, the majority of the crime prevention officers were placed out in the community. Presently, thirty officers are attached to the central bureau at police headquarters while an additional officer is assigned to each of the city's twelve precincts. The 108 officers manning the fifty police mini-stations throughout the city are all trained crime prevention practitioners.

Inspector Humphrey insists on stringent screening, and training of any officers assuming crime prevention duty. Most designated to headquarters received their instruction at the National Crime Prevention Institute in Louisville, Kentucky, and have taken supplementary courses in crime deterrence techniques and police administration at Macomb County Community College, and/or at the FBI. In addition, most of the officers have at least ten years of experience with the force. Thus, while crime prevention as a major police department function may be relatively new, the core staff of the crime prevention unit is certainly not new to police work.

The other 120 officers working out of local precincts and mini-stations have had at least a two-week crime prevention course provided by the department. Most also are members of professional associations, such as the International Society of Crime Prevention Practitioners, to keep up with developments in crime prevention techniques.

Inspector Humphrey explains that an additional problem which the Crime Prevention Section faces is to communicate to the rest of the force as well as to the community at large that the crime prevention officer is not just a community relations functionary. Placing the trained officers throughout the department and the community has helped educate both factions.

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH: THE IDEA

Crime prevention is primarily not a means toward criminal apprehension and punishment, nor does it ameliorate the social causes of crime. Crime prevention is basically an alternative aimed at making crime harder to commit by assisting the law-abiding citizen to avoid becoming a victim, and improving the efficiency of the law enforcement system.

The Detroit Police Department's Crime Prevention Section has instituted a range of services that represent the state of the art in crime prevention methods. The centerpiece of Detroit's effort is the Neighborhood Watch Program. About one-third of Detroit's 12,000 city blocks have been formally organized into Neighborhood Watch groups. However, "Neighborhood Watch means different things to different people around the country," explains Inspector Humphrey, "and I am personally skeptical of a lot of programs going under the title."

In Detroit, the Neighborhood Watch entails four major components, three concerned primarily with public education and one with the identification of property. Typically, a Neighborhood Watch organization originates when an existing block association or other community group contacts a crime prevention officer or, vice versa, when an officer contacts an organization to suggest a meeting with its members to talk about crime prevention techniques.

For a block to qualify as an official Neighborhood Watch group, it must fulfill two criteria: hold at least two formal meetings for residents, and have representation at these meetings of half the local households. When these criteria are met, the block can post Neighborhood Watch signs on the street.

At the two aforementioned neighborhood meetings, residents are informed about the four components of a Detroit Neighborhood Watch program: self-protection, burglary prevention, property identification, and crime reporting. Locking doors and windows is an elementary precaution, but many people forget to do this; national figures indicate that 35% to 40% of all burglaries occur through unlocked doors and windows. Furthermore, many citizens may not automatically alter their behavior to respond appropriately to changing neighborhood conditions.

* Self-Protection

The crime prevention officer demonstrates to citizens how they can protect themselves while walking on the streets and in other public places. Strategies show how to avoid confrontations and what to do if accosted. Such information is especially important for senior citizens and others who feel particularly vulnerable to assault. Self-protection techniques typically include four aspects: 1) carrying on one's person as little as possible things of value (cash, credit cards, jewelry, etc.); 2) avoiding areas of high risk -- ones that are unfamiliar, darkly lit or poorly trafficked, etc.; 3) going out with a companion whenever feasible; and 4) behaving in a manner generally non-threatening and appropriate to one's physical condition if accosted by an assailant.

* Burglary Protection

The crime prevention officer also provides information on how to protect a residence against burglary. Many people cannot identify home

features that constitute burglary risks. Residents are alerted to the best ways to secure doors and windows, to keep shrubbery trimmed, how to light possible hiding areas at night, and how to safeguard the home when the occupant is away for any reason.

* Property Identification

Through "Operation Identification" stolen property is made less attractive to the black market and easier to return to the rightful owner if recovered. The crime prevention officer explains to the residents how to mark valuable home items with a driver's license number or other identification number and makes an engraving tool available free of charge for such purposes.

* Crime Reporting

Even when the police respond quickly to a call, unless the complainant can provide accurate, usable information about a suspect, their speed is valueless. The crime prevention officer therefore instructs Neighborhood Watch participants on how to report crimes to the police. He also gives out checklists, which can be kept by the phone, of items to look for when describing an individual or a vehicle that seems suspicious.

Each of the four components of the Detroit's Neighborhood Watch is illustrated through pamphlets, slide presentations, and films that are used at the community meetings.

Detroit has developed its own crime prevention materials. Though in some cases these materials may not have the elaborate graphics of information provided by national organizations, Inspector Humphrey maintains that the Detroit literature is best for Detroit: "We really wanted the materials we distributed to reflect our people and communities."

After a Neighborhood Watch organization is in place, it then becomes the responsibility of community members and their local crime prevention officer to continue the program. Maintenance usually entails periodic community refresher courses or lectures and includes updates on crime statistics as well as results attributable to the group's activities. The crime prevention officer also personally contacts new block residents and other non-participants about the organization. They are invited to subsequent meetings and provided with personal instruction about crime

prevention.

Wherever Neighborhood Watch appears, its impact upon the community is always greater than the sum of its parts. Inspector Humphrey says, "Neighborhood Watch is simply being your brother's keeper." Whether it is described in those terms, or whether it is described as "the formation and maintenance of social networks for the stabilization or improvement of a community," the concept arises repeatedly when planning crime prevention projects. This is because practitioners have found that when citizens consciously act in accordance with their responsibility to protect themselves, their property, and their community from criminal victimization, these actions really work to reduce crime.

In instances where the natural controls of residents' behaviors have broken down or have never existed, the Neighborhood Watch concept seems to be partially filling the vacuum. It defines a community (a block); it brings people together around a common cause (fear of crime); it draws them into cooperative action (learning about how to avoid victimization, sharing "Operation Identification" engravers); and it ideally creates a sense of unified responsibility (a safe community is one in which you can trust your neighbors to be on the lookout for suspicious activity and to report such events to the proper authorities).

Neighborhood Watch also undoubtedly has roots in the social movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Groups formed to advance special interests like minority and women's rights prove that unified actions could produce positive change. Likewise, the era witnessed the founding of community groups to improve local schools, neighborhoods, etc. Neighborhood Watch is a derivation of the community action group, which focuses on the residents' mutual concern for avoiding criminal victimization.

The concept of Neighborhood Watch has been expanded in Detroit, as well as in many other parts of the country, to include additional physically-defined areas. For instance, Detroit has active initiatives to organize Apartment Watch, Business Watch, and Vertical Watch (for high-rise buildings) programs. Crime prevention practitioners offer services covering burglary protection and on-site security to residences and businesses. Instructors visit and inspect a site, then recommend what steps the resident

or owner should take to protect the property from burglary. In conjunction with many community groups, these security surveys are sometimes followed up in the cases of senior citizens and handicapped persons by having the crime prevention officer and/or volunteers from the community group install security hardware that has been donated for that purpose.

Detroit has conducted more than 10,000 crime prevention programs, reaching upwards of 600,000 people directly. Over 3,500 Neighborhood Watch groups have been organized; sixty-seven Business Watches and thirty-five Apartment Watches have been instituted. Crime prevention officers have carried out in excess of 6,000 individual security surveys. About 650 special crime prevention programs have been held for school-children, reaching approximately 175,000 students. Some 400 special programs have been implemented for senior citizens, touching about 29,000 people.

The model of a Neighborhood Watch has thus been promoted extensively in Detroit through specific programs, through the distribution of specially designed materials, through the cooperation of local civic groups with the police department, and through individual contacts by crime prevention officers with citizens. The idea seems good. But does it "work"?

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH: THE IMPACT

* The Experiment at Crary-St. Mary's

Consistent with the Detroit Police Department's extensive resources and commitment to crime prevention programming, in the spring of 1977 the Crime Prevention Section initiated a planned project which, in the words of the project report, endeavored "to prove or disprove the idea that a comprehensive crime prevention program involving both the police and citizens would reduce crime."

The project included the selection of two neighborhoods in Detroit about four miles apart: a target or experimental neighborhood and a control neighborhood. The two areas had very similar demographic and crime characteristics. The project entailed the establishment of an extensive crime prevention program in the experimental community and no police department-initiated crime prevention program in the control neighborhood. With the exception of the crime prevention efforts, police services to the two neighborhoods were the same. Evaluation of the program was based on:

1) comparisons of reported pre-experiment crime statistics (1977) to post-experiment statistics (1979) in the two neighborhoods, and 2) comparisons and results from probability sample surveys conducted before and after the two-year trial period in the experimental neighborhood.

The test locality was a 155-block area called Crary-St. Mary's. It had a population of about 12,880, about 65% white and 35% non-white, and 20% senior citizens. The median income was $15,000 per year and 65% of the residences were owner-occupied. Crary-St. Mary's is predominantly residential: 3,924 houses, thirty-seven apartment buildings and 219 commercial buildings.

Crary-St. Mary's and the control neighborhood were picked because each evidenced typical local Detroit problems. During the 1970s, Crary-St. Mary's experienced major changes in its demographics -- a growing senior citizen presence, mostly white, and a shift among younger residents from a predominantly white to a predominantly black population. Unofficial estimates put the unemployment rate for Crary-St. Mary's at as high as 50%. Crime statistics for the neighborhood had been steadily increasing, with high victimization rates in burglary and street robbery.

Crary-St. Mary's was also chosen because of the existence of a strong, activist community organization, the Crary-St. Mary's Community Council (CSCC). Detroit's crime prevention model assumes that the success of a program is dependent on having a strong communications network in the neighborhood. Since this network was already established through the CSCC, the experiment could determine the effects of the addition of a crime prevention program to an existing community organization's activities. Results would not be attributable to the creation of a new community action group.

The crime prevention program for Crary-St. Mary's entailed extensive analysis to identify crime trends and patterns. Four trained officers were assigned to the area, and a local crime prevention station, in space donated by the Victory Lutheran Church, was set up as a headquarters for the program. A comprehensive Neighborhood Watch project was then organized, focusing especially on the crimes of burglary, larceny, and auto theft.

The crime prevention officers cooperated with the CSCC on a range of

programs and information campaigns, some of which were not directly related to crime prevention, but which were intended to improve police-community relations. In all, the effort met not only the guidelines for a comprehensive Neighborhood Watch Program, but also met the department's other goals for decentralization of police services and a police force reflecting the community and helping fellow citizens.

Table 1 illustrates the extent of Crary-St. Mary's crime prevention program during the 1977-79 period:

Table 1: Crime Prevention Activities Conducted in the Crary-St. Mary's Area During the Experimental Period

Number of neighborhood block contacts	152
Number of neighborhood watches organized	151
Number of meetings	420
Number of security surveys conducted	636
Number of people attending programs (including repeat attendees)	9,680
Number of apartment watch programs	5
Number of business watch programs	4
Number of senior citizens escorted monthly	239

Reported crime statistics for the experimental period show a substantial reduction of crime in Crary-St. Mary's that is not matched by the statistics for the control neigh-borhood. Table 2 presents the statistics for the experimental period in the two neighborhoods. Total crime in Crary-St. Mary's was reduced by 58% with the highest specific reductions in breaking and entering and in purse snatching, down 61%.

Table 2: Comparison of Reported Crimes in Crary-St. Mary's and the Control Neighborhood During the Experimental Period, 1977-79

	1977	1978	1979	Percent Change 1977-79 %
Crary-St. Mary's Crime				
Rape	10	6	4	-60
Robbery	57	30	25	-56
Breaking and entering	253	131	97	-61
Larceny	17	11	9	-53
Larceny from auto	99	58	49	-51
Purse snatching	31	20	12	-61
	1977	1978	1979	Percent Change 1977-79 %
Crime Control Neighborhood				
Rape	8	9	8	-0
Robbery	52	40	43	-17
Breaking and entering	206	197	180	-12
Larceny	6	13	9	+50
Larceny from autos	94	80	89	-5
Purse snatching	7	9	4	-32

The results of the department's survey of the Crary-St. Mary's residents before and after the crime prevention programming indicate that fear of crime was significantly reduced, that there was a marked increase in home security precautions and personal property identification; and that there were increased positive interactions among neighbors and with the police. The following excerpt from the police department's report on the experiment details findings of the survey.

SURVEY FINDINGS

The probability sample survey was conducted with 500 citizens at the first neighborhood watch meeting they attended. The test was administered by the crime prevention officer prior to any crime prevention education and before any interpersonal relationship was established with the participants. The post-test was administered to a sampling of 20 percent, and between one and two years after the pre-test. The post-test was administered by non-police personnel and was done by telephone.

The results of the probability sample survey disclose the following salient findings.

1. How fearful are you of crimes happening to you, your family, or your property?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Very fearful	40%	12%

2. How safe do you feel, or would you feel, being out alone in your neighborhood at night?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Very safe	6%	30%

3. Have you done anything in the last year to protect this house (apartment) from crime...things like stronger locks, outside lighting, protected windows?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Yes	28%	60%
No	72%	40%

4. Have you marked your personal possessions with any permanent identifying marks? (Operation Identification)

	Pre-test	Post-test
Yes	28%	62%
No	72%	38%

5. Have you been a victim of burglary within the past two years?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Yes	24%	5%
No	76%	95%

6. Would you say, in general, that your police are doing a good job, an average job, or a poor job?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Good job	40%	75%
Average job	40%	22%
Poor job	14%	2%
Don't know	6%	1%

7. Within the past year or two, do you think that crime in the neighborhood has:

	Pre-test	Post-test
Increased	31%	15%
Remained the same	40%	35%
Decreased	17%	45%
Other	12%	5%

Detroit

8. Do you have an arrangement with any of the neighbors on your block to watch each others' house while you are away?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Yes	72%	89%
No	28%	11%

9. Have you ever reported a crime or suspicious activity to the police? If so, were you:

	Pre-test	Post-test
Very satisfied	20%	35%
Somewhat satisfied	15%	20%
Not too satisfied	15%	10%
Not at all satisfied	10%	5%
Don't know	4%	5%
Never called or reported	36%	25%

10. Have you attended any community or block club meetings in your area in the last year?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Yes	27%	100%
No	73%	0%

11. What do you feel is the greatest crime problem in your neighborhood?

	Pre-test	Post-test
Burglary	73%	60%
Larceny	2%	8%
Robbery	5%	15%
Auto theft	15%	14%
Sex offenses	5%	3%
Other	0%	0%
None	0%	0%

Crime has not been eliminated in Crary-St. Mary's, but it is quite clear that the incidence and fear of crime have been significantly reduced. Sustaining the program beyond the experimental period has created its own set of challenges, but it seems fair to assert that the neighborhood has continued to enjoy the benefits of the program initiated in 1977.

In 1982, Crary-St. Mary's is reporting about twenty-eight to thirty-two burglaries per month while a neighborhood one mile north is reporting that many burglaries each day. That is not to say that burglars which formerly struck Crary-St. Mary's are now operating in adjacent areas. Sergeant Barbieri of the Crime Prevention Section, who oversees current activities in Crary-St. Mary's, asserts: "I really don't believe there has been displacement going on here. Our experience indicates that there are a few transient burglars. Most of the crimes traced in the experiment are typically committed by neighborhood people."

Kathy Hoard, member of the board of directors of the Crary-St. Mary's Community Council, believes that the neighborhood will continue to benefit from the recent crime prevention programming. She says, 'We have built good relationships here, and there's always more than enough to do. We continue recruiting members, especially among new residents, to Neighborhood Watch. And we have about fifteen ongoing programs. We work on nuisances, streetlights, graffiti, and zoning enforcement problems. And we keep active with other community and social projects."

* After the Experiment

Neighborhood Watch and all its attendant activities have "worked" in Crary-St. Mary's. The programs instituted in 1977 have had a significant impact on what had been a serious and growing crime problem in that neighborhood. Reviewing the analysis of the effect of the crime prevention activities as detailed by the Detroit Police Department, it is not unreasonable to conclude that in large measure the overall decrease in crime throughout Detroit over the last seven years has been a result of city-wide crime prevention programs. Most of the activities implemented in the Crary-St. Mary's crime prevention program can easily be duplicated in any urban, suburban or rural area.

A few caveats about the Crary-St. Mary's example, however, must be noted. Most American communities probably do not have in place a base organization like the Crary-St. Mary's Community Council. The CSCC was founded in 1971, when the demographic profile of the community started changing rapidly. A core group of activists organized around the belief that the racial integration of the neighborhood should not mean the ruin of the community.

For over ten years the CSCC has been extraordinarily diligent in a wide range of community projects which achieved effective results -- clean-ups and beautification campaigns eliminating nuisances such as abandoned automobiles, monitoring the enforcement of zoning restrictions, overseeing local real estate practices, providing activities for youth and senior citizens, etc. The CSCC membership has remained strong over the years and reflects the black-white ratio of the community. It publishes a monthly newsletter, publicizes community events, and generally is a powerful force for communication and organization in the area.

The Detroit Police Department Crime Prevention Section integrated their activities with this sturdy network provided by the CSCC, with clear, impressive,and enviable success. The question arises, however, as to what can be done in a community that has no strong organization such as the CSCC.

In addition, the level of commitment of the Crime Prevention Section to Crary-St. Mary's was extraordinary during 1977 to 1979. Few municipalities could afford to allocate the resources and four crime prevention officers to

many, if any, of its neighborhoods. The experiment in this neighborhood was comprehensive and intensive. Since the completion of the experiment, there has been less department involvement. Currently, there are only two crime prevention officers in the neighborhood, but there has been no significant turnaround of crime curtailment in the community. But here again a question remains: Could another community repeat the level of success of Crary-St. Mary's without a fairly lengthy and extensive commitment of manpower and resources to crime prevention?

Still, neither of these unanswered questions detract from the results obtained in the Crary-St. Mary's experiment. The Detroit Police Department has all along understood both the limitations and the positive advantages of their experimental programming.

Today, in addition to Crary-St. Mary's, there are two other targeted crime prevention areas in Detroit. One of them is in an area called the Cass Corridor, which many consider the "worst" neighborhood in the city. Reverend Lowell Lawson of the Baptist Center, located in the Cass Corridor, has donated space to the Detroit Police Department so that it can operate its intensive crime prevention program. Reverend Lawson described the people of Cass Corridor: "They have very little voice in their destiny, and very little political clout. The people are highly vulnerable."

Indeed, the Cass Corridor has a highly disproportionate number of institutionalized people; several private and state facilities are located in the area -- nursing homes, pre-release/halfway house facilities, shelters for the homeless, and homes for the handicapped. The Cass Corridor also is characterized by a large number of lower socio-economic residents. Unofficial estimates place the unemployment rate in the neighborhood, among those who are able to work, at 90%.

The Cass Corridor Target Area crime prevention activities have not been formally evaluated, but Reverend Lawson, for one, speaks enthusiastically in favor of the programming: "It is the best crime prevention program I've seen in twenty-five years. I would never have let them remain stationed here in the Baptist Center if they weren't effective." Reverend Lawson has acted as the liaison with volunteer church groups outside the Cass Corridor who have come into the neighborhood to install security hardware for senior citizens and other residents totally free of charge. Reverend Lawson says,

"I hope the police never get enough money to provide all the services required. We need to involve people in volunteer service. The crime prevention program here gives the opportunity for the church and the citizenry to help."

The Cass Corridor program is funded entirely by the Detroit Police Department. According to Sergeant Barbieri, "We started in 1980 with a one-year plan. We're past that now. And we're needed here. We'll stay."

THE LESSONS OF DETROIT

* Concerns

Although most of those experts we interviewed praised with few or no reservations the Neighborhood Watch programs as exemplified in the City of Detroit, several people told us that they did not want to make it seem that the community approach always worked successfully with no tensions or problems. David Watrobe, president of the Detroit Police Benevolent Association, recognized the danger of police departments believing that their work was completed once citizens became involved:

> I don't believe that citizens who pay for crime protection are going to be fooled into believing that a police department is delivering quality service by devoting a lot of their resources to teaching them how to carry their purse so that they don't become victims or how to have a better lock installed so that their house is not burglarized, as opposed to their neighbor who does not have a good lock on the door. Those types of crime prevention programs are mentally conditioning citizens to perhaps get by with a police department that is not delivering the top-notch quality of service that it ought to.

Brenda McLane of the Michigan Avenue Community Organization (MACO) also expressed concern about the motivation of the police. "The police department looks at the community as well-meaning amateurs," she said. "They may think that we have some role to play, like attending community forums and such, but they really don't think we have a serious input when it comes to serious decisions such as where the cops ought to be, where the crime spots are, etc. They just don't want to deal with it that way."

Despite scattered criticisms, the size and commitment of the Detroit

Police Department's Crime Prevention Section to an intensive crime curtailment program in the target neighborhoods testify to an extraordinary effort at doing something new and constructive within the confines of local reality. The problems associated with crime still exist, but they are far less pervasive than they were before the establishment of the crime prevention unit.

The Detroit experience shows that a determined police effort can be more than matched by dedicated cooperative response from the citizenry. This, more than just the locking of doors or being street smart, is the real goal of crime prevention. After all, crime prevention is: 1) citizens acting in responsible, prudent ways to avoid potential victimization, and 2) citizens and the police assisting each other before and after a crime occurs. The crime prevention practitioners nationwide make a common assertion: The success of crime prevention programs, as measured by the reduction of crime, is dependent on citizen involvement. In Inspector Humphrey's terms: "Being your brother's keeper."

The police in Detroit have to a large extent been successful in erasing the image of "an army of occupation" Chief Hart sought to change. It is little wonder the officers in the Crime Prevention Section in Detroit are an optimistic group of men and women. They have seen the impact of their work in city-wide statistics -- and in other ways too. Officer Paul Jackson of Precinct 14, Ministation 2, says: "The job is very rewarding. I see instant results when I work with a new block or new community group."

Inspector Humphrey believes that short-run efforts which do something about crime -- like prevention and making crimes harder to commit -- will have long-term effects. "Professional criminals probably can't be stopped," says Inspector Humphrey, "but in most crime we see -- probably 90% -- the criminal is an amateur and an opportunist and lives four or five blocks from where the crime is committed. When our crime prevention programs are done right, they don't displace crime. We're changing the environment. And the environment changes attitudes and behavior."

Not everyone would agree with Inspector Humphrey that criminal behavior is so closely linked to the environment. But the lesson of Detroit is embodied in the Inspector's words. Detroit's experience shows that things can be done about crime which show quick, demonstrable results and

make neighborhoods safer. Actions can be instituted on a grass-roots level even without revamping the criminal justice system or without significantly increasing the size and scope of traditional law enforcement services. And these efforts can be accomplished despite other lingering social and economic questions.

If you ask a cross-section of people to account for the changes in Detroit over the past six years, you are likely to hear an explanation like that given by Officer Mel Williams, Crime Prevention Officer in the Detroit Police Department, who has worked in both the Cass Corridor and Crary-St. Mary's neighborhood projects: "With inflation, unemployment, interest rates -- we said to the people who complained about Detroit: 'You can't afford to move away. You're going to have to live here. So what are you going to do about it?'"

SANGAMON COUNTY AND SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH IN SMALLER COMMUNITIES

Sangamon County, located in central Illinois, encompasses thirty-five communities, the largest of which is Springfield, a city with a population of about 100,000. The other communities in Sangamon County, surrounded by farmlands, have populations of about 5,000 or less. The Sangamon County Sheriff's Office and the Springfield Police Department have developed effective crime prevention programs based on the Neighborhood Watch model in a variety of small town and rural settings.

The Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau actively supports over forty crime prevention programs throughout the county. To date, Sangamon County, excluding Springfield, has formed 253 Neighborhood Watch organizations ranging in size from a six-person group to a whole suburban subdivision. Each Neighborhood Watch group has between 80% and 90% resident participation. The bureau also sponsors rural crime prevention activities and a county justice education program in the schools.

Being neither large city or small town, Springfield displays characteristics of both. Crime in this city, however, has been controlled due to a strong cooperative relationship between the Springfield Police Department and the residents. The police department in Springfield believes that crime can be prevented by clearly identifying potential crime risks and by helping residents to avoid becoming victims. Springfield has successfully implemented and continued a crime prevention program despite budgetary constraints, an encouraging sign for many communities being hard-hit by budget cutbacks. The city has organized some 330 Neighborhood Watch programs since 1978 with over 25,000 citizens participating -- one-quarter of Springfield's population.

Sangamon County

CRIME PREVENTION IN JEROME, ILLINOIS

Jerome is an incorporated township of about 1,700 people just southwest of Springfield in Sangamon County, Illinois. In the mid-1970s Jerome experienced a significant increase in burglary, robbery, and vandalism, probably the result of increased non-local traffic through the town. A new highway had been completed on the border of Jerome and a shopping center opened outside Springfield. Both brought increasing numbers of non-residents to the area.

In 1976 at the height of this increase in crime, Jerome experienced nine residential and eleven business burglaries. Only three of the home burglaries and four of the business ones were marked by arrests, showing a clearance rate of just 35%.

During the next few years, increased police patrols and an unorganized response from a smattering of Jerome residents particularly concerned about their new vulnerability led to some decrease in the burglary rate. In 1977 and 1978 the town had six burglaries per year with 16% and 66% clearance rates respectively. But even this burglary rate was unacceptable to the seven-man Jerome Police Department.

With the support of Jerome's police chief, J. W. Ott, Officer Jim Gill started to spend about half of his on-duty hours on crime prevention activities within the community. He first got assistance from the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau and its director, Sergeant Ron Ellis. He then received help from the local women's club in organizing Neighborhood Watch groups. He spoke at gatherings of local businessmen. By 1979 Officer Gill and Sergeant Ellis had visited each of the 610 homes in Jerome to discuss safety precautions, to encourage participation in Neighborhood Watch groups, and to conduct security surveys of the residences.

The citizens of Jerome responded enthusiastically. Over 85% of the town's residents have directly received crime prevention instruction and are active Neighborhood Watch participants. The results have been fewer burglaries and a much higher clearance rate on those burglaries committed.

In 1979, the first year in which Neighborhood Watch was organized in Jerome, there were no burglaries reported. Since 1979 the burglary rate has

gone up a little, but never to the level of pre-Neighborhood Watch years. In 1980 there were four home burglaries, and four business burglaries. In 1981 there were three home burglaries and one business burglary. In the first five months of 1982, there were two home burglaries and no business burglaries.

As with any Neighborhood Watch, there is always the problem of "program maintenance," keeping participants active and getting new residents to become participants. Jerome has developed several mechanisms for program maintenance, including having the secretary of the town water department inform the police department when new residents move in. Officer Gill then contacts them about joining a Neighborhood Watch group.

At a time when crime in rural areas and small towns in central Illinois is generally increasing, and when outsiders continue to pass regularly through the community, Chief Ott, Officer Gill, and Sergeant Ellis attribute Jerome's lowered and stable burglary rate to the Neighborhood Watch programs. But even more impressive for Jerome is the fact that a larger percentage of the burglaries committed are being cleared by arrest, again as a result of the Neighborhood Watch program and more citizens reporting crimes in progress and/or identifying perpetrators.

From 1979 to the present, only two reported burglaries in Jerome were not cleared by arrest, giving the police department an 80% clearance rate on burglaries for the period. During 1976-1978 the department's clearance rate for burglaries had been only 34%.

These numbers, however, only tell part of the story. Officer Jim Gill relates that Jerome now has excellent police-community relations. The police department has benefited from positive media coverage in the Jerome Bulletin and, according to Gill, "from the best public relations source in the world -- word of mouth." Anecdotal information gets passed quickly around Jerome.

Chief Ott cites one example of a recent positive story: "We had several bicycles stolen from front porches and such places. We suspected juveniles from Springfield or from somewhere else outside Jerome, but we hadn't caught them. One of our Neighborhood Watch block captains spotted a bicycle being taken from her next door neighbor's property by someone she

didn't know. She called the police, and we apprehended the youth who was stealing the bike. The youth was from outside Jerome. Because our block captain reported the incident, we were able to recover and return to the rightful owners all eleven bicycles that had been stolen."

The Jerome Police Department's reputation has improved so much that they regularly get calls from residents of adjoining areas asking the Jerome department, rather than their own, for police services.

SANGAMON COUNTY, ILLINOIS

The results of crime prevention efforts in Jerome, Illinois, are fairly typical of how small communities have been able to reduce crimes of opportunity. One fairly unique factor about the Jerome story, however, is the access the Jerome Police Department had to the advice and assistance of the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau. The two independent crime prevention programs of the sheriff's office and of the city of Springfield police department are experienced, sophisticated operations which were mentioned more frequently during our survey of crime control experts than any other programs serving small cities, towns and rural areas. (The Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau has assisted seventeen other Illinois counties to set up crime prevention programs.)

Sangamon County is located in central Illinois and encompasses an area of 879 square miles. Sangamon has thirty-five communities including the city of Springfield, the largest, which is the county seat and the state capital. The county population is about 170,000 with nearly 100,000 people residing in Springfield. Aside from Springfield, the other communities in the county have populations of about 5,000 or less, interspersed among extensive areas of rich farmland.

Crime prevention activities came to the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office in 1974, funded by an LEAA grant. In 1975 the county sheriff's new Crime Prevention Bureau received funds from the Illinois Law Enforcement Commission. Federal and state monies for crime prevention programs, however, had dried up by 1978. The sheriff's office continued funding the Crime Prevention Bureau without interruption, although with some decrease in staffing.

Unlike the programs of many other municipalities in Illinois and around the nation, the crime prevention efforts of Sangamon County had proved its effectiveness to the local officials as well as to the citizenry. The programs therefore survived the contraction of federal and state funds in the late 1970s.

Sergeant Ron Ellis, current director of the Crime Prevention Bureau, says that in the early days of LEAA funding, crime prevention programs were quite lucrative for local police departments. Relatively few departments, however, evaluated their programs, demonstrated results, and created a real power base for crime prevention.

The attitude to crime prevention in Sangamon County, on the other hand, is illustrated by the fact that the current sheriff, J. H. Purdon, was formerly a lieutenant in charge of the Crime Prevention Bureau.

For a department its size, the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office shows a particularly strong commitment to crime prevention activities. In 1980 the sheriff's office was staffed by seventy-two full-time police officers and forty-eight full-time civilian employees. According to Sergeant Ellis, most of the officers in the department have had a minimum eight hours of crime prevention training and fifteen officers (about 21% of the staff) have had formal crime prevention either at the Texas Crime Prevention Institute at Southwest Texas State University, San Marcos, Texas, or at the Macomb County Community College in Michigan.

Today the Crime Prevention Bureau of the sheriff's office is staffed with three full-time officers, each of whom has had at least eighty hours of crime prevention training at one of the schools mentioned above.

The Crime Prevention Bureau has operated over forty programs in nine categories: 1) residential security; 2) commercial security; 3) personal safety; 4) crimes against the elderly; 5) rural crime prevention; 6) cargo theft; 7) public school projects; 8) drug abuse; and 9) miscellaneous (fire prevention, work with Explorer Scouts, media public service messages, etc.). A "program" may consist of year-round assistance to regular police patrols, a communications or community relations function such as aiding Neighborhood Watch organizations, or it can be a seasonal activity, such as several rural information and technical assistance

programs that instruct farmers how to avoid the theft of implements, equipment, chemicals, livestock, and grain during high-risk times of the year.

But most of the Crime Prevention Bureau efforts have been concentrated on those offenses like robbery and burglary, which are likely to be curtailed by standard crime prevention activities such as civilian surveillance, personal security measures, and citizen-police cooperation. The successes that the sheriff's office reports clearly show why Sangamon County has been sought out for advice in setting up crime prevention efforts by other Illinois counties.

Sangamon County (excluding groups in Springfield) has formed 253 Neighborhood Watch organizations. These organizations range in size from a six-person group to a whole suburban subdivision. An area must have 80% to 90% resident participation before the sheriff's office officially designates it a Neighborhood Watch group.

Some of Sangamon County's Neighborhood Watch areas report overall crime reduction of up to 85%. But the most convincing argument indicating the success of these activities is shown in the county-wide crime statistics for Sangamon and adjacent areas. Table 1 reveals the percent of change in reported robberies and burglaries for six central Illinois county sheriffs' offices. Each county is roughly similar to Sangamon in geographical and demographic features. Each has one predominant urbanized area with surrounding rural areas and small towns. The figures in Table 1 do not include statistics for the urban areas.

Table 1: Percent Change in Number of Reported Robberies and Burglaries 1979-1980 for Selected Central Illinois County Sheriff's Offices*

County Sheriff's Office	1980 Population of Reporting Area	Percent Change in Robbery %	Percent Change in Burglary %
Sangamon	59,250	-15.2	-33.8
Champaign	54,712	+87.5	+43.6
Kankakee	42,253	-7.1	+29.5
McLean	34,487	-40.0	+33.3
Peoria	52,496	-50.0	+36.9
Vermillion	56,116	+200.0	+67.1

* Illinois Department of Law Enforcement, Division of Support Services, Crime in Illinois: 1980 (Springfield, Ill., 1981), Table 33. Most recent complete statistics available at time of writing. Figures exclude crime rates for municipalities in the counties, such as Springfield or Sangamon, which report separately to the FBI.

Sangamon is the only county which reported a decline in burglaries for 1979-80. It is also one of only four countries that reported decreases in reported robberies, making it the sole county in its area to register declines in both categories.

When asked about displacement -- the theory that robbers and burglars move their activities away from areas with strong crime prevention programs -- Sergeant Ellis says, "Sure, I think there is displacement. Until 1978 most of the Neighborhood Watch groups were in or near the cities. As these groups became effective, we saw crime move out into rural areas. Now we're probably seeing some crimes moving away from Sangamon County. Whenever, for example, we clean up prostitution, or burglaries, or rural theft, we get complaints from the adjacent county sheriff's office that crime just moves there. All we can do is help them work up a crime prevention program as good as ours."

RURAL CRIME PREVENTION

Sangamon County has also concentrated crime prevention efforts on rural crime. The specific activities for rural crime prevention are different only in incidentals from residential crime prevention. The basic concepts are the same: 1) identify property to make it less easily sold if stolen; 2) take common-sense precautions to secure valuables; 3) watch out for your neighbors as well as yourself; and 4) work with the law enforcement agencies.

Rural crime prevention has been helped along in Sangamon County and throughout the nation by building on the existing ties and interdependencies of farming communities. According to Sergeant Ellis, farmers often have to rely on their neighbors. "Before we tried organizing official watch groups, many farmers had arranged informal buddy-system alarm efforts -- watching out for each others' property."

Farms are not as physically isolated as most city dwellers would suppose. Farms may spread out over wide areas, but there are often few access roads, which make criminal stealth and getaways a real problem. Sergeant Ellis cites one recent example: "A farmer in our area suspected his neighbor's farm was being robbed when he saw an unfamiliar vehicle and suspicious activities off in the distance. So he just pulled his harrow across the road, and radioed to the police. He'd been right. We got the thieves, because they couldn't get away and because we had been tipped off by a wary neighbor."

Rural law enforcement agencies have shown great resourcefulness, utilizing a combination of traditional and experimental methods in combating crime. Sangamon County reports successful use of cattle branding, confetti in grain, and ID numbers on chemical containers to prevent thefts. Sangamon is also participating in a four-county project organized by the Illinois Secretary of State's Office to register ID numbers of farm equipment in a central computer that can be instantaneously radio checked by a police officer.

The sheriff's office has increased participation in campaigns to register farm equipment ID numbers by getting youth involved. Future Farmers of America (FFA) groups in the schools are presented with two crime

prevention seminars and get extra credit for going home and marking ID numbers on their parents' farm equipment and implements.

Once again, the reported crime statistics indicate the success of Sangamon County's crime prevention activities. The Sangamon County crime rates for burglary and robbery have declined in recent years while the statewide rural area rates have either increased or declined at a much slower rate.

Table 2: Percent Change in Number of Reported Robberies and Burglaries 1979-80 and 1980-81, for Sangamon County and All Illinois Rural Areas*

	All Illinois Rural Areas		Sangamon County	
	1979-1980 Percent Change %	1980-1981 Percent Change %	1979-1980 Percent Change %	1980-1981 Percent Change %
Robbery rates	-8.1	-13.2	-15.2	-26
Burglary rates	-18.5	-2.9	-33.8	-27

* Crime in Illinois: 1980 and Crime in Illinois: 1981.

MOVING ON TO THE CAUSES OF CRIME

A frequent criticism of standard crime prevention activities is that they do nothing to deal with the causes of crime. In general this is probably true if "causes" of crime are defined as those social-economic features which are common in the backgrounds of many American criminals. Crime prevention is most often victim-oriented, aimed at reducing the vulnerability of potential prey.

However, the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Bureau has taken one initiative which is aimed at a particular group of

perpetrators. Recognizing that a large percentage of their local crime is committed by adolescents, the Crime Prevention Bureau has taken on the responsibility of educating county school children about their rights and responsibilities and about the criminal justice system.

The bureau sponsors bicycle safety programs, FFA seminars, tours of the county jails and courts, high school and college internships, and two in-school projects: an Officer Friendly Program for kindergarten through fourth grade and a Law Focused Education program for fifth and sixth grade.

Since the analysis of property crime in the county issued by the sheriff's office indicated that the majority of offenders were between 12 and 19 years of age, the Crime Prevention Bureau set about to discourage that age group from committing crimes in addition to their activities aimed at making property less vulnerable. To do this it initiated an in-school program called Law Focused Education for public school fifth and sixth graders. Sergeant Ellis says, "That group of kids is old enough to understand the concepts and yet they haven't formed the strong peer-group identifications they will later."

Law Focused Education describes its purpose "to provide the students with a general understanding of the police officer, the law, and the social and personal implications and repercussions that can arise out of the violation of these standards." The course, asserts Sergeant Ellis, uses no scare tactics. It consists of eight presentations on various topics by a crime prevention officer: 1) What's a Cop? 2) Vandalism; 3) Shoplifting; 4) Theft and the Juvenile; 5) You and the Law; 6) Drugs; 7) Personal Safety; and 8) Runaways.

The Sangamon County Law Focused Education program has only been in operation for a few years, and the Crime Prevention Bureau will not go so far as to claim its declining property crime rates are a direct result of the project. But the program is being evaluated by educators, and the sheriff's office is watching juvenile arrest trends to see if students who have had the course will be less likely to commit offenses. Still, however, it is most important to recognize this program as a typical and logical extension of a concern with crime prevention. Along with other aspects of the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office crime prevention programs, it shows the

wide variety of effective roles that can be played by the police before crimes are committed to protect the safety of all citizens.[1]

CRIME PREVENTION IN SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS

Springfield is located in the center of Sangamon County. It has a population of about 100,000 and is by far the largest urban area in the county. Springfield is also the county seat, the state capital and the heart of the "Land of Lincoln" tourism area. Springfield is neither a large city nor a small town, but often seems to suffer from many of the problems of each.

The problem of crime, however, is one to which Springfield officials will point with some satisfaction. At a time when the crime rates in Illinois urban areas have generally risen, Springfield has reduced its incidence of crime 13% from 1978 to 1981, as Table 3 below illustrates.

Table 3: FBI Index Crimes (Excluding Arson) for Springfield, Illinois, 1976-1981

Year	Springfield Population	Reported Index Crimes	Rate per 100,000 Population
1976	92,000	8,294	9,015.2
1977	92,000	7,665	8,330.4
1978	92,000	9,083	9,871.2
1979	92,000	9,858	9,845.6
1980	99,098	9,528	9,614.7
1981	100,054	8,625	8,620.3

* Annual Report, Police Department, Springfield, Illinois, 1981.

1. Several states have instituted school programs similar to Sangamon County's local project. The chapter of this report discussing Pennsylvania's statewide program provides information on the TIPS program, which originated in Virginia and is replicated now throughout the nation.

Sangamon County

Like the Sangamon County Sheriff's Office -- with which it maintains a cooperative working relationship as well as a friendly local rivalry -- the Springfield Police Department gives much credit for its recent crime decreases to its own crime prevention activities.

In recent years, Illinois cities have reflected the rest of the country in their increase in crime and their shrinking funds for municipal services due to inflation and federal cutbacks. Chief Howard E. Rogers of the Springfield Police Department reports that his budget has been cut 30% to 40% in real dollars since 1979. To cope in part with both of these state and national trends which have reduced and demoralized many other local law enforcement agencies, the Springfield Police Department has intensified its resolve in crime prevention programming. The department has a major commitment because it has found that crime prevention is relatively inexpensive and because, its officers confidently assert, "It works."

Echoing the priorities of Chief Hart in Detroit, Chief Rogers in the 1981 Annual Report of the Springfield Police Department lists his department's first two priorities as apprehending criminals and preventing crime. It is inter-esting to note that in the eleven items listed as the Springfield Police Department's mission statement, ten specifically focus on service and assistance to law-abiding citizens. As with most other law enforcement agencies with a substantial investment in crime prevention, the Spring-field Police Department's overall orientation is directed toward victims both real and potential, not criminals.

This is not to imply that Springfield and other departments involved in crime prevention activities have neglected the traditional duties of responding appropriately after crimes have been committed. But it does clearly show that the department acts on the belief that crime can be avoided and resisted by identifying potential risks and by assisting citizens before they become victims.

The Springfield Police Department's mission is defined as follows:

1. To identify criminal offenders and criminal activity and, where appropriate, to apprehend offenders and participate in subsequent court proceedings.
2. To reduce the opportunities for the commission of some crimes through prevention patrols and other measures;
3. To aid individuals who are in danger of physical harm;
4. To protect constitutional guarantees;
5. To facilitate the movement of people and vehicles;
6. To assist those who cannot care for themselves;
7. To resolve conflict;
8. To identify situations that are potentially serious law enforcement or governmental problems;
9. To create and maintain a feeling of security in the community;
10. To promote and preserve civil order; and
11. To provide other services on an emergency basis.

Chief Rogers reports that aside from the salaries of the crime prevention personnel, Sergeant Harry Stoutameyer and five patrolmen, the program has a budget of only $2,000 to $3,000 per year. An effective crime prevention program can be run on so few dollars for two reasons. First, once crime avoidance is understood throughout a law enforcement agency as a real priority, many operational areas integrate crime-preventive activities into their normal routines. For example, when an officer investigates a burglary, he can also take a few minutes to conduct a quick security survey of the premises and inform the citizen how another burglary can be avoided. To encourage such a continuous concern for prevention, the Springfield department has required an eight-hour crime prevention course designed by Sergeant Stoutameyer for all patrolmen.

Springfield has also used other existing department resources for crime prevention. The department is particularly proud of its patrol car "take-home." This program allows officers to take home their marked patrol car

for personal use. They can take the car anywhere except to a tavern, and they thereby maintain a high profile of police presence throughout the city as the cars sit openly in driveways and parking lots.

Based on the presumption that police presence in any form deters some crimes of opportunity, the program has apparently had good results. The department has only anecdotal evidence to evaluate the take-home program, but there is widespread agreement with one officer who says that there has not been a burglary on his block since he started taking the car home. Other demonstrable advantages of the program are that the cars are cheaper to maintain since the officer takes care of minor upkeep. The officers with take-home cars are also often called upon by citizens in need, thus providing quicker police service more cheaply than with a regular service call. And the patrolmen enjoy the benefit of having a "company car."

The second reason crime prevention is economical is that it is not just the six members of the crime prevention section of the police department who are active. Crime prevention and a safe community are always the responsibility of the police and of the thousands of citizens who actively participate in Neighborhood Watch and other crime avoidance activities.

As Chief Rogers says, "There just aren't enough police officers to meet the public's needs. We've tried to deal with this in two ways, by directed police patrol and through crime prevention. I didn't originally think Neighborhood Watch would work, but our experience has shown I was wrong." Chief Rogers and Sergeant Stoutameyer consistently return to a refrain repeated by crime prevention practitioners around the country. "The government can't stop crime, but the police and the people can."

Sergeant Stoutameyer provides a good description of how a Neighborhood Watch program is organized in Springfield and elsewhere. This procedure has been followed in Springfield since 1978 when Chief Rogers appointed Sergeant Stoutameyer director of Springfield crime prevention. Sergeant Stoutameyer's outline follows:

When we receive a request from a citizen for information on the Neighborhood Watch Program, we tell them to contact the people on their block to see if sufficient interest is found. (Seldom are neighborhoods not receptive to involvement in the program.) A meeting is then set up for 6:30 p.m. or 7:00 p.m. and a crime prevention officer is assigned to conduct the meeting. A blank notice is provided to the organizer of the block to fill in and distribute to all houses in the block notifying them as to date, location and time of the meeting.

The meeting itself consists of three segments:

1. Physical security (a hands-on demonstration of locking devices for doors, windows, sliding glass doors, garages, etc.)

2. A movie illustrating how to protect your home, personal safety, etc. We use several different movies:

   a) National Crime Prevention Test -- Part I

   b) Invitation to Burglary

   c) Target for Terror

   d) Crime in the Home

   e) Crime -- It's a Matter of Time -- Residential

All of these films do very well in educating the participants on residential security.

3. The Neighborhood Watch Program is introduced. This includes briefly going through each handout to explain the highlights of the information contained in each brochure.

   The importance of Operation ID is discussed and the neighbors are instructed to engrave their Illinois driver's license number on their property and to take pictures of items that cannot be marked. We also encourage them to fill out a personal property log to aid them in making a quality report if they have a loss from a burglary or fire. They are told how important it is to have serial numbers of driver's license numbers listed to enable us to

enter stolen items into N.C.I.C. One or two electric engravers are issued to each Neighborhood Watch area.

We try to impress the importance of community involvement. We make the point several times throughout the meeting that Neighborhood Watch is a people program -- not a police department program. Citizen involvement is the only way for the program to be a success.

Before the meeting is completed, a tablet and pen are passed around for attendees to sign their name, address, and phone number. The information is given to the people who volunteer to be co-block captains during the meeting. (We started the program in 1979 with block captains, but found strength in numbers. You cannot have too many co-block captains.) The only responsibility of the co-block captains is to determine from the list those residents who did not attend the meeting. Materials are left for the co-block captains to pass out to neighbors who did not attend the meeting and explain how they get involved in the program

Neighborhoods that comply with the program are given our Neighborhood Watch Signs. The signs are made up by our Traffic Engineering Department and installed in predetermined locations. At the close of the meeting, we tell the people that 90% of the residents in the Neighborhood Watch area must comply to some degree to qualify for the Neighborhood Watch Sign. Hopefully, during the meeting, we have convinced them to install security deadbolt locks, secure windows, cut shrubs, install security lighting, etc., but due to time constraints we cannot go back to that neighborhood and do a survey for every house. The bottom line for receiving the sign is 90% of the residents to place the Neighborhood Watch Stickers on the front and rear storm doors. All neighborhoods we have checked have complied to a greater extent than just putting up stickers but unfortunately none of the neighborhoods have complied 100% either.[2]

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2. From Springfield Police Department background statement, "Springfield, Illinois Neighborhood Watch Program Description."

The city of Springfield reports having 330 individual Neighborhood Watch programs organized since 1978 with over 25,000 citizens (about one-fourth of the local population) having been trained in upgrading physical security and on how to report a crime in progress. Residential and commercial burglaries have declined each year of the program's operation. In 1979 burglaries decreased 1%; in 1980 they decreased 5%; and in 1981 the police department reported a 26.4% decrease in burglaries.

RESOURCEFULNESS AND RESOURCES

The examples of successful crime reduction in Sangamon County and Springfield, Illinois, apparently as a result of the two law enforcement agencies' crime prevention programs, demonstrate that an impact can be made on crime in smaller municipalities as well as in large cities. While urban police forces have many advantages, and long-standing urban community action groups can be quite helpful, neither is necessary for crime prevention. The examples of these communities' experiences show that the professional resourcefulness of law enforcement agencies combined with one crucial resource -- the active support of the citizenry -- makes the difference in resisting crimes of opportunity.

Chief Rogers in Springfield describes the success of crime prevention in his area in terms of necessity being the mother of invention. He says, "Decades of research and experience show that law enforcement agencies aren't very efficient in fighting crime. But at the same time, I've got to produce results. I can't wait for a state agency or anything else. We at the local level have to anticipate and solve problems."

One possible danger of the limited financial resources of individual localities is, as Professor Gail Truitt of Lincoln Land Community College put it, "They (crime prevention programs) have a tendency to be short-lived. For example, we had a relatively high arson rate in the City of Springfield within the last two or three years. The police put a great emphasis on the investigation of arson. It went away for a while so they stopped concentrating on it and it is now tending to come back. Overall though, given their budget, manpower, and resources, they do a very good job."

JACKSONVILLE, FLORIDA

IMPROVED POLICE SERVICES

Jacksonville, the most populous city in Florida (600,000) and the largest city in land area in the country, has made great strides in offering its citizens improved police services. The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office has made two notable crime control efforts. First, during a time of national and local budget constraints and growing crime rates, Jacksonville has improved the effectiveness of its law enforcement services while reducing law enforcement costs to the community. Second, Jacksonville has instituted a wide range of joint police-civilian activities aimed at crime prevention and community patrol functions which are economical for the sheriff's office and promote better police-community relations.

A program to manage police personnel more efficiently and economically, the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program (ICAP) was instituted in Jacksonville in 1977. The program addressed such patrol problems in Jacksonville as response time to service calls and personal attention that patrol officers had been giving to different types of calls for service. ICAP also placed emphasis on tactical crime prevention, on handling victims of crime, and on special attention to habitual offenders.

Information is the key to ICAP crime control: information about staffing patrol needs, crime patterns, likely targets of victimization, the special needs of crime victims and witnesses, and the backgrounds, whereabouts, and habits of repeat offenders.

Statistics show that ICAP has been successful over the last five years. There has been a 27% increase in arrests since 1977. Simultaneously, the cost of police services has declined by 9% on a per capita basis for Jacksonville citizens.

The Jacksonville police department also recognizes the interdependence of the police and the community in which they function. Special efforts have been made to integrate Jacksonville citizens into programs designed to protect their property and their communities. Over 400 civilian volunteers participate in civilian patrol, crime prevention and victim/ witness assistance programs. These volunteer programs all require extensive training for participants and close supervision by sworn officers.

"LAW-AND-ORDER FOLKS"

The Honorable Everett R. Richardson, Judge of the Fourth Judicial Circuit of Florida and former Chief Judge from 1977 to 1981, describes Jacksonville, Florida, as a "stable place, inclined to be unilaterally conservative, with law-and-order folks" -- hardly a description you might expect of a municipality which has undergone a restructuring of its law enforcement agency and philosophy which many people around the country would consider experimental or even radical.

According to Judge Richardson, however, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office, the law enforcement agency for the consolidated government of the city of Jacksonville and most of Duval County, "has consistently tried to provide the best possible service to the public. They're continually looking at how to do that, not necessarily through innovation, but through reevaluation and gradual change."

Judge Richardson and many other people in Jacksonville say that the outlook of the sheriff's office is made possible by the unique consolidated government structure of city and county. This structure allows for a centralized law enforcement operation for Jacksonville, the largest city in population in the state of Florida (about 600,000) and the largest city in land area (about 827 square miles) in the lower forty-eight United States. The city's centralized government and law enforcement framework is complemented by a stable political, economic and demographic infrastructure -- mostly Democratic; an unemployment rate historically of about 6% to 7% (in January 1983 it was 8%); and a steady racial composition of about 25% black, 75% white.

During the years Judge Richardson was chief judge, he worked closely with the two other key people affecting law enforcement in Jacksonville, Sheriff Dale Carson and Mayor Ed Austin. "During those years there were no surprises. We had close relationships. No one acted quickly on emotions. We dealt with problems by getting on the phone and talking things out. We put our heads together to solve problems. None of us needed publicity."

The centralized legal structure and the private cooperation of leading officials allowed Jacksonville to make changes in law enforcement which likely would have encountered strong resistance in many other municipalities. Beginning in 1977, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office instituted a gradual program for the management of police priorities and patrol investigation which challenged many of the standard assumptions about law enforcement patrols and priorities. Until 1982 the program was coordinated nationally through the LEAA in seventeen cities. The program is called ICAP, the Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program. It is to a large degree the basis for what Judge Richardson described in Jacksonville as "the best police structure I've seen" and for making Jacksonville's one of the most frequently commended law enforcement agencies in our survey of crime control experts.

CRIME IN JACKSONVILLE

Tables 1 and 2, below, illustrate Jacksonville's position relative to the seven other cities in Florida with populations over 100,000. Jacksonville has the largest population of these cities, and its crime rate, according to FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics, has not significantly declined. However, as Table 2 shows, Jacksonville does have the second lowest crime rate per 100,000 of these eight largest Florida cities and is maintaining that position with the third lowest officer-to-population ratio.

Table 1: Per Capita Crime Rates, 1980-81, in the Eight Cities in Florida with Populations over 100,000*

City	Crime Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants 1980	Crime Rates per 100,000 Inhabitants 1981	Percent Change %
Jacksonville	7,901.7	7,836.1	-1
Miami	15,650.0	14,832.0	-5
Tampa	14,477.7	14,308.8	-2
St. Petersburg	9,021.0	8,419.9	-7
Hialeah	7,263.3	6,867.5	-5
Fort Lauderdale	13,604.0	13,454.5	-2
Orlando	13,717.1	12,862.6	-6
Hollywood	10,964.5	10,834.9	-1

* Source: Crime in the United States, 1980 and Crime in the United States, 1981, U.S. Department of Justice.

The success story in Jacksonville centers on the strides made by the sheriff's office in improving police services -- making them both more efficient and more economical. Improved policing along with the relatively stable crime rate, however, have together contributed to a familiar American community problem. The courts and corrections parts of the criminal justice system have not expanded their capabilities to deal as efficiently with the increased number of people charged and convicted. But none of these other factors lessen the real accomplishments of the law enforcement agency in Jacksonville in responding to citizens' needs.

Table 2: Selected Criminal Justice Statistics for the Eight Cities in Florida over 100,000 in Population*

Population	1981 Population	1981 Crime Rate per 100,000 Inhabitants	Ranking in Crime Rate per 100,000, Lowest to Highest	1981 Law Enforcement Employees per 1,000 Population
Jacksonville	546,675	8,244.4	2	1.73
Miami	387,357	13,659.5	6	2.22
Tampa	271,174	15,066.3	8	2.18
St. Petersburg	239,993	8,706.1	3	1.58
Hialeah	159,887	6,555.3	1	1.54
Fort Lauderdale	153,814	14,317.3	7	2.60
Orlando	130,403	13,396.2	5	3.03
Hollywood	121,955	11,029.5	4	2.18

* Source: Crime in Florida, 1981, Florida Department of Law Enforcement.

ICAP

The Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program is a personnel and information management system focused primarily on the patrol function of a law enforcement agency. ICAP, originally known as the Patrol Emphasis Program, was an LEAA program originated under the direction of Robert Heck in 1977 with thirteen participating municipal law enforcement agencies.

ICAP's basic concept is not revolutionary. The program simply seeks to manage police personnel more efficiently and economically. But realizing that goal has proven to be no simple matter, since the most effective and economical policing methods are not necessarily consistent with traditional ideas concerning police patrols, police services, and criminal investigations.

For example, nearly every citizen anticipates that the local law enforcement agency will respond promptly and in person to any and every call for service. Customarily, police departments have shared this perspective of what makes an appropriate police patrol. The conventional test to evaluate patrol efficiency has been "response time," or the average time required for an officer to arrive on the premises in answer to a call for service. Breaking the three-minute response-time barrier has been the goal of thousands of policemen in departments nationwide.

This concern about response time and personal attention to every service call essentially means that patrol officers have been giving the same priority to a complaint about noise as to an aggravated assault. A fixation on response time ignores the fact that many calls for service need not immediately be attended to in person by a sworn officer.

Robert Heck, former director of the National ICAP program, asserts that only 15% of the calls received by the police, even regarding serious violent crimes, require immediate attention. Therefore, a delayed response or one without a personal physical presence is appropriate in 85% of all calls, since there is no serious safety threat or likelihood of destruction. In addition, Heck contends that prompt patrol response improves the on-scene arrest rate only negligibly. Therefore, ICAP proponents argue, in the overwhelming number of cases it is not how fast you get to the scene of a crime, but what you do when you get there that matters most in criminal investigation and apprehension.

Likewise, ICAP affirms that the detective specialization on the force impedes rather than facilitates effective police work. Traditionally, the patrol officer responds to a call for service, takes information, then passes a report on to the investigative unit. Some time later, usually several days, a detective follows up on the report, often beginning by collecting the same information the patrolman has already gathered. This time lag between the call for services and the investigation often makes victims and witnesses less reliable and cooperative. It may even suggest to those involved that the police force does not view their case as important.

ICAP, on the other hand, argues that the most effective, efficient, and economical investigative procedure is one that trains patrol officers to conduct their own investigations and follow-ups to whatever extent possible.

This can be done only if the patrolman is freed from immediate and on-the-scene responses to non-essential complaints.

Another important example of ICAP's redefining of the patrol function is evident in its encouragement of the "directed patrol." The standard model has been three equal-sized shifts in a designated area, on "random patrol," essentially walking or cruising while responding to calls as they come in.

ICAP proponents have been vociferously critical of the random patrol. They assert that crime statistics indicate that there are certain times of the day when the rate of crimes committed is likely to increase and that patrol shifts should be staffed and directed to reflect these trends. Again, all this is possible only if officers are pulled off random patrols and not expected to respond in person to all calls for service.

These examples are just the vanguard of the ICAP's war on crime. ICAP also places a high priority on tactical crime prevention, on handling victims of crime, and on investigative activities focused on habitual offenders and career criminals. From the ICAP perspective, information is the key to crime control: information about staffing patrol needs; information about crime patterns; information about likely targets of victimization; information about the special needs of crime victims and witnesses; and information about the lives and habits of known repeat offenders.

Adoption of ICAP strategies usually requires a radical rethinking by local law enforcement agencies as to their priorities and operational techniques. The new procedures also take years to implement as they usually have to be sold not only to the police force but also to the public. Yet the program's benefits seem to make it work the effort. Once in place, ICAP improves police services, makes police departments more efficient, requires no additional resources or personnel, and generally improves the patrol force's level of job satisfaction. Robert Heck enthusiastically describes the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office as exemplifying the state of the art in patrol management. He attributes this to their long-term commitment to implementing ICAP techniques together with the public support they have earned over the years.

Jacksonville

ICAP IN JACKSONVILLE

The first stage (1977-1979) of Jacksonville's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program entailed the development of a comprehensive crime analysis unit in the sheriff's office. Consistent with ICAP objectives, the department felt that it could effectively redesign its operations only if it had the appropriate information about crime patterns in Jacksonville. The information required goes far beyond the year-end totals of reported crimes, arrests, clearances, etc. Really useful crime data means detailed statistics about all reported crimes, and the timely identification of trends or patterns which will indicate the need for special patrols or the likelihood of increased activities by repeat offenders.

Also during this limitation period, in 1978 the department implemented a patrol investigative procedure to prepare officers to assume greater responsibility. By 1979, as the crime analysis unit became better able to provide timely information on a regular basis, directed patrols and a management system for service calls were introduced. Patrols commenced answering prescreened calls in accordance to their seriousness. Officers were also assigned to patrol activities designed to have the greatest impact on crimes in targeted areas.

The second phase of the ICAP in Jacksonville was implemented in 1980-1981. It expanded patrol inquiry procedures, instituted special training for officers, brought citizen volunteers onto the crime analysis unit, and increased the sophistication of investigation and operations techniques. The third phase of Jacksonville's ICAP, beginning in 1982, originated several specially focused programs: comprehensive crime prevention, anti-arson plans, victim/ witness assistance activities, career criminal projects and anti-violent crime efforts.

Today, the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office is proud of the results of its ICAP as it has evolved over the past five years. While there has been a 15% increase in calls for service, and a 13.5% increase in actual offenses, 22% of all calls requiring a report are now handled over the phone and the department has realized a 20.1% per unit cost reduction in handling the service calls.

The directed patrol efforts, based on information supplied by the crime analysis unit, have yielded a 68% increase in the average monthly arrest

rate of perpetrators while the crime is in progress. There has also been a 21% increase in the average monthly arrests per patrolman for murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault. The gains have occurred during a period when the population increased by about 2% and the overall number of sworn officers decreased by about 1.5% with a concomitant 2.6% decrease in inflation-adjusted dollars. Overall there has been a 27% increase in arrests since 1977, a percentage exceeding the 13.5% increase in offenses. At the same time, the cost of police services declined 9% on a per capita basis for Jacksonville citizens, and the per unit cost of these increased arrests was reduced 27.4%.

An independent assessment by Koepsell Associates of the cost-efficiency and productivity of Jacksonville's ICAP revealed the following conclusions:

* Between 1977 and 1982, net per capita expenditures for police services decreased 3% in inflation-adjusted dollars. Net expenditures for other Jacksonville city services increased 26%.

* The agenda of police activities (handling calls, dispatching officers, investigating criminal offenses, making arrests and affecting criminal clearances) all showed decreases in per unit cost in adjusted dollars.

* While the ratio of sworn officers to 1,000 citizens declined from 1.68 to 1.62, and calls for service increased 6%, the calls requiring that a policeman be dispatched decreased 2%.

* The annual number of reported crimes per patrol officer increased from 130 to 152.

* The per capita annual arrest rate of patrol officers and detectives rose from fifty-four to seventy-two while the number of these officers dropped from 531 to 494.

* The per capita annual clearance rate for patrolmen and detectives grew from an average of thirty-five to thirty-nine.

According to Gary Higgins, chief of planning and research at the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office and ICAP project director, all these accomplishments show "a clear recognition that we're in a people business in

policing, a manpower-intensive business, and that policing can be managed more effectively and efficiently." ICAP , according to Chief Higgins, shows that "policing can be a proactive activity." Calls can be managed; they need not manage the patrol force. Since crime patterns can be identified and indicate future likely targets, patrols can be directed accordingly.

Proactive police patrols and investigations are consistent with the new initiatives reflected in modern police and private citizen approaches to crime prevention. All these activities seek to identify risks and vulnerabilities and to deal with the specific threats of crime most effectively and economically. None of these strategies designed to react after crimes have been committed. The underlying presumption is that some crimes will tend to occur; therefore, the most frequent crimes should be identified, vulnerability to them should be minimized, and the response to crimes once committed should be informed and appropriate.

JACKSONVILLE'S CRIME ANALYSIS UNIT

At the heart of Jacksonville's Integrated Criminal Apprehension Program is the Crime Analysis Unit. Effective deployment of patrols and resources can only be achieved by foreseeing where and when the greatest demands for police manpower will occur.

There is a common misconception that local law enforcement agencies always have information they need regarding crimes committed within their jurisdictions. Also, since most local law enforcement agencies provide their crime statistics to the FBI, it is generally thought that these local agencies have at hand information about changing crime patterns. They do not.

Yearly totals on reported crimes are of little use to those making day-to-day operating decisions in a local law enforcement agency. Furthermore, information on file somewhere is not necessarily in a helpful form to the individual who has to act on it. The kind of sophisticated organization and analytic back-up brought to bear on highly publicized crimes or in TV show investigations are usually just not available for the great majority of everyday crimes that take up most of the police officer's attention and affect the largest number of citizens.

It has regularly been the case that patrol officers have no way of determining what happened on their beats during the sixteen hours they are off duty. Reports of crimes committed during one shift are not immediately available to the next shift as a routine matter. This situation gives local criminals the advantage of being able to carry out burglaries, for example, around the clock with reasonable certainty that no one will pick up on their patterns for some time.

Likewise, police managers can do very little to target patrols when they do not have access to timely information about where, when, and how crimes are being committed. Since the majority of street crimes and burglaries are attributable to repeat offenders who usually work within a short distance of their residences, police patrols can be made much more effective if managers and patrolmen can be kept apprised with accurate data of crimes as they happen. Gathering such information, identifying patterns in it and supplying the facts to the individuals responsible for acting on it is the central goal of the crime analysis unit which makes ICAP.

The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office initiated its ICAP by forming a Crime Analysis Unit in 1977. The section consisted of two officers who created a manual filing system for all reported burglaries and robberies. The object of the system was to enable the crime analysts to spot patterns in burglaries and robberies so directed patrols could be appropriately assigned. The group's services and personnel have grown steadily and they have also acquired computer technology to ensure that information remains immediately accessible.

Today the Crime Analysis Unit provides 24-hour reports printed at 6:00 a.m., 2:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m. daily as well as weekly and monthly reports organized by patrol beat and by type of crime. Continuous research is undertaken in fourteen areas: agricultural crimes, burglary to auto, burglary to residence, career criminals, purse snatching, robbery to individuals, thefts, auto accessory thefts, burglary to business, burglary to coin devices, field investigations, robbery to business, sex crimes, and violent crime. The unit is headed by Sergeant Charley Hill and is staffed by five officers with a crime analyst designation and by about a dozen citizen volunteers.

All this information enables the force to deploy manpower and resources where they are most needed. When in November, 1981 the Crime Analysis Unit identified a sharp increase in robberies over the previous year's November statistics, the department reallocated patrols to counter the profiled crime patterns. The rash of robberies was quickly brought under control without a loss of quality in police service for other areas.

Sergeant Hill of the Crime Analysis Unit cites the example of a machete robber as dramatically illustrating the usefulness of this crime analysis. Almost a year ago, among the normal complement of eighty to ninety burglary reports per day, the Sheriff's Office began to receive reports of convenience store robberies being carried out by a perpetrator using a machete. After a few such holdups were committed during the course of a week, the Crime Analysis Unit was able to put together a complete profile on the perpetrator, projecting the most likely time for the robberies, type of target, getaway method, etc.

The Crime Analysis Unit noted that incidents took place in pairs, between midnight and 1:00 a.m., with the first robbery on one side of the St. John's River and the second on the other side. Once the trend was identified, the police were able to organize a stake-out which successfully ended the machete robber's spree. This whole scenario covered less than two weeks and ended the perpetrator's string of crimes within the time most reports take to be processed in other police departments.

Consistent with the Jacksonville Sheriff's Office's longstanding sponsorship of volunteer programs, the Crime Analysis Unit has the assistance of about a dozen senior citizen volunteers. The volunteers work mostly on the enormous task of logging and plotting, filing and cross-tabulating information necessary for analysis.

Based on a senior citizen model used by crime analysis units in the Tidewater, Virginia, police departments, and supported by the National Retired Teachers Association and the American Association of Retired Persons, Jacksonville's Crime Analysis Unit began its senior citizen volunteer program early in 1981. Adding this program to the Crime Analysis Unit has been another notable success both for the department and for the volunteers. During 1981 the private citizens donated a total of 3,600 hours, the equivalent of nearly two years of full-time employment in the department. Each

volunteer works about twelve to fifteen hours per week. As they receive no salary, the only costs these individuals represent to the unit are overhead and the materials they use in their work. The volunteers have also been more than satisfied with their work for the unit, and there has been a regular surplus of qualified applicants for the positions.

VOLUNTEERISM AND THE JACKSONVILLE SHERIFF'S OFFICE

The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office's concern for efficient and effective police service extends beyond the performance of its regular patrol officers. The department has long recognized the mutual dependence of the police and the community and has made special efforts to secure the goodwill and cooperation of the citizenry. Furthermore, consistent with Judge Richardson's description of the population as "law-and-order folks," there is a strong traditional impulse among these citizens to play a part in the protection of their property and community.

The sheriff's office has, therefore, developed over the years a number of civilian-volunteer programs which actively involve citizens in a variety of crucial police services. The senior citizen volunteers in the crime analysis unit are just one small example of the private citizen participation in Jacksonville police activities.

The Public Services Division of the sheriff's office maintains nineteen civilian and sworn officer professionals on permanent staff, but also manages over 400 civilian volunteers. The volunteer uniformed programs include the Police Auxiliary, the Community Posse, CB Watch, Motorcycle Escort, Mounted Police, and marine and four-wheel drive posses while the non-uniformed programs include a Safe House program, a Victim Advocate Program, a Drug Abuse Speaker's Bureau, and the Police Athletic League.

The volunteer efforts have contributed enormous support to Jacksonville law enforcement. The following list is only a partial tally of volunteer activity. In 1981 the Police Auxiliary provided 11,483 man-hours assisting patrols on regular assignments or on special duty such as stake-outs and undercover operations. The Jacksonville Community Posse contributed 2,384 hours to crime prevention activities. The Four-Wheel Drive Posse (a search and rescue operation) put in 31,044 man-hours in searches, crowd control, and guard duty. The Jacksonville Mounted Police Reserve contributed 34,725

hours to riding with sworn officers on patrol, walking beats, and at special events. The Marine Posse put in 2,437 hours in sea patrol, special events patrol, and water search and rescue. The sheriff's Communication Watch (monitoring ham and CB radios) contributed 9,203 volunteer hours. The sheriff's Motorcycle Escort provided 900 hours of safe conduct surveillance, crowd and traffic control.

The volunteer programs all require extensive training and supervision by sworn officers. Volunteers also supply their own vehicles, uniforms, radios, etc.

The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office Crime Prevention Unit, comprised of two officers and three civilian professionals, has the primary responsibility for Jacksonville's Neighborhood Watch and for sponsoring programs and disseminating information about various aspects of crime prevention: security inspections, juvenile crime curtailment, drug abuse restriction, crime deterrence for the elderly, sexual assault avoidance, and victim/witness assistance activities. The crime prevention unit assists and works with participants in several of the volunteer programs, providing them with research support, informational materials, technical back-up, and expertise in crime prevention.

The Crime Prevention Unit organized or participated with volunteer organizations in a total of 907 crime prevention programs in 1981.

THE POLICE ARE THE PUBLIC AND THE PUBLIC ARE THE POLICE

Current progressive police technologies have returned to the principles of law enforcement set out by the British statesman Sir Robert Peel (the man after whom the British "bobbies" are nicknamed.) His nine principles assert the importance of good relations between a law enforcement agency and the citizens it serves. Two of his best known principles are:

* Police, at all times, should maintain a relationship with the public that realizes the historic tradition: the police are the public and the public are the police.

* The ability of the police to perform their duties is dependent upon public approval of police actions.

The Jacksonville Sheriff's Office has made a concerted effort to provide the best possible police service while keeping costs down and maintaining positive relations with the community.

Until this year Jacksonville's ICAP had the benefit of federal funding through LEAA grants. Now, however, it is on its own. Its success has dramatically demonstrated what can be accomplished in terms of improved police services within existing resources. Jacksonville is now playing a major role in the development of FCAP, the Florida Criminal Apprehension System, coordinated through the Florida Department of Law Enforcement. Jacksonville's experience and expertise is helping other law enforcement agencies throughout the state improve local police services, increase arrests, and cut costs.

Throughout the history of Jacksonville's program to improve police services, there has been no serious public concern about abuse of police powers. The department has changed its methods quickly and without fanfare, but always with the implicit support of the community and often with the direct assistance of the Jacksonville volunteers.

All the crime problems in Jacksonville are by no means solved. The official crime rate is up, and the increased efficiency of law enforcement is currently straining the local judiciary and corrections systems to their limits. Nevertheless the clear lesson of Jacksonville's experience is once again that something can be done about crime. Policing can be significantly improved and law enforcement made more aggressive and effective without abuse of police power and with widespread public support. "The police are the public and the public are the police" is the unspoken motto of law enforcement in Jacksonville.

NEW PRIDE, INC., DENVER, COLORADO

AN EXPERIMENT IN COMMUNITY-BASED CORRECTIONS

The New Pride corrections program strives to alter the behavior of juvenile delinquents for their own benefit as well as for the protection of the community. It also emphasizes the importance of community involvement in the treatment of juvenile repeat offenders. The project was conceived in 1971 when the Denver Red Cross decided to offer new services to inner city residents.

The successes of the New Pride program are largely attributed to the fact that it addresses the entire spectrum of problems these offenders face: their home situation, lack of academic skills, need for job training, and need to build self-confidence. While the New Pride program is not an absolute solution to juvenile crime, many of its objectives have been substantially met in the Denver area, and the annual cost for enrolling youth in New Pride is about one-third the cost of incarcerating a juvenile offender.

The New Pride experiment in community-based corrections for juvenile repeat offenders has gained enthusiastic support in Denver and has drawn national attention. The New Pride program has been replicated across the country with mixed results, but the program's experience nevertheless represents one promising alternative in reducing the likelihood that juvenile offenders will become career criminals and/or be permanently institutionalized.

AN ALTERNATIVE TO IMPRISONMENT

In this survey of crime control experts, the only corrections program cited with any frequency was the New Pride, Inc. project. Originated in Denver ten years ago, it has been replicated by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in ten other cities around the country.

The fact that correctional programs were rarely cited by the surveyed experts as effective in crime control is consistent with the widespread public frustration with corrections efforts and rehabilitation of criminals. The fact that New Pride was repeatedly mentioned by professionals from around the country indicates that its accomplishments and reputation make it stand out significantly from the majority of other such corrections attempts.

New Pride is a community-based corrections program: that is, it is a program for offenders that does not incarcerate them, but allows them to continue living in their normal environment. It is a project designed for the treatment of juvenile repeat offenders and has three goals: 1) to change the behavior of offenders without incarcerating them; 2) to protect the community; and 3) to involve the community in the treatment and reintegration of these youths into productive lives within society.

HISTORY OF THE PROJECT

In 1971 the Denver Mile High Chapter of the American Red Cross received a mandate from the Red Cross to provide new kinds of services to inner city residents. As part of this mandate, they hired Tom James, who had extensive experience with inner city organizations and had the resources to develop Red Cross services for the surrounding urban community.

One of James' and the community's primary concerns was the rising rate of juvenile crime. Among James' priorities, therefore, was a group of educational services -- tutoring, arts and crafts classes, health classes, and recreational activities -- aimed at the youth being held in the Juvenile Hall, which was at that time a detention center for pre-trial and adjudicated minors. The activities were arranged by the Red Cross but were entirely implemented by volunteers.

It soon became clear to James and the Red Cross that the older youths in the center suffered from two overwhelming problems: first, they needed jobs, which they probably never would find because of their second problem, their serious academic deficiencies. Most were high school dropouts, and many could neither read nor write.

James went on to spend more than a year designing a project geared to youths with the greatest need, who represented a serious threat to the community and themselves -- juvenile burglary or robbery offenders with at least one arrest and/or conviction, with established records as repeat offenders, who lived in high-crime areas, whose home environment was usually a single-parent household with a lower socio-economic background, with a history of failures at school.

The program that James conceived was a rehabilitation project with special emphasis on 1) academic education, including special activities for juveniles with learning disabilities, 2) counseling, 3) cultural education, and 4) employment guidance. James worked closely with the Denver Anti-Crime Council, the Denver Mayor's Commission of Youth, probation officers, and judges of the Denver Juvenile Court.

The resulting program, initiated in July 1973 and named New Pride, was from the beginning a joint community effort. Funding came primarily from the Denver Anti-Crime Council, and through that organization, from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration. The Denver Chamber of Commerce officially "adopted" the program and provided volunteer tutors and participants in the cultural education aspect of the program.

The Denver Anti-Crime Council funded the program through 1976, and since that time most of the monies have come through the Colorado Division of Youth Services. In January 1977, New Pride was named an Exemplary Project by the National Institute of Law Enforcement under the LEAA. In 1981 the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and delinquency Prevention undertook to duplicate the New Pride program in ten other cities around the nation at a cost of over $13 million.

Denver

A COMMUNITY-BASED PROGRAM

Judge Orrelle Weeks, the presiding judge of Denver County's juvenile court, says, "We set this up together. It was tailored to help the courts so they wouldn't have to send the juvenile offenders away."

Weeks' comment sums up the central premise of New Pride, the element which is probably at the heart of the program's success and the feature which has brought national attention to the project. Not only is the program community-based and non-residential, but the community has been brought into a partnership with the juveniles to make the program work for them both.

New Pride participants are assigned by a judge to the program as a last resort before incarceration. They have to agree to comply with the rules of the project, and its administrators have to be willing to accept the youths. New Pride administrators do refuse to accept some referrals, if they believe that the person's record indicates incorrigibility or if they believe he is too dangerous to be left at liberty in the community.

New Pride participants live at home, in the environment in which they are most familiar and comfortable. However, the program also recognizes that there are features in that environment which have contributed to the minor's delinquency. Therefore, the program introduces a number of new and positive influences into their lives.

First of all, the parents of all participants must agree to attend counseling sessions before their children are accepted into the program. Second, counseling sessions for the juveniles themselves are held on an almost daily basis during the first six months of the program. Third, every effort is made to ensure that participants confer regularly with their parole officers and fulfill whatever responsibilities they might have. Fourth is the educational component of the program, in which the youngsters meet with tutors and volunteers to work on academic problems and follow remedial curricula tailored to their specific needs.

During the next six months, the program focuses on reintegrating participants back into their community. Special attention is given to learning job skills, including techniques required when applying for employment. The youths are also helped to find part-time positions in the

community while they are still part of the program. New Pride pays the juveniles' salaries during the first two months on the job, which serve as a trial period, and assists them in strengthening skills that will help ensure continued employment.

In addition, a cultural education element in the program assists the youths in developing social skills and self-confidence so they can comfortably cope in a variety of activities and settings. Participants are taken on field trips to see how certain organizations and businesses in the city operate -- for example, how television shows are made. Their experiences are broadened through such opportunities as an Outward Bound weekend and sports, recreational, or cultural events.

All of these activities -- the education, counseling, employment, and acculturation -- are tailored to the individual needs of the participant while in his home environment. A participant in a community-based corrections program such as New Pride never faces the difficult transitions of adapting to prison culture and then of reintegrating back into society. New Pride keeps the participants in society, and attempts within that environment to modify their behavior so they can live happy and productive lives.

The success that New Pride has had is partially attributable to Tom James and others on the staff who recognized that not only should the participants stay in the community, but that the community has a responsibility to be supportive of the participants.

Tom James has been called, not unkindly, a "master of borrowing expertise." He not only designed the program expressly to the needs of the juveniles, the courts, and the parole officers, but he designed the program to gain the optimum amount of cooperation from local business people and other citizens so that they would be willing to provide jobs and volunteer for tutoring and similar kinds of assistance.

THE HOLISTIC APPROACH

Project New Pride not only treats the participants in their home community, but it also treats their unusual range of needs, dealing with the whole person. The crucial point of this holistic method of treatment lies in two presuppositions: 1) that anti-social behavior is the result of a

complex set of interdependent circumstances that must be addressed simultaneously, and 2) that the program participants are not beyond help in assuming socially useful lives.

The project defines the profile of the typical participant:

> The typical New Pride client is a Spanish-surnamed male; an adjudicated delinquent, with a history of six or more prior arrests. He is 16 years old, from a single-parent family (the mother) and has three or more siblings, who in most cases have also had contact with the juvenile justice system. The family is receiving some form of public assistance, living a transient lifestyle, and includes one member who has been incarcerated. The child has probably dropped out of school, completing either ninth or tenth grade, and has several identifiable learning disabilities, although possessing average or above average intelligence. He has a history of expulsion and/or other school-related failures. The child's most recent attendance in school can usually be attributed to a court order.
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> The client's home is unstable, nonsupportive, and frequently other family members are involved in illegal activities and may be contributing to the delinquency of the client. The child is often viewed as an unwanted burden. He has frequently been placed in a variety of treatment programs designed to rehabilitate him. In almost all cases these "treatments" have been failures and have contributed to his feelings of low self-esteem. He has been incarcerated for brief periods of time and expects to be rearrested.[1]

From the beginning the program has tried to keep the juveniles from reverting to their criminal behavior when under stress. It does this by dealing with the individual's complete range of problems from improving his home situation, to academic skills, to job training, and building self-confidence.

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1. Tom Jones, quoted in Carol Holiday Blew, Daniel McGillis, and Gerold Bryant, Project New Pride: Denver, Colorado -- An Exemplary Project. Office of Technology Transfer, National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, LEAA and the U.S. Department of Justice, 1977.

Participants in New Pride are tested to determine if they have any perceptual or cognitive learning disabilities. More than 70% of the participants in a given year have been found to have at least two learning disabilities. The most common inabilities involve difficulties with auditory discrimination and deficiencies in auditory or visual memory. Those who are most severely handicapped with perceptual and/or learning disabilities, about 25% of all program participants, are treated and tutored at one of New Pride's two educational facilities, the Morgan Center for Learning Disabilities. At the Morgan Center a plan of physical therapy and counseling is devised for each participant.

All the youth attend the New Pride Alternative School in which the curriculum is adapted to individual needs. Volunteers tutor participants two to three days per week. Most juveniles elect to prepare to return to school or to obtain a high school equivalency certificate.

New Pride participants also receive psychological and behavioral counseling designed to improve self-image and help in coping with the environment. The minors have regular counselors who also meet with their families, teachers, social workers, probation officers, judges, and anyone else relevant. Counselors also at times request a consulting psychologist to perform psychological evaluations.

In addition to educational programs and counseling services, New Pride participants attend job skills workshops to learn how to look and apply for a job. At the beginning of the reintegration period, they are placed in a position within the community with New Pride paying the salary. The jobs are usually in janitorial services, service industries, or building construction. New Pride recently received a HUD grant for $190,000 to renovate forty houses in Denver. About forty program participants work on the renovations under the supervision of teachers from the school system and three licensed contractors.

None of the New Pride services in themselves is unusual, but the combination of them all within one organization, this holistic approach, has made the program notably unique.

EVALUATION AND RESULTS OF THE PROGRAM

The obvious question that arises is how effective New Pride is. Does it work? As in the evaluations of most criminal justice activities, the statistics have to be reviewed with caution, primarily because we cannot know how these same youths would have turned out without New Pride.

New Pride has been evaluated in a number of ways and the records of New Pride participants have been compared to roughly comparable youth who were not participants. However, there are no youths comparable to New Pride participants who are not receiving some kind of treatment or probation monitoring, or who are not incarcerated. And obvious ethical considerations as well as concern for the safety of the community would force the creation of an experimental control group of juveniles for purposes of comparison with the program participants.

One special gauge of New Pride's success has to be its mere survival. As has been indicated throughout this report, crime control and crime resistance programs are more likely than not to drop by the wayside. Even programs with good records often terminate because funding is cut off or due to lack of continued community support. New Pride's ten-year record in Denver and its expansion across the country reflects consistent confidence and belief in the program's principles as well as its positive impact on local youth.

Another measure of New Pride's success is the fact that it was chosen by the federal Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention to be replicated across the nation. The decision to duplicate New Pride, however, was not made without dissent. The October 1981 issue of Corrections magazine weighed the pros and cons behind that decision. Though some critics of the Denver program acknowledged the encouraging signs of success attributable to the effort, they questioned whether New Pride's record was strong enough yet to warrant the massive federal expenditures required in implementing the project elsewhere.

As of early 1983, only four of the original ten New Pride spin-off programs were still in operation. Three were closed shortly after their start-up, largely because of administrative problems. Three more programs lost their federal funding in 1983, although that cut-off in no way reflected a judgment that the programs had failed. They had simply not

received sufficient local funding to indicate that they could be institutionalized in the foreseeable future.

The four New Pride models are in Pensacola, Florida; Fresno, California; Camden, New Jersey; and Providence, Rhode Island. These programs have two major accomplishments to their credit so far. First, they have been administratively successful and judged to be serving their participant base well. Second, they have received enough regional funding to suggest to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention that they are well on the way to being locally institutionalized.

John Rector, who was head of the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention in the late 1970s, admits in the Corrections article that the decision to replicate New Pride was partially made simply because it seemed to be the best existing -- and the least threatening to surrounding localities -- community-based corrections program. New Pride at least had a track record of some success, something most other experimental projects could not claim.

The 1977 evaluation of the Denver New Pride effort, conducted by ABT Associates and released in conjunction with its being cited as an Exemplary Program by the LEAA, enumerated several examples of the program's positive impact. After twelve months in the community, only 27% of New Pride participants were rearrested for an offense serious enough to have had them referred to the program in the first place. However, 32% of a roughly comparable group of non-New Pride participants were rearrested for such offenses.

Tom James estimates that currently about half of the New Pride youths have been rearrested, but he compares that to the 78% rearrest rate which the Denver Anti-Crime Council maintains is typical. James also says, however, that only about one in five of rearrests among New Pride participants is for a felony and of those arrested only 37% are charged.

Seventy percent (70%) of the New Pride juveniles were placed in jobs and the rearrest rate among employed participants was one-third that of unemployed participants. New Pride's critics, however, are quick to point out that most of the New Pride-employed participants do not keep their jobs beyond the two-month trial period in which the program pays their salaries.

No one can say with confidence whether this less than impressive job-holding record reflects participants' behavior or the state of the economy. But New Pride administrators maintain that whatever the reason for the lack of long-term success of the job program, this New Pride position represents the one and only time most of their participants have ever held a job of any kind, and that in itself makes the job-placement component of the program worthwhile.

The 1977 evaluation also indicated that the educational component of the program was having a particularly positive impact. Forty percent (40%) of the New Pride participants at that time had returned to school on completion of the program.

In September 1981, the first interim evaluation of the New Pride national replication project was made public. The assessment, conducted by the Pacific Institute for Research and Evaluation (PIRE) in Lafayette, California, noted the accomplishments in the area of education. In the Key Math Test, white New Pride participants gained 5.5 points, black participants gained 12.5 points, and Hispanic participants gained 12.6 points after counseling. On the Woodcock reading test, the average participant mastery score improved by 5.8 points -- a statistically significant improvement.

School attendance was also positively affected by the program. The average number of unexcused absences from school dropped from 58% before the program to 36% during the program.

Employment figures were also encouraging. Of the 522 juveniles admitted to the New Pride programs around the country in June 1981, 214 or 41% had found jobs.

During the year observed by PIRE, a monthly average of 9.22% participants continued committing criminal offenses. While, as noted above, comparisons are difficult to make, a 1976 Minnesota study reported that 29% of standard probationers and 36% of juveniles in institutions had arrest petitions filed against them. PIRE concluded that in light of such other statistics, the rearrest record of New Pride participants appeared to be good.

One final indication of the value of the New Pride program should be noted. The annual cost of incarcerating a juvenile in Denver is approximately $12,000. The yearly cost of maintaining a Denver New Pride client is about one-third that figure, between $4,000 and $5,000.

WORKING TOGETHER

New Pride spokesmen do not hesitate to admit that their records of success in some areas, including employment and rearrest rates, are not as good as they would like. But they will also point out that the alternative to New Pride is incarceration with little or no attempt at rehabilitation. The question about New Pride in the future will not be "Does it work?" but "Is the program good enough? Does it work often enough to justify its continued existence and funding?"

In the meantime, Tom James says that his most difficult problem is getting people to work together. The success of the Denver New Pride and of the four surviving New Prides from the federally funded program has been dependent on James' and other administrators' abilities in getting the local criminal justice systems, the communities, and the experts (psychologists, educators, and others) to cooperate. The holistic approach of the concept behind the New Prides requires that the professionals and authorities integrate their efforts, which usually requires continuous compromise. But what corrections people and psychologists and educators have not been able to do alone, perhaps through programs such as New Pride they can do together.

PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA

GRASS-ROOTS COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Sometimes the impetus behind a campaign activity to fight local crime comes from the citizens themselves without initial involvement of the criminal justice system. Philadelphia, long known for the ethnic flavor of its neighborhoods and community organizations, provides an excellent example of grass-roots community groups doing something on their own about the crime in their immediate area.

Philadelphia's CLASP (Citizen Local Alliance for a Safer Philadelphia) drew nationwide attention in the 1970s. To day, CLASP's lead has been taken up by several other organizations. Two neighborhood groups in the North Philadelphia section of Kensington, KAN (Kensington Action Now) and KJAC (the Kensington Joint Action Committee), illustrate how organized local residents can have an impact on particularly in tractable crime problems such as arson and drug-trafficking.

Both KAN and KJAC are multi-issue community organizations that have focused on local crime problems as one facet of a program to improve the community. They serve as excellent examples of how a grass-roots concern for criminal justice issues can affect public policy and improve the local crime situation.

NEIGHBORHOOD ORGANIZATIONS

In our initial survey of crime control experts, we were repeatedly encouraged to look at grass-roots community organizations that have mobilized around the issues of crime and safety. What distinguishes grass-roots organizations from other groups like the Neighborhood Watch is their willingness to act independently of municipal or other outside agencies and their tendency even to confront these governmental forces when authorities fail to support their goals.

Such neighborhood activists have existed in one form or another in American cities for the past 100 years. During the 1960s and 1970s neighborhood groups, often modeled on the precepts of Saul Alinsky or other political radicals, became highly visible for their work on upgrading city services and guaranteeing civil rights. While the Alinsky-style organizations are most often associated with left-wing issues, neighborhood groups have coalesced around social and political goals spanning the political spectrum, from integration to segregation, from pro-busing to pro-community schools, from pro-commercial development to anti-commercial development, from demands for more police presence in the community to demands for less police presence in the community.

As Fred Diedrich, executive director of the Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations, puts it: "Neighborhood organizations are based on the principle that you can't organize a program from the top down. The agenda must be taken from the real, primary concerns of the citizens who live in the area. A neighborhood organization is built around what the people on the block want and on what can realistically be done."

Diedrich outlines the typical grass-roots group. It is primarily an assemblage of block clubs or other small entities such as church or ethnic social clubs which have clearly defined interests of their own as well as some shared concerns with members from other organizations in the immediate vicinity.

Customarily a block club fits the following pattern: It tends to exist actively for three or four years and its effectiveness is dependent on the energy and personality of the leaders. A club is often captained by an older resident, usually female. The block club is built around an active corps of four or five people who organize meetings and activities which

attract about twenty local residents. Block clubs tend to meet monthly. The most common activities undertaken by the club are an annual street clean-up, some type of youth activity, a recreational program, or block-parent association. Block club members tend to vote in local elections. At least one of the central corps or the captain is active in the umbrella neighborhood group.

The major purpose of neighborhood organizations is to work for the common interests of several block clubs or local groups. The neighborhood organizations pool both the financial and volunteer resources of a number of smaller entities to influence actions of government or the private sector, to raise funds for various philanthropic or social causes, to lobby for legislative change -- generally to bring public attention and social pressure to bear at the appropriate times and places on behalf of its members.

Neighborhood organizations usually have a board of directors elected from member groups and an executive staff, often with one part or full-time salaried administrator and a number of volunteers. The staff works to implement the agenda mandated by the board of directors and can call on the membership of constituent groups for fundraising, meetings with public officials, and other activities.

It is not surprising that many block clubs and neighborhood organizations have crime and safety issues prominently on their agenda. The Detroit, Michigan, case study illustrated some of the activities the Crary-St. Mary's Community Council carried on in conjunction with the Detroit Police Department's crime prevention program.

Fred Diedrich's characterization of neighborhood groups is consistent with sociological research. The extensive Reactions to Crime project funded by the National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice and conducted by the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University, closely examined the activities of community organizations in anti-crime activities. The project found that the vast majority of anti-crime programs are not the major purpose behind community organizations, but are most likely an added project assumed by an existing association with a number of other community concerns.

In another study conducted by the Center for Urban Affairs at Northwestern University, "Factors Related to Citizen Involvement in Personal, Household, and Neighborhood Anti-Crime Measures," five specific findings about community anti-crime programs were identified:[1]

1. Group anti-crime activities are most common in densely populated, lower income areas with a large proportion of non-white residents.

2. City residents are more likely to be involved in anti-crime programs because they feel crime is already a problem in their neighborhood, while suburban residents are more likely to join anti-crime efforts to prevent crime from becoming a problem.

3. The more individual participation required by the group activity, the lower the participation rate.

4. Most residents who are aware of an anti-crime group activity do not get involved.

5. Blacks are regularly more likely to join anti-crime groups that one would expect given their percentage of the population. While anti-crime programs are more likely in lower income areas, individuals from relatively higher income households in the area are most likely to join.

This report corroborates the findings of our research, and refutes the accusation sometimes made that crime prevention programs are nothing more than white middle-class suburbanites trying to protect themselves from the threat of urban crime spreading to the suburbs. Crime prevention activities are, in fact, more likely to be found in areas of high crime and among minority populations. They are also most likely, though not exclusively, to be found in neighborhoods, suburban or urban, where there is a pre-existing strong community organization.

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1. Paul J. Lavrakas, et al. "Factors Related to Citizen Involvement in Personal, Household, and Neighborhood Anti-Crime Measures. Executive Summary." (Evanston, Illinois: Citizen Participation and Community Crime Project, Center for Urban Affairs, Northwestern University, 1980), p. 10.

CLASP

In our survey of crime control experts, the citizen action groups of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, were mentioned more frequently than were those from any other city.

Part of the reason for the widespread familiarity with the Philadelphia groups may simply derive from their longevity, which has made them the subject of substantial research. Philadelphia was one of the major study sites in Volume One of the Reactions to Crime papers (Coping with Crime: Victimization, Fear, and Reactions to Crime in Three American Cities, 1980, by Wesley G. Skogan and Michael G. Maxfield). But national attention had also centered on Philadelphia during the 1970s because of CLASP -- the Citizen Local Alliance for a Safer Philadelphia.

CLASP got its start with the West Philadelphia Block Association. This community group was founded in 1971, principally by Ellie Wegener, a resident who along with several of her neighbors were prompted to "do something" about local crime following the rape of a friend.

West Philadelphia in the early 1970s was a highly mixed demographic locality. Mostly residential with one- or two- family houses, the area was populated by both well and poorly educated persons and by both low and upper income people. There was also a large international population. It was generally accepted that the neighborhood was deteriorating, and there was a high level of transiency.

The West Philadelphia Block Association was a classic neighborhood organization which closely fit the profile Fred Diedrich outlined above. The association was comprised of a group of block clubs, each of which sent a representative to its meetings, three or four times a year. The main reason for the association's formation, in this case, was crime prevention.

The association organized citizen surveillance of the neighborhood to report suspicious activities to the police. They also started "neighborhood walks" which kept members of the organization on the streets in two-hour shifts to watch for residents' safety. The group also sent out a newsletter, organized an escort service, and looked after the homes of people who were away or who had difficulty with upkeep.

The media and the grapevine in Philadelphia soon recognized the success

of the West Philadelphia Block Association, and later in 1971 when the Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce felt the need for a city coalition of neighborhood organizations to fight crime, Ellie Wegener was made, along with Ross Flanagan, one of the first coordinators of the new city-wide organization -- The Citizen Local Alliance for a Safer Philadelphia or CLASP.

The CLASP staff aggressively went out into Philadephia neighborhoods and set up groups around anti-crime activities where there was no strong local organization already established. They also worked with existing associations when they could. Within a few years CLASP had received nationwide publicity for its success in getting large numbers of Philadelphia citizens involved in crime prevention activities.

But the large participant figures and media attention are not the most telling signs of success, according to Ms. Wegener. "The real estate people in the organized neighborhoods exploited the CLASP program again and again. The existence of a CLASP affiliate in an area often became a major selling point -- like the presence of a good school or other desirable neighborhood services.

"We saw it from the beginning in West Philadelphia. We had a lot of young people, college students, who used to leave West Philadelphia as soon as they finished school or when they married and settled down. After we came to be known, we saw that these kinds of young people were staying in the neighborhood, improving the existing properties, and making the area much more stable."

According to Ms. Wegener, the main reason CLASP has been so successful in Philadelphia is that "we brought people back together." Changes in the demographic make-up of many communities, the flight to the suburbs, the political upheavals, had all isolated and estranged urban residents. "The people then were extremely alienated," says Ms. Wegener. "Even in the city we were an auto and a television society. People had deserted their neighborhoods and their streets for their living rooms."

CLASP and its constituent local clubs proved to be the right remedy at the right time. The Philadelphia crime rate was soaring in the 1970s and the police department was already overburdened. Ms. Wegener says that the

real goal of CLASP was to unite people in a common cause, "to make them get to know each other and to care about each others' safety as well as their own. Tremendous friendships were formed."

CLASP no longer exists, although many of its citywide functions have been taken over by the multi-purpose association, the Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations and by the Philadelphia Townwatch. Ms. Wegener is now a crime prevention and neighborhood organizing consultant based in Washington, D.C.

KENSINGTON

The North Philadelphia neighborhood of Kensington offers two more specific examples of how community organizations are dealing with the problems of crime and fear of crime. Kensington is in northeast Philadelphia and is characterized by residential, commercial and industrial land use. The neighborhood is not coextensive with police districts or any other municipal boundaries. The 1980 population density was about 15,000 per square mile. During the last decade, the northern part of the area (served by Kensington Action Now) saw a 15% to 20% population decrease while the southern part (served by the Kensington Joint Action Committee) experienced a 25% to 30% population decline. In 1980 the crime rate for the locality was approximately 2,000 to 3,000 reported incidents per 10,000 population.

Kensington has felt many of the problems associated with declining urban communities, and the record of its neighborhood organizations is an excellent example of what can be done by the local residents to improve their own situation.

KENSINGTON ACTION NOW -- FIGHTING ARSON

Kensington Action Now (KAN) is a multi-issue neighborhood organization founded in 1975 which serves the northern section of Kensington. The area has a combination of commercial, industrial and residential land applications with a population of about 80,000 living in 20,000 households, most of which are in single-family dwellings. This northern sector of Kensington is mostly ethnically mixed, blue-collar workers. There has been relatively little shift in population or demographics in recent years. In

the late 1970s the area had the highest home ownership rate of any neighborhood in Philadelphia.

KAN was originally created as a coalition of block associations in response to street crime, but it has moved on to address a number of other social and economic issues. KAN is currently comprised of about forty member groups -- block clubs, churches, and civic organizations. It is supported through its membership fees ($25 annual fee per member group), through community fundraising, and through foundation grants. KAN sponsors a typical range of community activities, such as volunteer neighborhood street clean-ups. Its safety committee has also identified "trouble spots" in the area and has organized meetings with the police district captains to request more aggressive police patrols of those areas.

The problems faced by these northern Kensington residents are basically the result of a decline in manufacturing industries, mostly textiles, that once prospered there. As these industries waned unemployment increased and industrial, commercial, and residential vacancies rose. In late 1982 KAN reported the area to have 800 empty homes, 100 vacant commercial buildings, and fifty vacant or partly vacant factories.

The growing number of abandoned buildings in the late 1970s and early 1980s brought along with it an alarming increase in the number of fires. The residents literally watched the area deteriorate from a solid working-class neighborhood to a desolated wasteland characterized by vacant, trash-filled, burned-out buildings. Between January and July 1982 there were 115 fires in the area, and KAN asserts that sixty-four of them, a full 54%, were deliberately set. In 1982, the effects of arson claimed two lives. And since 1980, three of the oldest and largest industrial buildings in the area had burned down. Kensington appeared to be going the all too familiar way of the declining urban neighborhood.

Arson as a distinct crime concern is a relatively new phenomenon. The FBI did not report arson rates in its annual Uniform Crime Report until 1979. It was not until recently that arson was recognized as a crucial factor in urban rot.

Arson can completely finish a neighborhood that is already economically hurting. Burned buildings cost the neighborhood -- real estate values drop;

insurance premiums rise; local merchants suffer; jobs are lost; taxes are lost; banks and insurance companies disinvest or redline the area. The result of a vicious cycle: business and residents leave, which creates more arson targets; the neighborhood deteriorates faster; and the city sooner or later is burdened with the clean-up of the properties.

An estimated $1.7 billion in property is destroyed by arson each year. In 1980, 1,000 deaths were attributed to arson -- more than the total number of deaths from all natural disasters in the country during the year. Yet arson is a crime for which there is virtually no penalty, since arson is fairly difficult to prove and it is even more difficult to identify an arsonist. According to a 1979 Federal Emergency Management Agency Report on Arson to Congress, for every 100 arson or suspected arson fires, the incarceration rate is less than 1%.

In a situation such as Kensington's, arson may simply be a kind of vandalism, or it may be committed by the property owner in order to realize a profit. When buildings are in poor repair, unoccupied or partially occupied, and incurring a heavy tax burden, it sometimes becomes financially preferable for the owner to burn the building rather than to raze, renovate, or sell it. A fire can demolish a building more cheaply than can a professional wrecking company, and a fire brings in insurance payments.

The human, social, and economic costs of arson finally became intolerable to the concerned Kensington community organizations which make up KAN. In addition, KAN had already begun to take some initial steps on residential property improvement through a related organization, the Kensington Area Revitalization Program (KARP).

KARP was founded in 1979 as a non-profit development corporation to revitalize existing residential properties in the neighborhood served by KAN. KARP was successful in stopping insurance redlining of the area. KARP also was instrumental in bringing Kensington into a $15 million, four-city demonstration project sponsored by the Aetna Insurance Company. The Aetna project made $2 million available to Kensington for the redevelopment of residential properties. KARP used the Aetna funds as well as HUD, state and city money to purchase and renovate Kensington real estate and then to coordinate the sale and financing of the properties.

KAN decided it had to do something about the incidents of arson in Kensington because of constituent concern over the deterioration of the area and the threat to its own burgeoning redevelopment program through KARP. It was clear that existing city resources were not adequate. KAN therefore initiated an effort with two overall objectives: 1) to pressure city agencies responsible for preventing arson to upgrade their involvement in the KAN area; and 2) to increase citizen awareness of arson risks and to get them to report the potential of arson to KAN and to the appropriate authorities.

In the spring of 1982 KAN created a Community Arson Awareness Program (CAAP). This program was designed to inform Kensington residents as to how they should make arson risks known in their immediate neighborhood. Citizens are encouraged to relate in detail and repeatedly the condition of vacant or rundown buildings and especially to report any activities that they believe are suspicious or threatening. Residents can report their property concerns to KAN and/or directly to the Philadelphia Department of Licensing and Inspections. Citizens are also encouraged to let building owners know that their property is being watched. KAN maintains that simply informing property owners that their building is a focus of neighborhood surveillance and displeasure will cause some owners to clean up and seal a structure appropriately.

John Barracato, director of the Aetna Insurance Company's arson and fraud unit, maintained in a Philadelphia Daily News interview that there is a 40% to 60% chance an arson will not occur once community groups contact a building owner to express their anxiety and attention.[2]

KAN's role in the Community Arson Awareness Program is, first, to educate residents as to how and when to report likely arson targets. KAN also coordinates group meetings with city officials to communicate special concerns about a specific problem property or about the level of city services regarding some aspect of arson prevention. KAN also monitors city responses to arson risks that have been identified by the community.

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2. Frederick Lowe, "Arson: You KAN Stop It, Community Group Told," Philadelphia Daily News, 25 May 1982.

A second milestone in KAN's anti-arson program was reached in September 1982 when KAN gained the public support of the Pennsylvania Insurance Commissioner, Michael L. Brown. Brown visited the area, met with KAN leaders and publicly committed the influence of his office to KAN's objectives. He promised to write personal letters to the insurance companies encouraging them to invest some of the money they receive in customer premiums from the sector back into the neighborhood.

KAN's next step was to organize a public meeting in November 1982 with Philadelphia Managing Director, W. Wilson Goode. At that meeting Goode announced the city's intentions to enter into a partnership with KAN to set up a neighborhood arson task force. The objective of the task force would be to set out clearly defined responsibilities for KAN and for attendant city agencies: the Fire Marshal's Office, the Department of Licensing and Inspections, and the Police Department. KAN has already received a $7,000 foundation grant for a computer which is to be used for maintaining a list on the status of potential arson targets for the reference of neighborhood leaders and city agency authorities.

The task force as proposed by KAN would be a pilot project for the city. It would include an enlarged arson investigation unit as part of the Fire Marshal's Office. It would also involve an expanded effort by police, fire, and building inspection officials to identify potential arson risks based on such factors as tax arrearage, code violations, mortgage delinquency, frequent or recent ownership change, heavy insurance coverage or significant insurance increases. The task force would also use the authority of the Department of Licensing and Inspections more promptly to clean and seal or demolish fire-damaged buildings.

The concept of the neighborhood arson task force was founded on successful programs in New Haven, Connecticut and in Brooklyn, New York. The concept implicitly accepts that the existing city services are not adequate for the extraordinary arson hazards of such a neighborhood. The task force idea also puts some responsibility on the citizenry to act as a pressure group on property owners and city agencies and to watch their areas for dangers of arson. Just as in a number of other crime prevention activities, an anti-arson program requires citizen involvement to ensure the safety of the neighborhood.

As of early 1983 the city agencies and KAN had not yet entered into full agreement as to the level of commitment the city would bring to the task force as proposed by KAN. The leaders of KAN, however, feel that getting the city's commitment to the concept of an arson task force is a major step forward, since in the past the perspective of most law enforcement agencies toward arson has been predictably reactive -- the traditional orientation toward most crimes. The neighborhood arson task force as proposed by KAN would make the city distinctly responsible for preventing arson, not merely for investigating arson after it has occurred.

In addition to its pushing for the creation of a neighborhood arson task force, KAN managed to impel the Department of Licensing and Inspections to clean and seal about thirty-five buildings between September and November 1982. KARP, on its part, had rehabilitated and sold five residences and was working on several more by June 1982.

The example of KAN clearly shows the ability of community organizations to have an impact on both local crime and the physical environment of their neighborhood. KAN's experience also shows how citizens can act collectively to compel government agencies to be more responsive to their needs. Most importantly, however, KAN is an example of grass-roots action organized around the issue of crime which shows what a community can do when it decides not to let its neighborhood deteriorate.

THE KENSINGTON JOINT ACTION COUNCIL

The Kensington Joint Action Council (KJAC) serves the southern part of Kensington. Its populace is different from the constituency served by KAN. The KJAC area is racially mixed, about one-third white, one-third black, and one-third Hispanic. It has a higher overall crime rate and has suffered more population decline, transiency, and neighborhood change.

KJAC is a coalition of about twenty-five church, neighborhood, and other group constituents as well as about 1,000 family members. It receives a $3.00 annual fee from families and $10.00 from associations. Organization members sit on the board of directors and other administrative committees. KJAC's funds come from the membership fees, from their own fundraising activities, and from some local foundations.

Dave Tatgenhorst, director of KJAC, says that the organization exists "to bring a new unity to the neighborhood. This area has been traditionally a neighborhood divided against itself. KJAC is consciously multi-racial. We try to show that the problems are common to all people in the neighborhood. And we try to show that collectively the people of Kensington have the power to solve their problems."

KJAC has four primary areas of concern: housing, crime and safety, education, and employment. Tatgenhorst concurs with the thinking of Fred Diedrich of the Philadelphia Council of Neighborhood Organizations that anything done to improve the community is crime prevention.

While KJAC does not claim success in improving the employment situation in the area, it does have a positive record in its other activities. Housing for the poor and transient individuals of the area is a vital concern, especially in the winter months. The area, like northern Kensington, has a substantial number of abandoned buildings and there is a large population of squatters in the neighborhood who have nowhere else to live.

KJAC has helped support the passage of local ordinances that facilitated the turning over of abandoned and severely tax-delinquent properties to the city which then made them available to a Gift Property Program, a kind of urban homesteading project in which local, low income residents are given properties contingent upon improvements to be carried out on the buildings. KJAC definitely feels they have made inroads in this area. Fourteen houses were turned over to local residents in November 1982.

KJAC was also instrumental in getting funds allocated from the state government for the construction of a new high school in the area. In addition, KJAC has had a positive effect in dealing with school-related problems such as removing asbestos from a local elementary school building and in selecting student textbooks.

Considering the extent of the social problems in the area, it is probably not surprising that KJAC has not concentrated more on the reduction of crimes of opportunity, and street crime, which, in the face of the neighborhood's other problems, seem quite small. But in the late 1970s,

Philadelphia

KJAC did play a major role in the fight against drug trafficking in Philadelphia.

KJAC's concern with drug trafficking was particularly focused on the presence of drug dealers at popular neighborhood gathering places. Churches and other community organizations were especially alarmed about the visibility of these people in their parks and other public places. Under the direction of a crime and safety task force coordinator, meetings of neighborhood groups were held with city authorities in which the residents laid out their concerns and provided officials with relevant information.

In 1977 KJAC contributed extensive community support to District Attorney Edward G. Rendell in lobbying the Philadelphia City Council for the funding of a Drug Strike Task Force. Both Rendell and KJAC believed that the only way to address the problem would be to have a branch of the district attorney's office charged with the investigation and prosecution of mid-level dealers.

The police department had traditionally concentrated on low-level users, and Rendell and KJAC along with other community spokesmen, argued for an initiative that would fight the drug abuse problem before the substances ever filtered down to potential or low level users. The district attorney's office commends the Kensington community organization for being one of the most active and instrumental groups in supporting the task force. In 1978 the city council granted an initial $850,000 funding for the Drug Strike Task Force and it is now an ongoing program of the district attorney's office.

Unfortunately, KJAC does not have the internal resources to evaluate the effects of the task force on its neighborhood. But Dave Tatgenhorst says, "There is definitely a subjective sense that there has been a great positive impact on the drug problem. Pushers were moved out and have generally stayed away from the local park. But most importantly, our experience in support of the Drug Strike Task Force showed the citizens that through a strong network of people and a new multi-racial, multi-ethnic definition of what Kensington is, we have the ability to make things happen for the neighborhood."

TO BRING PEOPLE BACK TOGETHER

Each of these Philadelphia organizations has worked to fight crime in its immediate neighborhood, with tangible success. Each also has found that its community anti-crime efforts have brought people back together and provided considerable secondary benefits by improving the overall quality of life.

Ellie Wegener, former director of CLASP, asserts that the major accomplishment of that coalition was bringing people back together in Philadelphia neighborhoods. It also appears to be one of the major achievements of both KAN and KJAC as they have united residents around local crime and safety issues.

CONCERNS

It is difficult to find serious criticisms of crime prevention programs which emphasize cooperation between police and citizens. Some of those with whom we spoke, however, did warn that communities should be wary of certain pitfalls. For example, John S. Goldkamp, chairman of the Department of Criminal Justice at Temple University, noted that both police and community groups must at all times be aware that while there may be some overlap, each group has a separate function in any crime prevention program. "There is a point of departure," he warned, "where we have to know what a community organization is and what its limitations are. The same thing with the police." Professor Goldkamp also noted that in some community organizations "the police are talking past the community groups and the community groups past the police. In Philadelphia there are some examples of amazing community efforts which could serve as models for other places with comparable problems. And then there are examples of mediocre programs. KAN and KJAC are among the best examples. These two organizations have been very resourceful and are examples of the art form as it is developing into something quite extraordinary."

STATE PROGRAMS

THE ROLES THAT STATES CAN PLAY

While the major theme of this study has been the importance of local action and direct community involvement in crime control and crime prevention, our discussions with criminal justice experts repeatedly indicated that there were roles for state governments to play as well in supporting effective crime control efforts.

The following three case studies covering Pennsylvania, Texas, and California illustrate three ways in which states are successfully assisting local municipalities and citizens to reduce crime and to ameliorate the causes and effects of crime throughout their states.

What these three state programs have in common with the other preceding five case studies is their overriding concern with the role of the law-abiding citizen in crime prevention and in the criminal justice system. Pennsylvania and Texas illustrate the intensive training programs provided for local law enforcement officers to make sure that these officers who deal with the public daily are prepared for this responsibility. The California program shows what one state has done in the support of victim and witness assistance, and the Texas statewide Crime Stoppers program provides a good example of how witnesses and other kinds of informants can productively and safely be brought into the investigation of crimes.

PENNSYLVANIA

WE KNOW THE TERRITORY

State governments can play a variety of roles in supporting crime resistance programs at the local level. Since 1978 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, through the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, has been committed to assisting local law enforcement agencies to maintain effective crime prevention programs appropriate to local needs and resources.

The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency has sought to strike a balance between the features of a statewide program and local autonomous activities in crime prevention. It has tried to retain the best features and resources of each. The commission uses a field network of technical assistants who bring training and information about crime prevention techniques and about the effective administration of crime prevention programs directly to local police departments throughout the state. On-site training is always tailored to conditions and resources of the local police departments. It is also characterized by realism about the capabilities of crime resistance, about local social and political conditions, and about the strengths and limitations of both state and local efforts.

Alfred Blumstein, professor of sociology at Carnegie-Mellon University in Pittsburgh and chairman of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, says, "Governor Thornburgh's professional mandate to the commission was simply to do a good job according to their own lights and as local circumstances dictate. As a result, we have a staff that is enthusiastic, professionally committed, rarely subject to political pressures, and always able to respond to local situations." As Herb Yost, Director of Pennsylva-nia Crime Watch, put it: "We know the territory, the local police, and the local political leaders, the problems and the pressures."

Pennsylvania

The commission currently sponsors three information and education programs which are at the heart of the crime prevention effort: an initial course for local crime pre-vention officers, an advanced course for the same officers, and a course for municipal government leaders. This training is conducted year-round throughout the state at accessible, central county locations and at times of day which are least likely to interfere with the officers' and municipal leaders' regular schedules. (The commission has, for example, conducted training programs for police dis-patchers at 2:00 a.m. at the conclusion of their evening's work.) By having the commission's field staff stationed in offices around Pennsylvania, the commission has tried to make a technical assistant readily available to any of the state's 1,200 police departments -- usually within a two-hour drive.

Conducting the on-site training programs for officers and municipal leaders is not just for convenience. These seminars bring the state program personnel into regular contact with local personnel and conditions so they can better assess regional situations and resources. The commission is an active and approachable presence throughout the state, not another office in the bureaucracy sending out directives and setting criteria. The field staff build and maintain a personal network of mutual communications between the local municipalities and the state capital in Harrisburg.

The on-site classes also allow the commission to instruct local crime prevention practitioners and municipal leaders by example as well as by precept. Organizing neighborhood watch programs and other activities which involve citizen participation requires the crime prevention officer to assume a leading role in the education of community activists -- a role for which most officers are not well-prepared by standard police training. The Pennsylvania commission's seminars not only provide information about how the officer can effectively execute this leadership role in the community, but they also act as models for the kinds of meetings the officers will subsequently organize with municipal and neighborhood participants to implement crime prevention efforts.

The Pennsylvania commission also coordinates a statewide elementary school program called JETS, or Justice Education Teaching Strategies, to help children understand the importance of law and legitimate authority, to understand their individual rights, and to encourage them to accept and

carry out the responsibilities of citizenship.

Instituted in 1979, the JETS program was based on the early experience of the TIPS program in the state of Virginia. TIPS, which originated in the Charlottesville and Albemarle County, Virginia, school districts, is a criminal justice program for youth in kindergarten through eighth grade. It teaches children how to avoid situations in which they are vulnerable to becoming a victim of crime. One version of the TIPS acronym is Teaching Individuals Protective Strategies.

But programs like TIPS and JETS go further. They are also designed to help youngsters develop responsible conduct at home, at school, and in the community. The other version of the TIPS acronym is Teach Individuals Positive Solutions. This aspect of the program is focused on helping children to learn strategies for coping positively with stressful or conflict situations.

The TIPS program itself was an outgrowth of the earlier FBI Crime Resistance Program in DeKalb County, Georgia. The success of the DeKalb County pilot project led to the Virginia experiment and has contributed to the national replication of TIPS in public schools across America.

The history of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency set the precedents which have enabled it to operate effectively within its decentralized structure. The commission was formed in 1968 as a state planning agency to administer grant monies. A fairly autonomous staff in eight regional offices assisted local law enforcement agencies in applying for federal grants and then in implementing the funded programs. The mandate of this field staff changed in 1975. At that time their major role became technical assistance -- to provide on-site, short-term support to local communities in upgrading all or any areas of the criminal justice system and to act in liaison with state and federal agencies.

By the time the mission of the field staff changed again in 1978 to emphasize crime prevention activities, the commission and several of the field staff had amassed a decade's worth of familiarity with local law enforcement agencies and municipalities throughout the state. The commission and many of the staff have witnessed the coming and going of

other state and federal programs and have kept in close touch with individual law enforcement agencies over the years.

The commission's experience thus makes it not only sensitive to local situations which affect the success of state-initiated programs, the commission also can bring to bear in its current activities the lessons it has learned during the more affluent years of federally funded criminal justice programming and experimentation.

A LITTLE MONEY AND A LOT OF PLANNING

Herb Yost, director of the Pennsylvania Crime Watch and chief supervisor of the field staff of the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency, along with other crimi-nal justice and law enforcement administrators from all over the country, has learned one sure lesson from experience with LEAA and other federal and state programs: "Don't get municipal crime prevention funded from the outside. Outside funds dry up. Get crime prevention built into the local law enforcement agency's budget."

Funding of crime prevention activities at the local level, however, will nearly always mean for a municipality that little money will be available for the effort. Alfred Dean, the Director of Public Safety for the city of Harrisburg, voiced the need for "broader based funding sources for start-up and experimental programs, particularly as it relates to police-community relations and crime prevention programs, because the solution to the crime problem in this country is in the involvement of the community. We need to do more research in this area in order to determine how we can better utilize community resources."

Others, however, actually believe that the necessity of working with limited funds can be an asset. Yost maintains: "Small amounts of money spent at the local level is the most effective way of implementing crime prevention."

Crime prevention practitioners from across the country agree that citizen participation in crime prevention programs is absolutely essential. One great advantage of the police department's having strict financial constraints for crime prevention programs is that it forces them to turn to the community at large for substantial support. Even in cases where officers resist having civilians involved in police work, the shortage of

funds compels them to accept citizen volunteers for many jobs as they cost the police force little or nothing.

Likewise, the shortage of funds shows the civilian volunteers what an important role they can play in crime prevention. Often a salaried law enforcement employee cannot be appointed to even a necessary job if the volunteers fail to deliver. Restricted funds also oblige everyone to plan and set clear goals and objectives. Sharply defined priorities work in the crime prevention officer's favor, since he is forced to manage his resources prudently, and document the results of his work to justify his expenditures. Finally, limited funds encourage the department to keep the level of technology appropriate to the needs of the program.

All of this may sound like an effort to turn adversity into a virtue, but, as Herb Yost observes, "the high-cost programs, experiments and hardware of past years just didn't work to reduce crime." Recognizing the dubious track record of programs in the past as well as the limited local financial and personnel resources of the present, the Pennsylvania commission feels it has found an economical way to upgrade police services throughout the state and ultimately to reduce crime and improve police-community relations.

MANAGING TO SURVIVE

Many observers of the criminal justice system have pointed to its "educative" function: the criminal justice system teaches citizens to study and respect the law by example, precedent, and threat. As the analysis of crime prevention activities in this report shows again and again, much of the crime restriction movement is an effort to educate citizens to protect themselves and their neighbors from becoming victims of others who disobey the law.

The Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency decided essentially that it could not and would not attempt in a major way to educate citizens directly. It would, however, become a unifying force throughout the state, setting crime prevention standards, and teaching those responsible for the public welfare -- the crime prevention officers and municipal leaders.

Pennsylvania

As has been noted above, the crime prevention officer frequently works on a "shoestring budget." Additionally, in many cases he is also undervalued and without status in his own department because he is not directly responsible for law enforcement duties. Crime prevention is still commonly perceived as an adjunct, rather than a mainstream department function.

Realizing the handicaps under which crime prevention officers were operating, the Pennsylvania commission decided that generating support for these individuals was a crucial priority: if the local crime prevention officer did not have training and support from somewhere, crime curtailment as a statewide activity would not survive, much less reduce crime. So while the Pennsylvania commission does have other activities -- programs for senior citizens, a justice education program for the elementary schools, public affairs announcements, etc. -- it has directed a large part of its own resources into training and supporting crime prevention officers in local law enforcement agencies.

The instruction programs sponsored by the Pennsylvania commission are designed to upgrade the quality of information citizens receive through the crime prevention officers and to support the policemen in planning, administering, and evaluating their activities. Because they work under severe financial constraints, they must set realistic, achievable goals and objectives, keep accurate and accessible records of activities and accomplishments, and communicate their achievements to their superiors persuasively. At least half of the training contained in the two Pennsylvania commission programs helps officers with such program planning, crime analysis, statistical record-keeping, and report-writing. The emphasis on these planning and management skills is always that of finding the most appropriate technology and procedures for the needs of a particular department and community whether that means state of the art electronic equipment or a pin map and a file of three-by-five cards.

The programs for municipal leaders are designed to inform them about crime prevention and to give them an understanding of procedures and likely outcomes so they can realistically appreciate and encourage the local crime prevention program.

Herb Yost, of the Pennsylvania commission, is refreshingly candid: 'We

know that many of the programs and experiments in the past have not had results. We are reasonably confident that crime prevention does work under some circumstances. But we don't know, in the long run, how much and when crime prevention will ultimately reduce crime. And we'll never know, we'll never have the chance to know, unless we can help the crime prevention officers all over the state do a good job and survive their local political and bureaucratic pressures. We've got to give them the chance -- five years or more -- to see to what extent crime prevention works."

Alfred Blumstein, chairman of the commission, concurs. "It is reasonable to be skeptical about many of the claims of crime prevention practitioners. We usually don't have any convincing negative data either. The issue of crime prevention's ultimate effectiveness is unresolved. It may just displace crime from one place to another -- that is, by the way, why statewide programs like ours are so important. And if one of our goals is to give citizens a better sense of security and participation in the protection of their neighborhoods, we definitely succeed in that."

Since 1978 over 1,600 Pennsylvania law enforcement officers have taken the commission's basic crime prevention course. The commission reports that at least one officer from each of the approximately 1,200 law enforcement agencies has been trained in crime prevention. Put these officers together with the state policemen who have gone through the program, and we find that the pool of crime prevention officers is available to nearly every municipality in Pennsylvania. In addition, about 250 senior officers have taken the advanced crime prevention training course, and over 700 local government officials have had the municipal officials seminar.

In less than five years, the Pennsylvania Commission on Crime and Delinquency has made a significant impact on the law enforcement community throughout the state. The Pennsylvania approach has instituted efficient, economical, crime prevention strategies on a statewide basis. And it has struck an effective balance among its citizens, local municipalities, law enforcement agencies, and administrators on the responsibilities and roles each should assume in the overall crime prevention effort.

CALIFORNIA

A COMPREHENSIVE PROGRAM

More than any other state, California has been the focus of a tremendous amount of media and political attention concerning crime and efforts to combat crime. No state has done more in recent years to implement a broad range of comprehensive crime prevention measures. It has stressed hard-line approaches such as stricter sentencing and more police, while at the same time maintaining its reputation as one of the more progressive states in social and rehabilitation programs. Perhaps most significantly, during the past several years California has taken the lead in emphasizing financial and psychological assistance to those most affected by crime -- its victims.

Neighborhood Watch programs have sprung up throughout California, enthusiastically supported at the state level. California's Crime Prevention Center within the Office of the Attorney General provides local communities with a host of printed, audio-visual, and in-person assistance. Local businesses, schools, families, senior citizens, farmers, and crime victims have all been specifically targeted. Toward this end, voluminous, well-designed materials, as well as specific technical assistance, are available from the Attorney General's Office through the Crime Prevention Center. Topics include:

* Arson
* Auto Theft
* Business Crime
  - Check/Credit Card Fraud
  - Shoplifting/Internal Theft
  - Burglary/Robbery
* Home Security
* Marine Theft
* Rural Crime
* School Safety
* Sexual Assault
* Consumer Fraud
* Disabled
* Domestic Violence
* Drug/Alcohol Abuse
* Elderly
* Fraud/Bunco
* Ski Theft
* Truck and Cargo Security
* Vacation Security
* Victim Rights
* Youth Crime Prevention

THE VICTIM/WITNESS ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Traditionally, criminal justice programs have focused exclusively on preventing crimes from being committed. More police, more jails, swifter and stricter punishment, rehabilitation measures, social programs targeted at groups thought to be most likely to commit crimes such as the poor and the unemployed, and, more recently, crime avoidance techniques such as improved home, car and personal security techniques, have all been emphasized at both the state and national level. California, however, has taken the lead in concerning itself with the group of citizens most severely affected by crime, the victims themselves.

As described by the California Office of Criminal Justice Planning, the California Victim/Witness Assistance Program provides the following services to all state residents who have been crime victims:

* Crisis intervention, including counseling reassurance and support following the crime.
* Emergency assistance, including food, clothing and lodging.
* An explanation of the criminal justice system, the victim's own particular case in particular.
* The prompt return of property used as evidence.
* Advice to victims concerning the various resources available to them in their local community.
* Assistance in submitting the necessary application forms to receive compensation from the StateVictim of Violent Crime Fund.

In addition, witnesses, who in many cases are also victims, are provided an escort to court, transportation if necessary, notice as to when their appearance is required in order to avoid the necessity of their waiting at the courthouse, and notification as the case progresses of the status and final disposition of the case. Comprehensive witness assistance programs are presently in place in thirty-five of California's fifty-eight counties.

Probably the most revolutionary aspect of California's Victim/Witness Assistance Program is its mandate to compensate victims by fining convicted criminals. In September 1979 Senate Bill Number 383 was signed into law by Governor Brown. It amended the Government Code to read:

> 13967. (a) Upon a person being convicted of a crime of violence committed in the State of California resulting in the injury or death of another person, if the court finds that the defendant has the present ability to pay a fine and finds that the economic impact of the fine upon the defendant's dependents will not cause such dependents to be dependent on public welfare the court shall, in addition to any other penalty, order the defendant to pay a fine commensurate with the offense committed, and with the probable economic impact upon the victim, of at least ten dollars ($10), but not to exceed ten thousand dollars ($10,000).

During the past three and a half years, California's victims' compensation program has been substantially expanded. The philosophy, however, has remained the same: victims have been neglected in the effort to combat crime. They are the ones who suffer the most and, whenever possible, should be directly compensated by the criminal involved.

PROPOSITION 8

The most controversial of all recent crime prevention initiatives is California's Proposition 8, passed in June 1982. Both its defenders and critics claimed that it would represent "the most sweeping change in American criminal justice procedures." Its defenders also said that it would "restore justice to our criminal justice system" while its critics warned that it was the "broadest assault on due process and civil liberties ever wrapped up in one package." Ten months after its passage, however, the proposition does not seem to have lived up to either camp's expectations.

Proposition 8's official title, "The Victims Bill of Rights," is slightly misleading to the uninitiated. Some of its most sweeping measures are only peripherally related to victims' rights, although the new law's preamble does make its overall objective clear:

> The People of the State of California find and declare that the enactment of comprehensive provisions and laws ensuring a bill of rights for victims of crime, including safeguards in the criminal justice system to fully protect those rights, is a matter of grave statewide concern.
>
> The rights of victims pervade the criminal justice system, encompassing not only the right to restitution from the wrongdoers for financial losses suffered as a result of criminal acts, but also the more basic expectation that persons who commit felonious acts causing injury to innocent victims will be appropriately detained in custody, tried by the courts, and sufficiently punished so that the public safety is protected and encouraged as a goal of highest importance.

The Proposition, however, does much more than state legislative intent. Its most sweeping changes involve not victims' rights, but the rights of criminals. Measures include:

* Public Safety Bail. In setting bail, consideration is now given not only to the probability of the defendant appearing at trial, but also to "the protection of the public, the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of the defendant...Public safety shall be the primary consideration."

* Use of Prior Convictions. "Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceeding, whether adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding."

* Habitual Criminals. The proposition adds a five-year sentence to the conviction of a serious felon who previously has been convicted of a serious felony in the state.

* Right to Truth in Evidence. "Relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding."

* Limitation of Plea Bargaining. The state's right to plea bargain with serious felons is restricted.

The Proposition does, however, also concern itself with victims' rights. In addition to legislating the right of victims to testify and to receive notice of the case's ajudication, including the defendant's release

or parole from prison, the Proposition states that "It is the unequivocal intention of the People of the State of California that all persons who suffer losses as a result of criminal activity shall have the right to restitution from the persons convicted of the crimes for losses they suffer. Restitution shall be ordered from the convicted persons in every case, regardless of the sentence or disposition imposed, in which a crime victim suffers a loss, unless compelling and extraordinary reasons exist to the contrary." By mandating restitution for every serious crime, Proposition 8 has strengthened previously existing law.

THE AFTERMATH

Proposition 8 can be divided into two areas, restitution to a victim and a victim's right to know the current status and resolution of the case in question, and the relaxation of many of the restrictions that have been imposed in recent years on police and prosecutors.

Today, ten months after passage by referendum, all sides agree that Proposition 8 has not had the revolutionary effects prophesied by its critics and promised by its supporters. Much of the reason lies in the fact that prosecutors and judges seem to be waiting to see which provisions the California Supreme Court will eventually find unconstitutional and which it will uphold. Lower courts are unwilling to use the new statutes for fear they will be declared invalid, thereby making necessary new trials costing millions of dollars and creating chaos for the court system. Other provisions have been simply found to be too impractical. An elimination of plea bargaining, for example, would swamp the courts and jails.

Although some municipalities have complied more stringently with the law than others, most provisions, at least for the time being, are being largely sidestepped by prosecutors and defense lawyers alike.

Despite the fact that it is too early to judge the long-term effect and value of Proposition 8, there can be no question of the message its passage sends to courts and criminals, as well as to other states. For years California has been committed to crime prevention, avoidance, and the rehabilitation of criminals. In addition to these measures, however, there is now a clear feeling that the courts must become stricter with serious, repeat felons. The ultimate question of the constitutionality of Proposi-

tion 8's various provisions may take years to settle. As their outcomes are decided, they will be watched closely by individual state legislators as well as the federal government.

Perhaps the most significant contribution by California is in its victims' assistance and compensation programs. The California legislature has been instructed by Proposition 8 to enact legislation which will carry out its intent to compensate all victims of serious crime. The legislature has promised to act before the end of the year. In 1978, $7 million was awarded to victims of violent crime. In 1982 the total awards doubled, to $14 million. It is still too early to tell what effect if any Proposition 8 will have on this figure in 1983. For all these reasons California's crime rate and the attitudes of its citizens regarding crime and the fear of crime bears watching closely in the years ahead.

TEXAS

PUTTING IDEAS ON WHEELS: THE TEXAS CRIME PREVENTION INSTITUTE

When you talk to crime prevention practitioners in Texas, you will hear again and again about their state's ability "to put an idea on wheels." Similar to the goals of state crime prevention specialists in states like Pennsylvania, a principal focus for crime avoidance on the state level in Texas has been to train and educate local law enforcement officers in establishing crime prevention programs and to provide materials and direct assistance to these officers in their efforts to do so.

This idea has been put on wheels -- it has been largely institutionalized -- through programs of the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office and through the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies at Southwest Texas State University at San Marcos.

One division of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies, the Texas Crime Prevention Institute (TCPI), has become a leading world center for law enforcement and information about crime prevention. Leland Wood, director of the Institute estimates that since 1974 TCPI has trained over 5,000 Texas police officers -- that is, nearly one-third of the state's sworn staff. The Institute has also trained more than 1,000 people from thirty-six other states, Canada, Guam, and U.S. federal and military agencies. One of the most common qualifications mentioned among crime prevention practitioners around the country is that they attended at least the basic course given at TCPI.

TCPI conducts a curriculum of basic, advanced, and special subject crime prevention courses throughout the year both on campus at Southwest Texas State University and at other sites around the state. Several classes are offered on a regular basis and are for the most part taught by the three full-time instructors of the Institute: an 80-hour basic course for crime prevention practitioners, a 40-hour basic course for other officers, and a 40-hour advanced course. Special classes are taught primarily by off-

campus volunteers who are national experts on the topics: 20-hour courses in crimes against the elderly, executive protection, rape/armed robbery, construction and security, public information and crime-stoppers programs.

In addition to these seminars, the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies provides English and Spanish-language brochures, booklets, decals, posters, radio and television spots, and films. The Institute also publishes a monthly newsletter for crime prevention practitioners called Prevention Press which is followed by over 6,000 such individuals in the United States and abroad.

TCPI, like so many other innovations and experiments in criminal justice, had its origins in an LEAA grant in the 1970s. At that time the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office allocated about three-quarters of its block grants to the twenty-four government councils in the state of Texas and about one-quarter to special state impact programs -- which included the Institute of Criminal Justice Studies. In the post-LEAA era, however, Texas has substantially taken over the funding of the former LEAA-funded programs through a legislative mechanism which sets aside a proportion of all state state from class C misdemeanors on up through felony fines to be used in the support of criminal justice programs in the state.

Texas has, therefore, solved in a fairly unique way one of the major problems of crime prevention practitioners -- funding their efforts -- and has taken the burden of financing off the taxpayer and placed it onto the criminal. While this device has not been able entirely to replace the LEAA's former bounty, it has kept a majority of Texas's programs in place. It has enabled the Texas Crime Prevention Institute to continue to meet its goal of serving the state's crime prevention officers, and to act as a nationwide resource center for crime prevention training and materials.

Leland Wood, Institute director, says that TCPI turns officers from being only "enforcers" to being "educators" as well. TCPI training gives officers something positive with which to approach citizens. He also notes a long-term influence of the Institute: "Our graduates get promoted in their hometown departments and make crime prevention a priority."

CRIME PREVENTION IN GARLAND, TEXAS

When training and resources such as those provided by the Texas Crime Prevention Institute are made available by a state at no or a very low cost, communities of all sizes are able to initiate crime prevention programs that would otherwise be impossible.

Garland, Texas, is such an example. According to the the number of serious crimes reported to the FBI for 1981, Garland had the third lowest crime rate among American cities with populations between 100,000 and one million and was among the safest cities in the nation for its size. Garland also is exceptional, probably not coincidentally, in that ninety percent of its approximately 150 police officers have attended at least the one-week course in crime prevention at TCPI.

Jess Youngblood, director of police services of the Garland Police Department, is reluctant to attribute Garland's relatively low crime rate exclusively to its crime prevention program, but he definitely feels that the program -- which was one of the first in the state -- has had a important, positive influence. Not only does Garland have a relatively low crime rate, but, according to Youngblood, its crime rate has not increased as sharply as that of most cities in the same population category. In 1973 the Garland Police Department committed itself to having 100% of their officers trained in crime prevention techniques. While they have never quite reached that goal because of normal attrition and new hires, the department has maintained its initial adherence to the curtailment of crime: "Our approach to crime prevention," says Officer Youngblood, "was that it was not the most effective thing to do to train two people, put them in an office somewhere, and try to serve the whole city. We wanted every one of our police officers to be familiar with the basic concepts of crime prevention."

Initially, at the department's expense, a few officers were sent to the National Crime Prevention Institute in Louisville, Kentucky, and these first officers became the core of the crime prevention unit. It was far too expensive, however, for the Garland Police Force to make use of the National Crime Prevention Institute for all its officers. Yet the grants that made the Texas Crime Prevention Institute possible also made it possible for Garland to have the majority of its police force trained in crime reduction.

The first step in the development of Garland's crime prevention program was to get beat officers involved with the few crime prevention specialists that existed on the force so that they could organize neighborhood watch and anti-shoplifting programs. The second step was to encourage the police force to become truly proactive in combatting crime once the percentage of officers trained in crime prevention increased.

As a regular part of law enforcement duties, the patrolmen began to write crime risk reports when they identified any situation in a residential or commercial area that constituted an especially vulnerable crime target. These crime risk reports were sent to the crime prevention specialists on the force who the next day contacted the citizens who owned the property. In addition, the patrolmen themselves, now trained in crime avoidance techniques, often spoke directly to the property owners to instruct them in safety precautions.

Such a department-wide determination to deter crime was only made possible because of the economical application of resources and training provided by the Texas Crime Prevention Institute. Officer Youngblood asserts, "I think that TCPI is extremely valuable to the law enforcement community. When TCPI came into being, the grant situation was favorable to us to maximize its use for all our people. We made use of every bit that we could."

THE TEXAS CENTER FOR JUVENILE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION

Another major division of the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies at Southwest Texas State University at San Marcos is the Texas Center for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention (TCJDP). Organized and operated similarly to the Texas Crime Prevention Institute, the TCJDP offers training and technical assistance in the areas of juvenile justice and delinquency prevention to a wide range of professionals who work with youth.

Since TCJDP was founded in May 1978, over 5,000 people have taken courses. One measure of the center's success and reputation is that three out of four applicants for training are turned down because of funding and class size limitations. Courses at the center are most often taken by law enforcement officers, detention center personnel, probation officers, school teachers, and youth service workers. Others who have taken classes include

school administrators, judges, and attorneys.

All of the staff instructors have had field experience in their particular area of specialization -- law enforcement, probation, teaching, etc. The center also invites nationally prominent guest lecturers. According to Margaret Dunn, director of the center, "The courses have an emphasis on practical applications. We want people to attend and leave on Friday with information about what they can do differently back at work on Monday. We give them some theoretical background, but it is almost all application."

The TCJDP represents a significant commitment by the state to deal with the particular problems of juvenile crime and juvenile crime prevention. Juvenile crime has long been considered a problem distinct from adult crime for two reasons: first, perhaps as much as 40% of juvenile crime falls into the category of "status offenses," that is, offenses which are crimes only because the perpetrator is a minor, crimes such as truancy, running away, consensual sexual behavior, smoking, drinking, curfew violation, and disobeying parents. Second, even serious juvenile criminals on principle, have generally been considered as candidates for rehabilitation, and judicial dispositions have therefore been oriented toward treatment rather than punishment.

The combination of these two unique aspects of juvenile crime has created a peculiar adjudicative situation. In many parts of the country, a juvenile convicted of a serious crime such as burglary or assault is more likely to be released (in the custody of parents, social workers, probation officers, etc.) than is the juvenile convicted of a status offense such as breaking curfew, or running away from home because status offenses have more clearly mandated punishments.

The TCJDP tries to sort out the issues involved in the treatment of serious and status juvenile offenders and provides models for treatment and educational programs that the professionals attending can implement back in their communities. In addition, the center is concerned with juvenile delinquency prevention. It provides information on how youth workers can identify and respond to youth who show early signs of delinquent behavior. The center also offers courses on how schools, parents, and community groups

can organize activities and protect property to reduce the opportunity for youthful crimes such as vandalism.

THE TAYLOR COUNTY JUVENILE JUSTICE ASSOCIATION

A typical example of the effect of the Texas Center for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention can be seen in the juvenile crime programs in Abilene, Texas. In 1979, after attending courses at TCJDP, Lieutenant Melvin Martin of the Abilene Police Department, along with a local probation officer and the Abilene YMCA, formed the Taylor County Juvenile Justice Association.

At the TCJDP, Lieutenant Martin had learned about other cities' successes in improving criminal justice services and delinquency prevention through the coordination of existing agencies. The Taylor County Juvenile Justice Association was therefore created in order to establish a single network to coordinate the efforts of the childcare agencies with all other professionals in the county. The association has provided a mechanism for childcare professionals in the county to contact and take advantage of the expertise of any other professional or agency when a problem requires additional resources.

Just one of the many outgrowths of the Taylor County Juvenile Justice Association has been the Reassignment School. Again, Lieutenant Martin learned of similar programs in other Texas cities through the TCJDP which he adapted to the needs of Abilene. The Reassignment School is an alternative school for youth who have been suspended from the regular school system for some kind of incorrigible behavior. It is independent of the mainstream educational system, is open five days a week and staffed with a director, a full-time and a part-time teacher and two counselors.

The Reassignment School serves several crucial functions: its existence enables a school to suspend students who are disruptive but does not cut them off entirely from the educational system, and it keeps these youths off the city streets, thus reducing their opportunities for criminal activities. Lieutenant Martin says, "We are not seeing the juvenile crime in the daytime that we had three years ago. We can't put a black-and-white statistic on it, but we can say that we're not seeing anywhere near the juvenile crime that we used to. Overall, our juvenile crime has definitely not decreased,

but in the last couple of years it has increased 2% to 4%. Before that we had been experiencing 20% to 30% increases."

The results of Abilene's juvenile justice project and Garland's crime prevention program show the crucial role that the Institute for Criminal Justice Studies plays throughout the state of Texas.

CRIME STOPPERS IN TEXAS

Another crime control activity being implemented statewide in Texas is the crime stoppers program administered out of the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office. The crime stoppers program is simply a variation of the old wanted poster for informing the public about crimes and offering rewards for information leading to the apprehension of criminals. The crime stoppers approach, however, uses contemporary mass media rather than the bulletin board at the post office.

The first crime stoppers program was originated by Detective Greg MacAlese of the Albuquerque, New Mexico, Police Department in September 1976. The program used the city's local media to inform citizens about crimes being committed, and provided them with a method for anonymously reporting any information they might have about them. Rewards were provided to informants whose tips led to indictments, and the informants' anonymity was scrupulously maintained. In July 1979 New Mexico became the first state to operate a statewide crime stoppers program, and today Greg MacAlese is the executive director of the New Mexico program.

The crime stoppers idea has been repeated widely throughout the country. Crime Stoppers USA, Inc., an advisory organization, estimates that there are now over 320 such programs in forty-two states. Only three states, however, operate statewide versions: New Mexico, Montana, and Texas.

Several major cities in Texas have independently followed the lead of Albuquerque. In January 1982 Prevention Press reported the impact of four projects. The El Paso crime stoppers program had, since November 1978, resulted in 389 cases cleared by arrest, more than $500,000 in stolen property recovered, over $6 million worth of narcotics confiscated, and had paid out about $56,000 to informants. The Austin crime stoppers program had, since October 1979, 445 cases cleared by arrest, $2.2 million worth of stolen property and narcotics recovered, and paid out $30,000 to informants.

Texas

The Dallas crime stoppers program had, since October 1980, 173 cases cleared by arrest, more than $200,000 in stolen property and narcotics seized, and paid out $11,000 to informants. And the Houston crime stoppers program, since January 1981, resulted in 520 cases cleared by arrest, $1.8 million worth of stolen property recovered, $600,000 worth of narcotics confiscated, and $73,000 paid out to informants.

By January 1982 when the statewide crime stoppers program was initiated, there were forty-three local crime stoppers programs in Texas. By the end of 1982, eighty-eight local crime stoppers programs were in operation.

The statewide crime stoppers program was created by legislative act in 1981. It was funded through a state of Texas criminal justice grant, and operated out of the Criminal Justice Division of the Governor's Office. The state program produces television, radio, and print communications on the crime of the month and informs citizens of the toll-free number which can be used to provide information about any crime in the state. In the first year of operation the Texas crime stoppers program has featured burglary, drug trafficking, homicide, driving while intoxicated, vote fraud, auto theft, and arson as crimes of the month.

Fifty-nine of Texas's sixty-nine television stations run the sixty-second crime stoppers spot five times per month during prime time and ten times per month during non-prime time hours. 215 of the state's 419 radio stations run thirty-second spots, in English and/or Spanish, twenty times per month during prime time and ten times per month during non-prime time hours. In addition, seventy-five out of the state's 114 daily newspapers, 199 out of the state's 498 weekly papers, and twenty-five monthly publications run ads featuring the crime of the month.

The state crime stoppers office receives about six calls per day with tips about crimes, and the University of Texas police department takes informant calls between 5:00 p.m. and 8:00 a.m. During the first year of the statewide program, nearly 1,800 tips were received. Ten rewards were paid totaling $56,000 for tips which led to successful indictments. Not all tips leading to indictments require the paying of a reward, because 75% of the informants do not care about them. Rewards are paid for information

that leads to an indictment of a felony crime and they range from $200 to $1,000. A mechanism has been devised to ensure the informants' anonymity even if they receive a reward.

By far, most of the calls to the state crime stoppers program are in relation to drug trafficking. As a result of these calls, about $2.5 million worth of narcotics has been seized in the past year. Citizens have recovered $37,000 worth of stolen property through the state program.

Everyone involved with the state program has been exceedingly pleased with its first year of operation. The program even was able to return $252,000 of its first year's grant, partially because so many informants are not interested in receiving the rewards the program offers. In a time when funds for criminal justice programs all across the country are intensely scrutinized, the Texas crime stoppers program has had no problem convincing the state and the citizens that it is an effective program well worth continued funding.

The record of the Texas crime stoppers program as well as local programs across the country undoubtedly reflects the successful marriage of one traditional and one quite contemporary phenomenon. The traditional role of the informant has long been recognized as the pivotal factor in many, if not most, criminal investigations. The police, who simply cannot physically be on site every time a crime is committed, must rely on information from people who were there. Crime stopper programs aggressively solicit the cooperation of citizens who may know something about the crimes being committed in their communities, and enables citizens to provide assistance to the law enforcement agencies without putting themselves in jeopardy.

The utilization of mass media in the crime stoppers campaign is a particularly contemporary facet of today's lifestyle with its mobile population, large impersonal municipal agencies, and urban isolation. Informants have customarily been part of a network of personal and community relationships based on trust and reciprocal favors. The state crime stoppers program uses mass media as a substitute for the strong personal networks of the past. The neighborhood grapevine becomes the telephone hotline. It is a good example of how the resources and scale of scope government can produce impressive crime control results.

SAFE COMMUNITIES

In The Figgie Report, Part IV eight in-depth case studies examine what five American communities and three states are doing to control crime and improve the citizen safety. In addition to these detailed profiles, we used 1981 Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports, among other sources, to identify a cross-section of some of the safest places in America. We calculated per capita crime rates for all of the cities and towns with populations of 10,000 or more and ranked them in four categories. In total we settled on fifteen examples. They include: Huntington Beach, California; Columbus, Georgia; Madison, Indiana; Glasgow, Kentucky; Marlborough, Massachusetts; Sterling Heights, Michigan; Ridgewood, New Jersey; Belmont, Bronx, New York; Allegheny County, Pennsylvania; Erie, Pennsylvania; McCandless, Pennsylvania; South Fayette, Pennsylvania; Upper St. Clair, Pennsylvania; Brunswick, Ohio; Chesapeake, Virginia.

We then interviewed local leaders in these communities to find out what they believed accounted for the relative safety of their areas. (See Methodology for details of procedures.)

What makes the citizens of a community regard themselves as safe? Why do some police officials feel their local crime situation is under control? What contributes to a public attitude of calm and optimism? What formal and informal social controls have the residents of an area implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, to create a secure environment?

While the causes of crime are manifold, the factors behind a low crime rate seem to be few in number and similar in all of the municipalities we studied, regardless of size. We found eight elements that consistently characterized these localities:

* Improved police methods and procedures where quality of service and innovative techniques are stressed;

* Stability of the community population, especially entailing a lack of lower socio-economic class transience;
* Community cooperation and support of the local police force;
* Neighborhood Watch and other crime prevention programs;
* Active community organizations, especially churches and volunteer groups that sponsor programs geared toward young people;
* Good criminal justice administration, including strict, fair judges and district attorneys and a good court system;
* A history of low unemployment; and
* A small population density within the community.

POLICE PROCEDURES AND METHODS

The factor most often cited by law enforcement officers as contributing to a safe community was improved police methods and procedures.

Chief Roland A. Lakoski of **Chesapeake, Virginia,** attributes his community's safety to the fact that "our officers are hard-working and they are well-trained. I believe in well-trained officers." He also states: "We are computer ized. We study the reports and we assign our officers during the high incidence times according to our computer printouts." Police Chief Clayton Crook, of **Brunswick, Ohio,** seconds Lakoski's belief in well-trained police officers. He claims that Brunswick has "good guys out on the street." And District Attorney Michael Veshecel of **Erie, Pennsylvania,** praises the police force in his community as being "pretty much first rate."

In **Glasgow, Kentucky,** Chief of Police Jimmy Smith credits the hard-working police force with keeping the community safe: "If anybody is going to commit a crime, he knows that this isn't really the place to do it because you are going to get caught."

Reliance on innovative computer-assisted patrol management techniques is also cited by Chief Earle Robitaille of **Huntington Beach, California.** Chief Robitaille says that his community "developed the first computerized

command control system in the United States. It has been replicated by many major cities all over the country." During the summer period when crime in this resort community rises, Robitaille claims that "we can anticipate and project ahead specific kinds of problems. With the computer-based management information system and dispatch system, it gives us the ability to manipulate and analyze an awful lot of data for our own purposes. We can be prepared for the problems that come with a great number of non-residents."

Flexibility and innovation of police procedures is also important as Police Chief Frank Milliken of **Ridgewood, New Jersey**, points out: "I am a great believer in flexibility, and we try to react to what seems to be the current thing. If our larceny goes up, then we would zero in on that. If our burglaries go up, we zero in on that. This is aside from the general overall patrol coverage we give. If we are finding one particular type of malicious mischief in an area or throughout the community, we will zero in on that."

Chief John Kelley of **Upper St. Clair, Pennsylvania**, emphasizes the importance of a strong, visible police force to assure tranquility in the community: "The technique is to have a very strong and active patrol division that has assigned sectors to patrol. We assign patrols permanently so they can pick up the particular habits of the residents within their sector, so that they could almost sense when something is wrong."

Perhaps the words of Chief Patrick McCabe of **McCandless, Pennsylvania**, best summarize sentiments on what makes a community safe. When questioned about the low per capita crime rate in McCandless, McCabe says, "I have to feel that it is our patrol system being highly visible. Good, well-trained police officers, and innovative patrol management techniques that take advantage of computer systems all seem to help officials in keeping these communities safe."

POPULATION STABILITY

The second most frequently mentioned factor that community leaders believe encourage safety is population stability. District Attorney Robert Colville of **Allegheny County, Pennsylvania**, makes this point when he says, "I think it has a great deal to do with the type of people that we have in

this area, more so than anything that we do. Allegheny County does not have the radical transient community found in many other Northeastern cities."

Any influx encountered by the community to date, Colville says, has been of white collar, executive residents. He contrasts this with the experience of other Northeastern cities, which according to him, have absorbed blue collar and unemployed transients to a far greater degree. Colville also reports that the minority community in the Pittsburgh area is extremely stable. Many black families, for example, have lived in the area for five or six generations.

Police Chief Ted Villani of **South Fayette, Pennsylvania,** attributes safety there to the unchanging population mix, the fact that "people living here have roots in the community." He says: "Most of our officers were born and raised in our community. We generally have no problem with identifying anybody."

Captain Thomas P. Cox of **Belmont, the Bronx, New York,** echoes this sentiment. He says that people in Belmont are "kept here by strong family ties and relations." Police Chief Alan Nalepa of **Sterling Heights, Michigan,** refers to the permanence of the local population calling them "full-time residents." He links this to the low per capita crime rate in Sterling Heights.

District Attorney Michael Veshecel says of Erie, Pennsylvania: "The kids stay here after their education is completed. People enjoy living here." He thinks that this population, taking root, enhances the community's stability and is a major reason why Erie continues to be a safe place in which to reside.

The relationship between transience and crime is asserted by **Marlborough, Massachusetts,** Chief of Police Floyd Russell. In his community, extensive land development is underway, mostly in the form of apartments. Chief Russell believes this situation will lead to a rise in the transient population and ultimately to an increase in crime.

Brunswick, Ohio's Chief of Police Clayton Crook also comments on the problem of transience. Brunswick is situated near a major thoroughfare that comes out of Cleveland. According to Crook, a lot of the crime committed on his beat during the past two years has its origins in Cleveland. He says:

"Burglars, thieves, and other perpetrators come down from the city and hit the smaller communities such as Brunswick which are conveniently located near the main thoroughfare."

Concerning Huntington Beach, California, Chief of Police Earle Robitaille, speaking about the outsiders that his community's extensive beaches attract, claims that the transient problem is critical. He says that "eighty-five percent of all the arrests in the community are of outsiders."

The obvious lack of social ties that these visitors have to Huntington Beach seems to foster criminal tendencies, as these individuals have little concern or respect for the local townspeople and their property. Likewise, Erie, Pennsylvania, is also a resort community, and suffers an increase in crime during the summer months when its location on Lake Erie attracts strangers.

Permanence and stability in a community, as well as homogeneity of the population, is widely believed to further safety. Homogeneity does not necessarily mean a community's population need be of one racial or ethnic source but rather that bonds of longstanding common experience and family ties exist within that resident population.

CITIZEN SUPPORT FOR THE POLICE

A good relationship between the citizens of a community and the local police force is another important element contributing to safe communities. In South Fayette, Pennsylvania, Chief Ted Villani commends the "positive attitudes towards the law enforcement officials" that the citizens have. In Sterling Heights, Michigan, Police Chief Alan Nalepa describes the community as being "very supportive." He says there is "excellent cooperation between the citizens and the law enforcement authorities."

Captain Thomas P. Cox of Belmont, the Bronx, New York described the police force as being very close to its community's, political, youth, educational and church groups. He says that they are all "very intertwined and coordinated with the police department." And Chief Jerry Sachlaben of Madison, Indiana, claims that residents in his community are "very likely to report crimes if they see it."

When questioned about private citizen support and cooperation in relation to the police in Brunswick, Ohio, Chief of Police Clayton Crook responded: "We have the type of citizens who are concerned when they see something going on that they think is suspicious; they certainly don't hesitate to call us. I think this is very helpful in keeping the crime rate at a respectable level, if you could call any level respectable." Chief Crook says that many citizens of Brunswick moved there from Cleveland to flee its urban crime. Since "they came from high crime areas, they are very willing to help the police."

Chief Roland A. Lakoski of Chesapeake, Virginia, directly links safety in his locality to the cooperation of its residents. He describes the people in the community as "very positive. I am sure the low crime rate has been affected by their concern and their genuine interest in the city." Here again we see another example of the importance of a stable population that has a stake in the preservation of its neighborhoods.

In Glasgow, Kentucky, "If anybody knows anything or thinks that they have seen anything, the police have good cooperation. They give them the information. They will call and say I have seen something," according to Chief of Police, Jimmy Smith.

District Attorney Bill Smith of **Columbus, Georgia**, refers to his community as part of the "Bible Belt." The citizens of Columbus are "law-and-order oriented and believe in swift and severe punishment for those who are guilty of crime." He says this keeps the community safe.

Only two of our interviews with crime prevention officials in our designated safe communities produced negative responses when questioned about the subject of citizen cooperation and support of police officers. In Ridgewood, New Jersey, Police Chief Frank Milliken has noticed a decline in the level of of citizen concern after the community implemented a Crime Prevention Program. Since the program has been in effect for some time, citizens are beginning to ignore the importance of reporting suspicious occurrences. And Allegheny County District Attorney Robert Colville says that "people are just fearful of becoming involved."

Despite these few exceptions, there is a strong case for linking safety with citizen cooperation. If individual cooperation is not at an ideal

level in such places as Ridgewood or Allegheny County, other factors like population stability and strong informal social controls probably contribute to their relative safety, offsetting the significance of a formal police-community alliance.

NEIGHBORHOOD WATCH/CRIME PREVENTION PROGRAMS

The law enforcement leaders also cited the importance of a Neighborhood Watch or other prevention program in deterring crime and fostering safety within communities. Chief of Police Alan Nalepa of Sterling Heights, Michigan, believes that "crime prevention programs certainly do address themselves to the alleviation of incidents of crime. They make people aware of protecting themselves and protecting their property." Bronx police captain Thomas Cox agrees, saying that crime prevention programs, especially "target-hardening," have a "strong impact on crime." He says that you have to have "good windows, good locks and, if need be, a good alarm system if your premises are a likely target for a burglary."

In Marlborough, Massachusetts, a crime prevention officer conducts meetings and speaks with citizens who are interested in learning new methods of securing their homes. Although the city of Brunswick, Ohio, has not implemented a crime watch program per se, police officers give crime prevention talks before various civic groups and the police force tries to encourage active crime deterrence among the citizens. According to Chief of Police Clayton Crook, "every officer has been schooled and is knowledgeable in crime prevention."

The crime reduction effort in Chesapeake, Virginia, is responsible for Neighborhood Watch programs throughout the city. Officers from the police force inspect businesses and homes in the community and make recommendations to citizens on how they can prevent crimes. District Attorney Roland Lakoski describes the community as "very receptive" to the program.

Huntington Beach, California, according to Chief of Police Earle Robitaille, has a very active Neighborhood Watch group: "For the last nine years we've had the biggest and most active neighborhood watch organization that I am aware of in this area. I think we have something like 14,000 active participants in the community." Robitaille claims that the low burglary rate in the city is attributable to the program: "I know for a

fact that since we have started our concentration on burglary with the Neighborhood Watch organization, it has been a major factor in reducing crime."

Chief John Kelley of Upper St. Clair, Pennsylvania, says that his community's police department stresses the personal aspect of crime prevention and victim assistance. They have instituted a formal plan of neighborhood surveillance called the Friendly Neighbor program. After a crime has been committed, the victim is kept informed of developments in the investigation on a regular basis. This serves to involve the victim and to show that the criminal justice system is really working his behalf. Most important, the project also encourages victims to take crime prevention precautions in the future.

A similar program has been implemented in McCandless, Pennsylvania, according to Chief of Police Patrick McCabe, known as Block for the Youth. Citizens offer their support in keeping any eye on local school children who may run into trouble going to and from school.

According to Police Chief Frank Milliken, Ridgewood, New Jersey's active crime reduction effort has significantly reduced the number of break-ins and entries. Milliken gives the credit to the police department's active deterrence programs. The result: "The crime prevention bureau was increased substantially; it used to be a two-man operation."

ACTIVE COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS

Committed community groups such as churches and voluntary organizations that support social activities and programs aimed at uniting local residents are important contributors to neighborhood safety. The majority of officials interviewed in these safe communities stated clearly the importance of this factor.

Thomas Cox, from Belmont, in the Bronx, New York, describes the local church as "very active". In Belmont, we have the reverse of all the factors that criminologists say lead to crime." Likewise, Marlborough, Massachusetts, is characterized as a "church-going community" by Police Chief Floyd Russell. And Glasgow, Kentucky's chief of police Jimmy Smith, describes his area as a "good church-going town." District Attorney

Colville of Allegheny County similarly attested to the church-going nature of his community.

Recreational and sports programs directed by the church are often cited as deterrents to crime in these communities. Keeping people occupied, especially youths, while simultaneously instilling a code of ethics decreases the likelihood of people becoming involved in crime. Whether church-sponsored or not, a majority of the safe communities we approached cited major recreation programs and facilities within their areas. For instance, Sterling Heights, Michigan, was said by Chief Alan Nalepa to have a "good recreational program" which is complemented by a good parks system that provides citizens with leisure pastimes and enhances the quality of life in the community. Most of the other safe communities also reported extensive recreational facilities and strong community group and agency support of social programs.

TOUGH JUDGES AND DISTRICT ATTORNEYS

Although a few of the crime prevention officials interviewed describe judges in their communities as lenient, the majority claim to have strict judges which they believe help to deter crime and make their communities safe. Chief of Police Floyd Russell of Marlborough, Massachusetts, views judges in his community as being "very strict." The "good judicial system" in Madison, Indiana, is cited by Chief of Police Jerry Sachlaben as a crucial factor in maintaining this community's low crime rate.

Chief Lakoski of Chesapeake, Virginia, characterizes the judges in his community as "tough, much tougher than other judges." Lakoski describes his town as a place where an offender would not want to be caught, and he feels that the "tougher sentencing of judges and tougher treatment by the jury" generally curtails crime in the area.

In Erie, Pennsylvania, a similar situation exists. In this community crime is low, according to District Attorney Michael Veshecel, because "penalties here are relatively stiff." And in Glasgow, Kentucky, Chief of Police Jimmy Smith attributes the effective prevention of crime in part to a court system which is "pretty strict."

Safe Communities

Overall, the interviews reveal that strict judges and district attorneys, and a good court system are believed to have the effect of discouraging disruptions within the communities surveyed.

LOW UNEMPLOYMENT AND LOW POPULATION DENSITY

Opportunities for employment and low population density within the community were cited by a few of the crime prevention officials interviewed as being important factors in controlling crime and promoting safety. Economically depressed areas are commonly associated with high crime rates. Affording people the opportunity to support themselves seems to be a crucial factor in producing safe communities. While several of the leaders interviewed expressed concern about the rising national unemployment rate and recent lay-offs in their particular areas, none say that their area currently suffers from extraordinarily high rates of unemployment.

High population densities within the community also appear to be linked to crime, according to many of those interviewed. Many of the safe communities were described as "rural" or of "low population density" and this probably accounts for, in part, their low per capita crime rates.

CRIME PREVENTION IN URBAN CENTERS LIKE NEW YORK

Many of the characteristics cited as integral to safe communities would be impossible to achieve in most major metropolitan areas. Yet the example of Detroit's successful crime prevention program shows that not all of these factors are necessary to achieve improved community security. For instance, New York as a whole ranks second nationally in per capita crime among cities with more than 1,000,000 inhabitants. However, in each of its boroughs effective crime prevention programs have produced local islands of comparative safety.

In the Kingsbridge/Marble Hill section of the Bronx, the Interfaith Civilian Patrol was started by several local clergymen in response to acts of vandalism to houses of worship. The ICP works independently of, but in cooperation with, the police department. Patrol members are trained in observation and reporting techniques and work out of base stations and mobile patrols.

Brooklyn's neighborhood crime prevention projects, conducted in cooperation with the Midwood-Kings Redevelopment Corporation, have expanded local citizen surveillance activities into programs like Operation Interface. This project brings together forty different civilian patrols in the Flatbush-Midwood section of Brooklyn on one radio frequency, making it less likely for a criminal to escape civilian and police detection.

In Queens, the Jamaica Safety Coalition has worked with other local government and neighborhood organizations to provide crime prevention and victim assistance services to senior citizens in over 250 block associations.

Manhattan, too, has its local crime prevention efforts. The rather affluent and densely-populated Upper East Side instituted the Lenox Hill Neighborhood Association, which provides a wide range of community and youth activities as well as crime prevention activities.

The North Shore Anti-Crime program of Staten Island has had recognized success in dealing with the crime problem of an area of Staten Island suffering from residential and commercial deterioration.

The city police also work with an Auxiliary Police force. New York City's nearly 8,000 Auxiliary Police are uniformed, trained men and women who carry radios, who do not carry guns, and who greatly enhance the police department's patrol capacity. Since their uniforms are virtually indistinguishable from those of sworn officers, they have acted as an effective, visible deterrent to crime. In one area alone, that of Prospect Park in Brooklyn, reported felony crimes decreased 55% after the introduction of regular auxiliary patrols.

THE GOALS OF CRIME PREVENTION

The crime control activities observed in the case study sites for The Figgie Report, Part IV clearly exemplify the major features associated with safe communities. However, the survey also reveals that improved police methods combined with a stable resident population supportive of its law enforcement agencies are the characteristics most likely to coincide with low crime rates and a community perception of safety.

Safe Communities

In the final analysis, safe communities are those in which the people and their government agencies have common values and common goals which they take active steps to preserve.

CONCLUSION

The Figgie Report, Part IV: Reducing Crime in America -- Successful Community Efforts profiles eight state and local crime prevention efforts mentioned most frequently and enthusiastically by more than 100 criminal justice experts nationwide. Apart from individual suggestions as to specific successful programs, a unifying trend emerges from the interviews, revealing a new optimism among the public that solutions can be found to reduce crime. However, the "solutions" recounted do not lie solely in providing increased funds to deal with the problem. More police, more courts, more prisons, more guns will not in themselves lower crime to acceptable levels.

According to these professionals, the crucial components in any effort to reduce crime are the active involvement of community organizations and residents; a rethinking of the role of law enforcement agents; and greater cooperation among citizens, police officials and city administrators. Individuals must draw on their criminal justice system for support, but they must also do their share.

Every case study in the report demonstrates the effectiveness of community support of local law enforcement endeavors. At the same time, each case study also shows the importance of a law enforcement agency's willingness to encourage local residents' involvement. This creates a dual edge to crime curtailment efforts: first, eliminating the opportunities to commit a crime and second, increasing the likelihood of apprehension should a crime occur.

Although actions springing from the community itself, such as opportunity reduction, increased police patrol efficiency, youth projects, and victim/witness assistance, will not eliminate crime, they do seem to have a demonstrable positive impact. Equally important, the enthusiasm and optimism generated when individual citizens unite in even moderately

successful programs seem also to reduce the fear of crime, which Part I of The Figgie Report showed adversely affects more than ninety million Americans.

This report finds that whatever a neighborhood does to create a sense of community will improve local crime prevention, no matter if it is Jerome, Illinois, a town of 1,700, or the boroughs of New York, a city of nearly eight million. However, when these efforts are instituted in conjunction with improved police procedures, they bring together the best of the deterrence and social justice perspectives on crime control.

All of the case studies examined here provide ideas for those in other communities with similar problems on how to implement successfully a crime prevention program. They portend a future in which more individuals will be able to avoid criminal victimization, and in which a national optimism about the ability to deal with crime problems effectively through cooperation between law enforcement agencies and the public will spread across the country.

APPENDIXES

METHODOLOGY

CASE STUDIES

The Figgie Report, Part IV: Reducing Crime in America -- Successful Community Efforts has, in a sense, been a Research & Forecasts, Inc. project since work first began on Part I: America Afraid (1979). Over these five years, the research team collected materials, reviewed literature, and conducted interviews with a wide variety of individuals concerned with the criminal justice system on their responses to the problem of crime in America. The Figgie Report, Part II: The Corporate Response was our first effort to present our findings regarding responses to crime.

In the spring of 1982, the research team intensified its effort in this area and contacted representatives from all fifty states about crime control activities. We also spoke to people in agencies of the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and several private and university research groups for information about the current philosophy and practice of crime control. The purpose of this data gathering was to determine the kinds of activities currently aimed at controlling crime.

We then sought two additional kinds of information: a reliable statistical measure showing reduced (or increasing at less than the national average) crime rates for particular municipalities over at least the last five years, and/or a comprehensive national list of anti-crime activities.

Neither currently exists, we found. The inadequacy of national statistics (the FBI Uniform Crime Reports and the U.S. Census Bureau National Victimization Surveys) for trend analysis of crime in particular communities has been a long-standing problem for crime research. Local anomalies in reporting procedures, changes in reporting procedures over the past decade, and other problems led us to decide that we could not confidently use these statistics to identify trends in declining crime rates.

Nor did we find any appropriate catalogue of anti-crime programs. Several organizations are currently working toward producing just such a comprehensive information base (notably, the National Center for Community Anti-Crime Programs in Norfolk, Virginia), but nothing to meet our needs currently exists.

Lacking reliable sources of nationwide information regarding areas with reduced crime rates or regarding anti-crime activities, the research team decided to conduct a survey of experts in the field to determine if there were any consensus regarding 1) types of activities widely considered effective in reducing crime, and 2) the identification of states and municipalities with exemplary crime control activities.

The experts interviewed were chosen by a snowball reputational sampling method starting from three bases:

1. A list of directors of state crime prevention associations provided by the National Criminal Justice Association.

2. A list of directors of state anti-crime agencies provided by the National Criminal Justice Association.

These first two lists consisted of at least one name in every state and in Guam, the U.S. Virgin Islands, and Puerto Rico. The people listed were police officers and administrators, senior administrators in public safety departments, and officials in state departments of justice.

3. A list of contacts and advisors who had assisted the Research & Forecasts staff over the past five years during the preparation of the first three parts of The Figgie Report.

This third list consisted of university and private foundation researchers, state legislators, researchers in the Department of Justice and the FBI, and police administrators and statisticians from major metropolitan forces around the country.

Interviewees were asked if there were anyone else we should talk to who would have a national perspective on crime control, and by such referrals we

expanded our list of contacts. The bulk of the over 100 interviews were completed between April 5 and April 30, 1982. The interviews were open-ended and wide-ranging, and notes and tapes of the interviews were afterward carefully analyzed and coded.

The results of these interviews showed a strong consensus that opportunity reduction crime prevention activities were widely considered to be the most popular and believed to be the most effective crime control activities today.

When, early on during the interviewing, a pattern evolved in the responses showing no significant number of mentions of policing techniques, parole programs, corrections, etc., we began asking respondents specifically about such activities. We also called back earlier respondents to get their opinions of these activities in regard to crime control. Their responses were nearly unanimous -- no activity or program in any of these traditional areas of enforcement and corrections had their confidence to the same extent as did opportunity reduction crime prevention activities. These other activities were judged more or less effective in dealing with criminals -- arrest rates, recidivism, etc. -- but none was cited with assurance as today making a significant impact on the overall incidence of crime.

Many of the respondents said that more research, experimentation and aggressive implementation in these traditional areas of crime control were, of course, needed, but there was no significant trend in these areas widely considered to have a positive impact on the incidence of crime. Opportunity reduction activities, however, were most often considered effective in reducing the incidence of street crimes and other crime of opportunity. Two significant exceptions to this pattern arose: Project New Pride in Denver, Colorado and the ICAP program as implemented in the Jacksonville, Florida Sheriff's Office were repeatedly cited as effective efforts.

The results of this survey showing a consensus that opportunity reduction programs are most effective in preventing crime is corroborated by the journalists from around the country who wrote the case studies for The Figgie Report, Part III: A Fourteen-City Profile (1982). Those case studies indicated a strong interest and support for opportunity reduction programs, especially those programs entailing citizen involvement.

Methodology

The diversity of respondents and the frequency of responses indicating that opportunity reduction programs were the most effective crime control activities led us to focus our research and the report in this area. The sites for our case studies were selected then by at least two of three criteria:

1. The site had to be one of those mentioned frequently by the respondents.
2. The site should illustrate specific activities frequently mentioned as being effective in general.
3. The set of sites as a whole should reflect the diversity of types of crime prevention activities noted as being effective, and the demographic diversity of the United States.

First, the number of mentions of various sites mentioned by the experts during the interviews was tallied. The following states and municipalities, in the following categories, were most often mentioned by the experts:

States

California

Texas

Pennsylvania

Municipalities or Local Programs

Urban

Detroit, Michigan

Seattle, Washington

Hartford, Connecticut

Small City/Rural

Charlotte, North Carolina

Port Smith, Virginia

Sangamon County/Springfield, Illinois

Youth Programs

Denver, Colorado

Syracuse, New York

Police Experiments/Programs
Kansas City, Missouri
Jacksonville, Florida

Grass-Roots Community Organizations
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Chicago, Illinois

The case study sites of this report were selected from this list based on the attempt to represent the demographic and geographic variety of the nation, based on the availability of information, and based on recommendations from the project's outside advisory board.

After the selection of the case study sites, the research proceeded through three stages: 1) A preliminary review of the existing literature and evaluations of the programs followed by initial telephone contacts with program administrators; 2) On-site interviews with program administrators and participants and local officials familiar with the programs; 3) Follow-up phone interviews with previously contacted respondents and interviews with experts in national organizations most likely to be familiar with the case-study subjects.

SAFE COMMUNITIES

As part of our background research for The Figgie Report, Part IV, we were interested in profiling the factors that consistently characterize a safe American community. We reviewed a variety of studies and recent rankings of American cities by crime and safety factors.

We also compiled our own list of relatively safe municipalities in the U.S. using the 1981 FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics from Table 5, "Number of Offenses Known to the Police, Cities and Towns 10,000 and Over in Population, 1981." We calculated per capita crime rate figures for each of the over 5,000 reporting municipalities in Table 5 using the Crime Index Total and the population figure, and then ranked them from lowest to highest in per capita crime rate.

We also categorized the cities and towns into four population groups: 10,000 to 24,000; 25,000 to 99,000; 100,000 to 999,999, and 1,000,000 or more. We ranked the municipalities within each population category from the

lowest to the highest in per capita crime rates.

To ensure that crime reporting irregularities of various kinds were not deceptively, though unintentionally, indicating a low crime rate when it was not the case, we called the police departments in the ten communities with the lowest per capita crime rates in each population category to see if there were overlapping reporting areas or any other factors which might make the reported rates misleading. When we were convinced that our crime rate statistics on the specific areas were as reliable as any currently available, we then went on to conduct a series of interviews with police chiefs, district attorneys, sheriffs, and municipal leaders in the safest American communities in 1981 according to our calculations.

Our purpose in this part of the research was not to identify, analyze or evaluate these safe communities for their own sake, but to combine the information we received from them with our background investigations in order to formulate a succinct profile of "naturally" safe American communities to compare to the communities that are not as safe but that are making aggressive efforts to improve their safety.

Given the controversial nature of crime statistics, we are not making public the exact rankings of the communities. In the long run, doing so would not be productive, since one year's statistics could not with confidence be used to assert that certain locations are likely to continue to be safe in the near future. The communities cited, however, were among the ten with the lowest per capita crime rates in their population categories according to our calculations.

We also identified safe places by consulting the reference work, Places Rate Almanac (by Richard Boyer and David Savageau, Rand McNally and Company, 1981) which ranks the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas according to 1980 FBI Uniform Crime Report statistics. We also reviewed the June 1982 New York City Police Department's Statistical Report: Complaints and Arrests to identify relatively safe neighborhoods in New York City.

After identifying to our satisfaction a group of safe American communities, we then conducted open-ended interviews with one to three municipal leaders in each of the areas. The interviewers told the interviewees about our calculations identifying their community as among the

safest, and then they were asked why they thought their community was relatively safe. If the respondent was not forthcoming in the open-ended interview situation, the interviewer used an questionnaire-guide based on the FBI's list of "Crime Factors" (FBI Uniform Crime Report, 1981, page v) in order to elicit further comments about why the community was safe.

Transcripts of these interviews were carefully analyzed and coded to determine which factors were mentioned most frequently by the respondents.

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